Category

(Greek kategoría, accusation, attribution)

The term was transferred by Aristotle from its forensic meaning (procedure in

legal accusation) to its logical use as attribution of a subject. The Latin

equivalent, prædicamentum, given it by Boethius, aptly suggests its technical

significance. The categories or predicaments are the most widely generic

classes or groups of predicates applicable to an individual Subject--summa

genera prædicatorum. Whether Aristotle originally intended them as aspects and

divisions of words, of ideas, or of things is a debated question. Nevertheless they

lend themselves readily to each of these subjects. They are divisions:

of Ideas in as much as they are the widest generalizations under which all

other more restricted ideas may be subsumed;

of words in that they are the oral terms answering to those supreme

notions;

of things in the sense that they are aspects which the mind abstracts

from the objects falling under experience.

In the first acceptation they belong to logic, where they stand as the ultimate

classification of strictly universal ideas; in the second to grammar, where they

represent the parts of speech; in the third to ontology, where they are the

ultimate classes of real (finite) being. In this latter sense they will be here

considered.

Since it is the business of philosophy to reduce the world of real beings--the self

included--to its simplest terms or aspects and their orderly relations, the task of

discovering and defining the corresponding categories has been attempted by

every philosopher of note. The results, however, have been by no means

identical. Thus we find the Indian sage, Kanada, the reputed founder of the

Vaiseshika philosophy, reducing all things to substance, quality, action,

generality particularity, co-inherence, and non-existence, while the Greek

(supposed) author of the word philosophy, Pythagoras, discovers twenty ultimate

groups, ten of which he calls good and the opposite ten bad. Plato in turn

subsumes all things under being, identity, diversity, change. In modern times

Descartes and Leibniz arranged seven categories: mind (spirit), matter (body),

measure, shape, rest, motion, position, while Kant, basing his division on the

varieties of judgment, invented twelve categories or forms under which he makes

the intellect (Verstand) judge of all objects of experience. Aristotle's classification

of ten categories which was taken up into Scholasticism, and still holds its place

in the logic and ontology of Catholic philosophy, is thus set forth in the fourth

chapter of the "Organon":

of things in-complex enunciated (i.e. simple predicates), each

signifies either substance or quantity or quality or relation or where

(place) or when (time) or position or possession or action or

passion. But substance is to speak generally as 'man', 'horse';

quantity as 'two' or 'three cubits'; quality as 'white'; relation as

'greater'; where as 'in the Forum'; when as 'yesterday'; position as

'he sits'; possession as 'he is shod '; action as 'he cuts '; passion

as 'he burns'.

Of these groups substance, quantity, quality and relation are obviously the

principal; the remaining six are reducible to some form of relation, for it should be

noted that between some of the categories a real distinction is not required; a

virtual, i.e. an objectively founded mental distinction suffices, as, e.g., between

action and passion. The object or thing divided into the categories is:

(a) real being i.e. not the mere being expressed by the copulative verb

(ens copulæ); nor conceptual being (entia rationis); nor, at least according

to many Aristoteleans, being as explicitly actual (ens participium); but

substantive or essential being--reality--the object matter of ontology (ens

essential non ens existentæ);

(b) being per se, i.e. being having an essential not merely accidental

unity--such as an artificial or a random construction (ens per se, non per

accidens), or concrete adjectives which include a subject;

(c) complete being, not the abstract differentiæ or the parts of things;

(d) finite being; the Infinite of course transcends all categories. Though the

privilege of categorization is thus limited, a method has been devised

whereby accommodation may be secured for any (finite) reality

whatsoever.

For (a) some beings enter a category directly (in linea recta), as do genera,

species, and individuals; (b) others indirectly (a latere), as do specific and

individual differentiæ; or (c) others come in by reduction as do the parts of things

and things having only an accidental unity (entia per accidens), and even, by

analogy, mental fictions (entia rationis). Thus for instance family and hand are

reduced to the category of substance; intensity of heat to quality; a point to

quantity and so on. It should be noted, however, that being itself as such (ens

transcendentale) cannot be confined to a category since it is not a univocal, but

only an analogous attribute of the supreme divisions of reality (e.g. substance

and accident), and is not therefore a genus as is each category. For the same

reason accident is not a genus by itself under which the nine classes mentioned

above are subsumed as species. If the foregoing restrictions are taken into

account it will be found that the Aristotelean classification answers its

purpose--the simplification of the world of finite reality for the sake of

investigation--and that on the whole no more workable scheme has thus far been

devised.

F. P Siegfried

Transcribed by Rick McCarty

The Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume III

Nihil Obstat, November 1, 1908. Remy Lafort, S.T.D., Censor

Imprimatur. +John Cardinal Farley, Archbishop of New York

The Catholic Encyclopedia: NewAdvent.org