Cosmology

ORIGIN OF COSMOLOGY

METHOD

DIVISION OF COSMOLOGY

The first cause of the material universe

The constituent causes of the world

The final cause of the material universe

From its Greek etymology (kósmos world; lógos, knowledge or science) the

word cosmology means the science of the world. It ought, therefore, to include in

its scope the study of the whole material universe: that is to say, of inorganic

substances, of plants, of animals, and of man himself. But, as a matter of fact,

the wide range indicated by the etymology of the word has been narrowed in the

actual meaning. In our day cosmology is a branch of philosophical study, and

therefore excludes from its investigation whatever forms the object of the natural

sciences. While the sciences of physics and biology seek the proximate causes

of corporal phenomena, the laws that govern them, and the wonderful harmony

resulting therefrom, cosmology aims to discover the deeper and remoter causes

which neither observation nor experiment immediately reveals. This special

purpose restricts in many ways the field of cosmology. There is another limitation

not less important. Man's unique position in the universe makes him the object of

a special philosophical study, viz. psychology, or anthropology; and, in

consequence, that portion of the corporeal world with which these sciences deal

has been cut off from the domain of cosmology properly so called.

There is a tendency at present to restrict the field still further; and limit it to what

is known as inorganic creation. Psychology being by its very definition the study

of human fife considered in its first principle and in the totality of its phenomena,

its investigations ought to comprise, it would seem, the threefold life of man,

vegetative, animal, and rational. And, indeed, the inter-dependence of these three

lives in the one living human being appears to justify the enlargement demanded

nowadays by many authors of note for the psychological field. Hence for those

who accept this view, cosmology has nothing to do with organic life but is

reduced to "a philosophical study of the inorganic world". Such, in our opinion, is

the best definition that can be given. At the same time it should be remarked that

many philosophers still favour a broader definition, which would include not only

the mineral kingdom but also living things considered in a general way. In

German-speaking countries cosmology, as a rule, is known as Naturphilosophie,

i.e. philosophy of nature.

Under this name, philosophers usually understand a study of the universe along

the lines of one of the foregoing definitions. Scientists, on the other hand, give a

more scientific turn to this philosophy of nature, transforming it into a sort of

general physics with an occasional excursion into the realm of sensitive and

intellectual life. A notable instance is the work of Prof. Ostwald, "Vorlesungen

über Naturphilosophie" (Leipzig, 1902).

ORIGIN OF COSMOLOGY

The word itself is of recent origin. It was first used by Wolff when, in 1730, he

entitled one of his works "Cosmologia Generalis" (Frankfort and Leipzig). In this

treatise the author studies especially the laws of motion, the relations that exist

among things in nature, the contingency of the universe, the harmony of nature,

the necessity of postulating a God to explain the origin of the cosmos and its

manifestation of purpose. Because of the advance the natural sciences were then

making, Wolff omitted from his philosophic study of nature the purely scientific

portion which till then had been closely allied with it. The cosmology of the

ancients and especially of Aristotle was simply a branch of physics. The

"Physics" of Aristotle treats of corporeal beings in as far as they are subject to

motion. The work is divided into two parts:

General physics, which embraces the general principles governing

corporeal being. It treats of local motion and its various kinds; the origin of

substantial compounds; changes in quality; changes in quantity by

increase and decrease; and changes arising from motion in place, on

which Aristotle hinges our notions of the infinite, of time, and of space.

Special physics which deals with the various classes of beings: terrestrial

bodies, celestial bodies, and man.

It is the first part of this work that comes nearest to what we mean by

cosmology. The Schoolmen of the Middle Ages, as a rule, follow the path

marked out for them by Aristotle. Cosmological subjects, properly so called,

have no reserved place in philosophical study, and are generally treated as a part

of physics. In our own time, philosophers employ the words "cosmology" and

"philosophy of nature" to designate the philosophic study of the corporeal world.

