Epicurus,
Epicureanism
and
Epicureans

                     This term has two distinct, though cognate, meanings. In its popular sense, the
                     word stands for a refined and calculating selfishness, seeking not power or fame,
                     but the pleasures of sense, particularly of the palate, and those in company
                     rather than solitude. An epicure is one who is extremely choice and delicate in
                     his viands. In the other sense, Epicureanism signifies a philosophical system,
                     which includes a theory of conduct, of nature, and of mind.

                                               HISTORY

                     Epicurus, from whom this system takes its name, was a Greek, born at Samos
                     341 B.C., who, in 307 B.C., founded a school at Athens, and died 270 B.C. The
                     Stoic School, diametrically opposite to this, was founded about the same time,
                     probably 310 B.C. Thus these two systems, having for their respective
                     watchwords Pleasure and Duty, sprang up within the first generation after
                     Aristotle (d. 322 B.C.), each of them holding a half-truth and by exaggeration
                     turning it into falsehood. The Epicurean School was rather a practical discipline
                     than a habit of speculation. The master laid down his principles dogmatically, as
                     if they must be evident as soon as stated, to any one not foolish. His disciples
                     were made to learn his maxims by heart; and they acquired a spirit of unity more
                     akin to that of a political party, or of a sect, than to the mere intellectual
                     agreement of a school of philosophers. About a century and a quarter after the
                     death of its founder, the system was introduced into Rome, and there, as well as
                     in its native country, it attracted in the course of time a number of adherents
                     such as moved the astonishment of Cicero. It had the fortune to be adopted by
                     the finest of didactic poets, Lucretius (91-51 B.C.), and was expounded by him in
                     a poem (De rerum naturâ) with a beauty of expression and a fervour of eloquence
                     worthy of a nobler theme. In the latter half of the second century, when Marcus
                     Aurelius was founding chairs of philosophy at Athens, that emperor, himself a
                     Stoic, recognized the Epicurean (together with his own, and the Platonic, and the
                     Aristotelic systems) as one of the four great philosophies to be established and
                     endowed on a footing of equality. In modern times Epicureanism has had many
                     theoretical as well as practical adherents. In the seventeenth century, when
                     Aristoteleanism and Scholasticism were assailed by the champions of the new
                     sciences, Gassendi (q.v.) selected Epicurus for his master; but he seems to
                     have been attracted chiefly by the physics, and to have aimed at reforming the
                     moral theory so as to make it tolerable to a Christian. The numerous editions of
                     the poem of Lucretius which the present age is producing may be taken to
                     indicate a sympathy with the philosophy expounded in it.

                                          EPICUREAN ETHICS

                     Philosophy was described by Epicurus as "the art of making life happy", and he
                     says that "prudence is the noblest part of philosophy". His natural philosophy
                     and epistemology seem to have been adopted for the sake of his theory of life. It
                     is, therefore, proper that his ethics should first be explained. The purpose of life,
                     according to Epicurus, is personal happiness; and by happiness he means not
                     that state of well-being and perfection of which the consciousness is
                     accompanied by pleasure, but pleasure itself. Moreover, this pleasure is
                     sensuous, for it is such only as is attainable in this life. This pleasure is the
                     immediate purpose of every action. "Habituate yourself", he says,

                          to think that death is nothing to us; for all good and evil is in
                          feeling; now death is the privation of feeling. Hence, the right
                          knowledge that death is nothing to us makes us enjoy what there
                          is in this life, not adding to it an indefinite duration, but eradicating
                          the desire of immortality.

                     His idea of the pleasurable differs from that of the Cyrenaic School which
                     preceded him. The Cyrenaics looked to the momentary pleasures of gaiety and
                     excitement. The pleasure of Epicurus is a state, equably diffused, "the absence
                     of [bodily] pain and [mental] anxiety".

                          That which begets the pleasurable life is not [sensual indulgence]
                          but a sober reason which searches for the grounds of choosing and
                          rejecting, and which banishes those doctrines through which
                          mental trouble, for the most part, arises.

                     The wise man will accordingly desire "not the longest life, but the most
                     pleasurable". It is for the sake of this condition of permanent pleasure, or
                     tranquillity, that the virtues are desirable. "We cannot live pleasurably without
                     living prudently, gracefully, and justly; and we cannot live prudently gracefully,
                     and justly, without living pleasurably" in consequence; for "the virtues are by
                     nature united with a pleasurable life; and a pleasurable life cannot be separated
                     from these." The virtues, in short, are to be practiced not for their own sake, but
                     solely as a means of pleasure, "as medicine is used for the sake of health". In
                     accordance with this view, he says that "friendship is to be pursued by the wise
                     man only for its utility; but he will begin, as he sows the field in order to reap".
                     "The wise man will not take any part in public affairs"; moreover, "the wise man
                     will not marry and have children". But "the wise man will be humane to his
                     slaves". "He will not think all sinners to be equally bad, nor all philosophers to be
                     equally good." That is, apparently, he will not have any very exacting standard,
                     and will neither believe very much in human virtue, nor be very much surprised at
                     the discovery of human frailty. In this system, "prudence is the source of all
                     pleasure and of all virtue".

