Determinism

Determinism is a name employed by writers, especially since J. Stuart Mill, to

denote the philosophical theory which holds -- in opposition to the doctrine of free

will -- that all man's volitions are invariably determined by pre-existing

circumstances. It may take diverse forms, some cruder, some more refined.

Biological and materialistic Determinism maintains that each of our voluntary

acts finds its sufficient and complete cause in the physiological conditions of the

organism. Psychological Determinism ascribes efficiency to the psychical

antecedents. In this view each volition or act of choice is determined by the

character of the agent plus the motives acting on him at the time. Advocates of

this theory, since Mill, usually object to the names, Necessarianism and

Fatalism, on the ground that these words seem to imply some form of external

compulsion, whilst they affirm only the fact of invariable sequence or uniform

causal connectedness between motives and volition. Opposed to this view is the

doctrine of Indeterminism, or what perhaps may more accurately be called

Anti-determinism, which denies that man is thus invariably determined in all his

acts of choice. This doctrine has been stigmatized by some of its opponents as

the theory of "causeless volition", or "motiveless choice"; and the name

Indeterminism, is possibly not the best selection to meet the imputation. The

objection is, however, not justified. The Anti-determinists, while denying that the

act of choice is always merely the resultant of the assemblage of motives playing

on the mind, teach positively that the Ego, or Self, is the cause of our volitions;

and they describe it as a "free" or "self-determining" cause. The presence of

some reason or motive, they ordinarily hold, is a necessary condition for every

act of free choice, but they insist that the Ego can decide between motives.

Choice is not, they maintain, uniformly determined by the pleasantest or the

worthiest motive or collection of motives. Nor is it the inevitable consequent of the

strongest motive, except in that tautological sense in which the word strongest

simply signifies that motive which as a matter of fact prevails. Determinism and

the denial of free will seem to be a logical consequence of all monistic

hypotheses. They are obviously involved in all materialistic theories. For

Materialism of every type necessarily holds that every incident in the history of

the universe is the inevitable outcome of the mechanical and physical

movements and changes which have gone before. But Determinism seems to be

an equally necessary consequence of monistic Idealism. Indeed the main

argument against monistic and pantheistic systems will always be the fact of

free will. Self-determination implies separateness of individuality and

independence in each free agent, and thus entails a pluralistic conception of the

universe. (See DUALISM; MONISM.) In spite of the assertions of Determinists,

no true logical distinction can be made between their view and that of Fatalism.

In both systems each of my volitions is as inexorably fated, or pre-determined, in

the past conditions of the universe as the movements of the planets or the tides.

The opponents of Determinism usually insist on two lines of argument, the one

based on the consciousness of freedom in the act of deliberate choice, the other

on the incompatibility of Determinism with our fundamental moral convictions.

The notions of responsibility, moral obligation, merit, and the like, as ordinarily

understood, would be illusory if Determinism were true. The theory is in fact fatal

to ethics, as well as to the notion of sin and the fundamental Christian belief that

we can merit both reward and punishment. (See FREE WILL; ETHICS;

FATALISM.)

Michael Maher

Submitted by Rick McCarty

The Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume IV

Nihil Obstat. Remy Lafort, Censor

Imprimatur. +John M. Farley, Archbishop of New York

The Catholic Encyclopedia: NewAdvent.org