METHOD

Cosmology is the natural complement of the special sciences. It begins where

they leave off, and its domain is quite distinct from theirs. The scientist

determines the immediate cause of the phenomena observed in the mineral or

the organic world: he formulates their laws, and builds these into a synthesis

with the help of certain general theories, such as those of light, of heat, and of

electricity. The cosmologist, on the other hand, seeks the ultimate causes, not

off this or that class of beings or of phenomena, but of the whole material

universe. He inquires into the constituent nature of corporeal beings, their

destiny, and their first cause. It is clear that these larger problems are quite

beyond the range and purpose of the various sciences, each of which is by its

method confined to its own particular subject. Nevertheless, cosmology must

borrow, and borrow largely, from the data of science, since the causes which it

studies are not directly perceptible; they can be known only through phenomena

which are their more or less faithful manifestations. It is on these that cosmology

must rest in order to pass upward from cause to cause till the ultimate cause is

reached. Since, then, it is the role of the natural sciences to analyze and classify

the properties and phenomena of nature, cosmology is obliged to draw very freely

upon those sciences and to neglect none of their definitive results. In a word, the

cosmological method is essentially a posteriori. Descartes and his school

followed a different, even an opposite, course. Being a mathematician above all

else, he applies to cosmology the principles of mathematics, and as

mathematics sets out from the simplest propositions and travels along the road

of deduction to the most complex truths, so Descartes, starting from extension

as the primordial and universal property of matter, in fact its very essence, ends

by ascribing to all bodies in nature whatever extension implies and by eliminating

from them whatever it excludes. This a priori method, being essentially deductive

is anti-scientific; and is based, moreover, on a false supposition, since extension

is only one of the many properties of matter, not its essence. As Leibniz pointed

out, extension presupposes something extended, just as a repetition

presupposes something to be repeated. Philosophers, therefore, have almost

entirely abandoned this method; with the exception perhaps of the Idealistic

Pantheists of whom we shall speak presently.

DIVISION OF COSMOLOGY

Cosmology, as most philosophers understand it, has a threefold problem to

solve: Whence this corporeal world? What is it? Why is it? Hence its three parts,

concerned respectively with

the primordial efficient cause of the cosmos;

its actual constituent causes;

its final cause.

The first cause of the material universe

Geology, go back as it may and as far as it may in the scientific history of the

earth, must ever remain face to face with a fact that calls for explanation, viz. the

existence of matter itself. Even if it could decisively prove Laplace's hypothesis,

according to which all portions of this universe, earth, sun, and the whole stellar

system, originally made up a single nebular class, there would still remain the

very reasonable question, whence came this mass and what was its origin? Now

this is precisely the question cosmology asks; and in seeking the answer it has

riven rise to many systems which can always be brought under one of the

following headings:

(a) Monism;

(b) the theory of Transitive Emanation;

(c) Creationism.

(a) Monism

The Monist theory is that all beings in the world are but one and the same

necessary and eternal substance having within itself the sufficient reason of its

existence; while the seeming diversity of things and their attributes, are but the

various manifestations and evolutions of this single substance. Pantheism

identifies the world with the Divine Being. This Being is ceaselessly in process of

evolution; which, however, in no wise disturbs the universal identity of things. The

Pantheist is either an Idealist or a Realist according to the view he takes of the

nature and character of the original substance. If that substance is real he is

styled a Realist, and such were Erigena, Amalric, David of Dinant, Giordano

Bruno, and Spinoza. But if the original substance is something ideal, e.g. the

Ego, the Absolute, the Concept, he is styled an idealist, and such were Hegel,

Schelling, and Fichte. Kraus and Tiberghien support the Pantheistic view: God is

in the world and the world is in God, although they are not identical.

Schopenhauer devised a form of Pantheism which is known as Panthelism.

According to his view the motive force of the whole universe is a single blind will.

Hartmann goes a step farther and says the world is but the constant evolution of

the unconscious: hence the name Panhylism. Modern Materialists, such as

Büchner, Häckel, Baruch, as well as the old Greek Atomists, Leucippus,

Democritus, and Epicurus, consider all the activities of the universe as so many

purely material phenomena arising from one necessary and eternal substance.

Lastly, according to the supporters of the Immanent Emanation theory, the Divine

Being develops within itself so that it is continually identifying itself with the

beings it evolves, or that come forth from it, just as the grub maintains its

substantial identity throughout its transformation into chrysalis and butterfly. It is

clear that such a theory hardly differs from Pantheism

(b) Transitive Emanation

In the Transitive Emanation theory all beings issue from the Divine Substance

much in the same way as new fruits appear on the parent tree without changing

its substance and without diminishing its productive power.