                     The defects of this theory of life are obvious. In the first place, as to the matter of
                     fact, experience shows that happiness is not best attained by directly seeking it.
                     The selfish are not more happy, but less so, than the unselfish. In the next place
                     the theory altogether destroys virtue as virtue, and eliminates the idea and
                     sentiment expressed by the words "ought", "duty", "right", and "wrong". Virtue,
                     indeed tends to produce the truest and, highest pleasure; all such pleasure, so
                     far as it depends upon ourselves, depends upon virtue. But he who practises
                     virtue for the sake of the pleasure alone is selfish, not virtuous, and he will never
                     enjoy the pleasure, because he has not the virtue. A similar observation may be
                     made upon the Epicurean theory of friendship. Friendship for the sake of
                     advantage is not true friendship in the proper sense of the word. External actions,
                     apart from affection, cannot constitute friendship; that affection no one can feel
                     merely because he judges it would be advantageous and pleasurable; in fact he
                     cannot know the pleasure until he first feels the affection. If we consider the
                     Epicurean condemnation of patriotism and of the family life, we must pronounce
                     a still severer censure. Such a view of life is the meanest form of selfishness
                     leading in general to vice. Epicurus, perhaps, was better than his theory; but the
                     theory itself, if it did not originate in coldness of heart and meanness of spirit,
                     was extremely well suited to encourage them. If sincerely embraced and
                     consistently carried out, it undermined all that was chivalrous and heroic, and
                     even all that was ordinarily virtuous. Fortitude and justice, as such, ceased to be
                     objects of admiration, and temperance sank into a mere matter of calculation.
                     Even prudence itself, dissociated from all moral quality became a mere balancing
                     between the pleasures of the present and of the future.

                                              THEOLOGY

                     Epicurus said that "it was not impiety to deny the gods of the multitude, but it
                     was impiety to think of the gods as the multitude thought"; a sound principle, but
                     one which he wrongly applied, since he got rid of what was true as well as of
                     what was corrupt in the vulgar religion. Fear of the gods was an evil to be
                     eradicated, as incompatible with tranquillity. As to their nature, the gods are
                     immortal, but material, like every other being. He seems to have held that there
                     was one supreme being; but this god was not the creator, scarcely the orderer,
                     of the universe, the gods being only a part of the All. Nor is there a Providence,
                     for an interest in human affairs would be inconsistent with perfect happiness. In
                     short, the gods are magnified Epicurean philosophers.

                                         NATURAL PHILOSOPHY

                     The physics of Epicurus are in a General sense atomic. He claimed originality for
                     his theory, asserting that it began with his reflections upon a passage in Hesiod.
                     As he read in school that all things came from chaos, he asked, What is
                     chaos?--a question which his teacher could not answer. It is generally held,
                     however, that he really learned his atomism from the Democritean philosophy,
                     modifying it in one important respect; for he supposes that the atoms in falling
                     through empty space collide by virtue of a self-determining power, or rather an
                     indetermination owing to which ii is possible for them by chance to swerve a little
                     from the vertical direction.

                                              BIOLOGY

                     In this Epicurus simply followed the view of Empedocles, that, first, all sorts of
                     living things and animals, well or ill organized, were evolved from the earth and
                     that those survived which were suited to preserve themselves and reproduce their
                     kind.

                                           ANTHROPOLOGY

                     The anthropology of Lucretius may be supposed to have been derived, like his
                     physics and biology, from Epicurus. According to the Lucretian theory men were
                     originally savage; the primitive condition was one of mutual war; in this condition
                     men were like the wild beasts in strength and cunning; civil society was formed
                     under the pressure of the evils of anarchy. The reader recognizes here the ideas
                     indicated by the eighteenth-century phrases "state of nature" and "social
                     contract". The "golden age" is a dream.

                                                LOGIC

                     The Epicurean logic is criterional. The test of truth practically is the pleasant and
                     the painful belief. Theoretically, their criterion is sensation. Sensation never is
                     deceptive; the error lies in our judgment. Dreams, the ravings of fever or lunacy,
                     the delirium of the drunkard are true in their own way. Besides sensation the
                     human mind has also notions, or anticipations (prolépseis), as when, seeing an
                     object at a distance, one wonders whether it is a man or a tree. These notions
                     are the results left by previous sensations. The notion does not appear to differ
                     from the internal sense of a brute, such as enables a dog, for example, to
                     welcome strangers belonging to the profession of his master, and to bark
                     furiously at a beggar that he has never seen before. The understanding, then,
                     does not differ essentially from the internal senses.

                                             PSYCHOLOGY

                     The human soul is material and mortal, being composed of a finer kind of atoms,
                     resembling those of air or fire, but even more subtle. It is the bodily organism that
                     holds together the atoms composing the soul. Yet the human will is free. "Better
                     were it to accept all the legends of the gods, than to make ourselves slaves to
                     the fate of the natural philosophers." Fatalism, which to minds of a stoical
                     disposition seemed a source of strength, was to those of an Epicurean temper
                     simply a source of unpleasantness and helplessness. The freedom asserted by
                     the Epicureans is not rational freedom in the true sense of the word. It does not
                     consist in the power of choosing the right and the noble in preference to the
                     pleasant. It is little better than physical contingency, and may be described as
                     Casualism. The whole philosophy may well be described in a trenchant phrase of
                     Macaulay as "the silliest and meanest of all systems of natural and moral
                     philosophy".

                     M.J. Ryan
                     Transcribed by Rick McCarty

                                       The Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume V
                                    Copyright © 1909 by Robert Appleton Company
                                    Online Edition Copyright © 1999 by Kevin Knight
                                    Nihil Obstat, May 1, 1909. Remy Lafort, Censor
                                   Imprimatur. +John M. Farley, Archbishop of New York

The Catholic Encyclopedia:  NewAdvent.org