(c) Creationism

Creationism is the view held by the generality of spiritualistic philosophers. The

universe through its endless transformations reveals its contingency: that is to

say, its existence is not a necessity: therefore it must have received its

existence from some other being. This first cause must be a necessary and

independent one, unless we admit an infinite series of dependent causes and so

leave unsolved the problem of the world's existence. God has, therefore, drawn all

things from nothingness by the free act of His Almighty Will; in a word, He has

made them out of nothing, since any other explanation, e.g. Emanationism,

which implies a real intrinsic change in God, is incompatible with the

immutability, necessity, and absolute perfection of the Divine Being.

The constituent causes of the world

The composition of corporeal beings is also the subject of much discussion.

There are actually four systems of note, each promising to solve this delicate

problem: Mechanism; Hylomorphism (the Scholastic system); Dynamic

Atomism; and Dynamism proper.

(a) Mechanism

The characteristic tendency of Mechanism, i.e. of the mechanical theory, is to

disregard all qualitative difference in natural phenomena and to emphasize their

quantitative differences. That is to say, in this system the constituent matter of

all corporeal beings is everywhere the same and is essentially homogeneous; all

the forces animating it are of the same nature; they are simply modes of local

motion. Furthermore, there is no internal principle of finality; in the world

everything is determined by mechanical laws. To explain all cosmic phenomena,

nothing is needed but mass and motion; so that all the differences observable

between corporeal beings are merely differences in the amount of matter and

motion. Mechanism appeals especially to the law of the correlation of forces in

nature and of the mechanical equivalent of heat. Heat, we know, does work; but it

consumes itself in proportion to its own activity. In like manner mechanical

causes produce heat and grow weaker in proportion to the intensity of their

effect. So it is with all corporeal energy; one form may be substituted for another,

but the quantity of the new force will be always equivalent to the quantity of the

force that has disappeared. Having in this way identified mechanical force with

motion, the holders of this theory felt authorized to unify all forces and reduce

them to local motion; and it was then an easy step to consider substance as

homogeneous since its only use is to serve as a background for phenomena.

Other arguments are drawn from chemistry, especially from the facts of

isomerism, polymerism, and allotropism.

The mechanical theory is of ancient origin. Amongst its earliest partisans were

Thales, Anaximander, and Heraclitus, whose chief concern was to prove the

derivation of the world from one simple primitive substance. Empedocles,

however, held out for four elements--air, earth, water, fire. But Democritus, and

later Epicurus, suppressed this distinction between the elements, proclaimed the

essential homogeneity of matter, and referred the variety of natural phenomena to

differences of motion. After the time of Epicurus (270 B.C.), this system

disappeared from philosophical thought for eighteen centuries. Restored by

Descartes it soon won the favour of most scientists, and it is still dominant in

scientific research. The Cartesian philosophy was a restatement of the two basic

principles of the old theory, the homogeneity of nature and the reduction of all

forces to terms of motion; but it got new vigour by contact with the natural

sciences, especially physics and chemistry; hence the name Atomism (q.v.) by

which it is usually known. It should, however, be noted that there are two

Atomisms, the one purely chemical, the other philosophical. According to the

former all simple bodies are made up of atoms, i.e. of particles so small that no

chemical force known to us can divide them, but which have all the properties of

visible bodies. Atoms form groups of two or four or sometimes more; these small

tenacious groups, known as chemical molecules coalesce in physical

molecules, and from these in turn are built up the material bodies we see around

us. The material body thus results from a progressive aggregation of molecules,

and the very smallest portion of it that is endowed with the properties of the

compound contains many atoms of various species, since by definition the

compound results from the union of numerous elements. On this atomic theory,

independent as such of all philosophical systems, was grafted during the last

century that philosophical Atomism which, while ascribing to all atoms the same

nature, differentiates them only by varying amounts of mass and motion.

(b) Dynamism

Another explanation of the material world is offered by Dynamism. If Mechanism

attributes extension to matter and complete passivity to corporeal substances,

Dynamism sees in the world only simple forces, unextended, yet essentially

active. There is nothing strange in the antithesis of these two systems. The

Dynamism of Leibniz--it was he who propounded it--was but a reaction against

the Mechanism of Descartes. To these two matrix-ideas of unextended, active

forces the majority of Dynamists add the principle of actio in distans. They soon

found out that points without extension can touch only by completely merging

the one with the other, and on their own hypothesis the points in contact would

amount to nothing more than a mathematical point which could never give us

even the illusion of apparent extension. To avoid this pitfall, the Dynamists

bethought them of considering all bodies as aggregates of force unextended

indeed but separated by intervals from one another. Conceived by Leibniz, who

held the monads to be dowered with all immanent activity, this system has been

amended and modernized by Father Boscovich, Kant, Father Palmieri, Father

Carbonelle, Hirn, and Father Leroy. On the whole it has found few supporters;

scientists as a rule prefer the mechanical view. It would seem, however, that a

reaction towards it has set in since the discovery of the radioactivity of matter.

The property manifested by a considerable number of bodies of emitting at

ordinary temperatures a seemingly inexhaustible quantity of electric rays

suggests the idea that matter is a focus of energy which tends to diffuse itself in

space. But in point of fact there are only two arguments in favour of Dynamism.

One is drawn from the difficulties of grasping the concept of extension; the other

from the fact that all we know of matter comes to us through its action on our

organs of sense; hence the inference that force is the only thing existing apart

from ourselves.

(c) Hylomorphism

Between these two extremes stands the Scholastic theory, known as

Hylomorphism, or theory of matter and form (húle, matter; morphé, form), also as

the Aristotelean theory, and later as the Thomistic theory from the name of its

principal defender in the Middle Ages. Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), who was its

author, gave it a large place in his treatises on physics and on metaphysics. It

was discussed during centuries in the Peripatetic and neo-Platonic schools and

in the schools of Constantinople and Athens; but from the sixth century to the

twelfth, though its essential principles survived, it was an insignificant factor in

philosophic thought. An exception, however, must be made in favour of Avicenna

in the East (980-1037) and of Averroes in Spain (1126-1198), both famous

commentators on the Aristotelean encyclopedia. In the thirteenth century, the

Golden Age of Scholasticism, the system was restored, thanks to a number of

Latin translations, and its long-forgotten treasures were brought to light by daring

prospectors, such as Alexander of Hales, St. Albertus Magnus, St. Thomas

Aquinas, St. Bonaventure, and Henry of Ghent. During the fourteenth and

fifteenth centuries the cosmological theory, and indeed the whole Scholastic

system, suffered a decline which lasted till the nineteenth century, though during

the interval it found ardent supporters in some of the religious orders. The

restoration movement began about the middle of the nineteenth century with the

works of Kleutgen (1811-1883); Sanseverino (1811-1865), and Liberatore

(1810-1892); but it was especially owing to the impulse given it by the famous

Encyclical of Leo XIII, "Æterni Patris" (1879), that Scholasticism regained its

place of honour beside the great modern systems.

The Scholastic theory can be summed up in the following propositions:

Bodies both elementary and compound have an essential unity; they differ

specifically, and are by their very nature extended;

they possess powers or energies both passive and active which spring

from their substantial nature and are inseparable from it;

they have an immanent tendency toward certain special ends to be

realized by the exercise of their native energies.

The basic principle of this cosmology is that of immanent finality. The corporeal

world is a masterpiece of order and harmony. In spite of ceaseless

transformations, every species of body, simple and composite alike, reappears

again and again with its characteristic properties to further the well-being of the

individual and of the universe as a whole. Now this constant and harmonious

co-operation of innumerable causes acting under conditions the most diverse can

only be explained, say the Scholastics, by admitting in the material agents

themselves fixed and permanent principles of order. The universe must therefore

be composed of specific natures, i.e. of beings which by their constitution and

properties are really adapted to the ends they have to attain. Substance and its

distinctive energies form a whole which is completely subordinated to its

appointed destiny; so that if serious alterations, such as chemical combinations,

succeed in affecting these properties and in marring the harmony that ought to

exist between them and their substantial base, the being so affected must put on

a new nature in harmony with its new state. There takes place, in other words,

what the Scholastics call a substantial transformation. But this implies that an

essential portion of the original being must persist throughout the change, and be

carried over into the final result, otherwise transformation would involve the

annihilation of the first being and the production of the second out of nothing. On

the other hand, if we hold that during the process the being in question does not

lose its own specific difference in exchange for another, it would be illogical to

speak of a transformation, since a change which preserves the substantial

integrity of the being can never have as its result the production of a new being.

All bodies, then, that are subject to such a change must contain, in spite of their

unity, two constituent principles. The one is a specifying or determining principle

whence spring the actuality and distinguishing marks of the body itself; and it is

this principle which is born and dies at every step in the deeper transformations

of matter. It is called substantial form. The other, the indeterminate complement

of this, is the substratum which receives the various essential forms; and it is

called first matter. These are the fundamental ideas in the Scholastic theory.

As a system it is not at every point the direct antithesis of the two other systems

outlined above. It is true that, while Mechanism claims that the properties of

bodies are nothing but local motion, the Scholastics admit the existence of

qualities properly so called in all bodies, i.e. accidental determinations, fixed and

destined for action. These properties are generated with the new substance; they

cling to it indissolubly during its existence and they are its natural manifestation.

But, on the other hand, the Scholastics concede to the mechanical theory that

local motion plays a large part in the world, that it is the accompaniment and the

measure of every exertion of material force. Hence they give Mechanism credit

for assigning a quantitative value to the phenomena of nature by measuring the

movement proportionate to each; while, on their side, they explain the activity at

work in each case by taking into account the qualitative elements as well as the

kinetic. Again, with the mechanical theory the Scholastic recognizes in every

corporeal being an essential principle of passivity, of inertia, divisibility, and

extension--in a word, of all the properties so highly prized by Mechanism; this

principle is first matter. But the Scholastic theory adds a substantial form, i.e. a

determining principle and a root-cause of the activities and peculiar tendencies

displayed by each individual body.

A similar partial agreement exists between Scholasticism and Dynamism. In the

hylomorphic constitution of bodies the dynamic element has a preponderating

role, represented by the substantial form; but since the corporeal being does not

appear to be a source of energy pure and simple, the dynamic element is joined

with first matter, of which passivity and extension are the natural outcome.

(d) Dynamic Atomism

A fourth and last system is called Dynamic Atomism. The only real difference

between it and Mechanism lies in the fact that it attributes to bodies forces

distinct from local motion; but at the same time it maintains that they are purely

mechanical forces. Matter, it asserts, is homogeneous and the atom incapable of

transformation. This theory, proposed by Martin and Tongiorgi, and upheld

nowadays by certain scientists, is a transition between the mechanical and the

Scholastic system. Its partisans, in fact, are persuaded that a theory which

denies the reality of qualitative energies inherent in matter and reduces them to

local motion thereby makes the true explanation of natural phenomena

impossible and hands over the universe to the whims of chance. Some

Dynamists, therefore, to meet the obvious requirements of order in the world,

seek in substance itself the reasons of its secondary principles of activity. But in

this hypothesis it seems rather hard not to admit, as the Scholastics maintain,

that diversity of substance is the only explanation of the constancy observed in

the accidental differences of things.

The final cause of the material universe

The last problem that cosmology attempts to solve is that of the final cause. It is

intimately bound up with that of the first cause. Materialists like Hackel and

Büchner, who refuse to see in the universe a plan or a purpose, can assign no

goal to cosmic evolution. In their opinion, just as the world, during its eternal

past, has undergone countless variations in form, so during its eternal future it is

destined to ceaseless change. The laws of mechanics, the chance encounter of

atoms and molecules, the capricious play of natural forces following no

preconceived aim, will determine the number, nature, and form of the states

through which matter is to pass. Pantheists and all who identify God with matter

share as a rule the same view. For them the condition of the world is but the fatal

result of purposeless evolution; so that the world is its own end or rather is itself

the term of its existence and activity.

Those who believe in the existence of a personal God can never admit that an

all-wise being created without a purpose. And since a perfect and independent

being can have no other than himself as the final aim of his action, it follows that

the ultimate end of creation is to manifest the glory of the Creator, man being the

intermediary, and, as it were, the high-priest of the material world. The welfare of

man himself is the secondary purpose of creation. According to St. Thomas the

world is a vast hierarchy of which inorganic matter is the base and man the

summit. The mineral order ministers to the vegetable and this in turn to the

animal, while man finds in all these the satisfaction of his needs and the

adornment of his earthly life. Above all he finds in the material universe and in the

service it renders him a means of rising to perfect happiness in the possession of

God.

D. Nys

Transcribed by Rick McCarty

The Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume IV

Nihil Obstat. Remy Lafort, Censor

Imprimatur. +John M. Farley, Archbishop of New York

The Catholic Encyclopedia: NewAdvent.org