Ethics

1. Definition

Many writers regard ethics (Gr. ethike) as any scientific treatment of the moral

order and divide it into theological, or Christian, ethics (moral theology) and

philosophical ethics (moral philosophy). What is usually understood by ethics,

however, is philosophical ethics, or moral philosophy, and in this sense the

present article will treat the subject. Moral philosophy is a division of practical

philosophy. Theoretical, or speculative, philosophy has to do with being, or with

the order of things not dependent on reason, and its object is to obtain by the

natural light of reason a knowledge of this order in its ultimate causes. Practical

philosophy, on the other hand, concerns itself with what ought to be, or with the

order of acts which are human and which therefore depend upon our reason. It is

also divided into logic and ethics. The former rightly orders the intellectual

activities and teaches the proper method in the acquirement of truth, while the

latter directs the activities of the will; the object of the former is the true; that of

the latter is the good. Hence ethics may be defined as the science of the moral

rectitude of human acts in accordance with the first principles of natural reason.

Logic and ethics are normative and practical sciences, because they prescribe

norms or rules for human activities and show how, accordng to these norms, a

man ought to direct his actions. Ethics is pre-eminently practical and directive;

for it orders the activity of the will, and the latter it is which sets all the other

faculties of man in motion. Hence, to order the will is the same as to order the

whole man. Moreover, ethics not only directs a man how to act if he wishes to be

morally good, but sets before him the absolute obligation he is under of doing

good and avoiding evil.

A distinction must be made between ethics and morals, or morality. Every

people, even the most uncivilized and uncultured, has its own morality or sum of

prescriptions which govern its moral conduct. Nature had so provided that each

man establishes for himself a code of moral concepts and principles which are

applicable to the details of practical life, without the necessity of awaiting the

conclusions of science. Ethics is the scientific or philosophical treatment of

morality. The subject-matter proper of ethics is the deliberate, free actions of

man; for these alone are in our power, and concerning these alone can rules be

prescribed, not concerning those actions which are performed without

deliberation, or through ignorace or coercion. Besides this, the scope of ethics

includes whatever has reference to free human acts, whether as principle or

cause of action (law, conscience, virtue), or as effect or circumstance of action

(merit, punishment, etc.). The particular aspect (formal object) under which

ethics considers free acts is that of their moral goodness or the rectitude of order

involved in them as human acts. A man may be a good artist or orator and at the

same time a morally bad man, or, conversely, a morally good man and a poor

artist or technician. Ethics has merely to do with the order which relates to man

as man, and which makes of him a good man.

Like ethics, moral theology also deals with the moral actions of man; but unlike

ethics it has its origin in supernaturally revealed truth. It presupposes man's

elevation to the supernatural order, and, though it avails itself of the scientific

conclusions of ethics, it draws its knowledge for the most part from Christian

Revelation. Ethics is distinguished from the other natural sciences which deal

with moral conduct of man, as jurisprudence and pedagogy, in this, that the latter

do not ascend to first principles, but borrow their fundamental notions from

ethics, and are therefore subordinate to it. To investigate what constitues good or

bad, just orjunjust, waht is virtue, law, conscience, duty, etc., what obligations

are common to all men, does not lie within the scope of jurisprdence or

pedagogy, but of ethics; and yet these principles must be presupposed by the

former, must serve them as a ground-work and guide; hence they are

subordinated to ethics. The same is tre of political economy. The latter is indeed

immediately concerned with man's social activity inasmuch as it treats of the

production, distribution and consumption of material commodities, but this

activity is not independent of ethics; industrial life must develop in accordance

with the moral law and must be dominated by justice, equity, and love. Political

economy was wholly wrong in trying to emancipate itself from the requirements

of ethics. Sociology is at the present day considered by many as a science

distinct from ethics. If, however, by sociology is meant a philosophical treatment

of society, it is a division of ethics; for the enquiry into the nature of society in

general, into the origin, nature, object and purpose of natural societies (the

family, the state) and their relations to one another forms an essential part of

Ethics. If, on the other hand, sociology be regarded as the aggregate of the

sciences which have reference to the social life of man, it is not a single science

but a complexus of sciences; and among these, so far as the natural order is

concerned, ethics has the first claim.

II. Sources and Methods of Ethics

The sources of ethics are partly man's own experience and partly the principles

and truts proposed by other philosophical disciplines (logic and mataphysics).

Ethics taes its origin from the empirical fact that certain general principles and

concepts of the moral orderare common to all people at all times. This fact has

indeed been frequently disputed, but recent ethnological research has placd it

beyond the possibility of doubt. All nations distinguish between what is good and

what is bad, between good men and bad men, between virtue and vice; they are

all agreed in this: that the good is worth striving for , and that evil must be

shuned, that the one deserves praise, the other, blame. Though in individual

cases they may not be one in denominating the same thing good or evil, they are

neverthless agreed as to the general principle, that good is to be done and evil

avoided. Vice everywhereseeks to hide itself or to put on the mask of virtue; it is

a universally recognized principle, that we should not do to others what we would

not wish them to do to us. With the aid of the truths laid down in logic and

mataphysics, ethics proceeds to give a thorough explanationof the this

undeniable fact, to trace it back to its ultimate causes, then to gather from

fundamental moral principles certain conclusions which will direct man, in the

various circumstances and relations of life, how to shape his own conduct

towards the attainment of the end for which he was created. Thus the proper

method of ethics is at once speculative and empirical; it draws upon experience

and metaphysics. Supernatural Christian Revelation is not a proper source of

ethics. Only those conclusions properly belong to ethics which can be reached

with the help of experience and philosophical principles. The Christian

philosopher, howeer, may not ignore supernatural revelation, but must at least

recognise itas a negative norm, inasmuch as he is not to advance any assertion

in evident contradiction to the revealed truth of Christianity. God is the

fountain-head of all truth -- whether natural as made known by Creation, or

supernatural as revealed through Christ and the Prophets. As our intellect is an

image of the Divine Intellect, so is all certain scientific knowledge the reflex and

interpretation of the Creator's thoughts embodied in His creatures, a participation

in His eternal wisdom. God cannot reveal supernaturally and command us to

believe on His authority anything that contradicts the thoughts expreseed by Him

in his creatures, and which, with the aid of the faculty of reason which he has

given us, we can discern in His works. To assert the contrary would be to deny

God's omniscience and veracity, or to suppose that God was not the source of

all truth. A conflict, therefore, between faith and science is impossible, and

hence the Christian philosopher has to refrain from advancing any assertion

which would be evidently antagonistic to certain revealed truth. Should his

researches lead to conclusions out of harmony with faith, he is to take it for

granted that some error has crept into his deductions, just as the mathematician

whose calculations openly contradict the facts of experience must be satisfied

that his demonstration is at fault.

After what has been said the following methods of ethics must be rejected as

unsound.

1.Pure Rationalism. -- This system makes reason the sole source of truth,

and thereforse at the very otset excludes every reference to Christian

Revelation, branding any such reference as degrading and hampering free

scientific investigation. The supreme law of science is not freedom, but

truth. It is not derogatory to the true dignity and freedom of science to

abstain from asserting what, according to Christian Revelation, is

manifestly erroneous.

2.Pure Empiricism, which would erect the entire structure of ethics

exclusively on the foundation of experience, must also be rejected.

Experience can tell us merely of present or past phenomena; but as to

what, of necessity, and universall, must, or ought to, happen in the future,

experience can give us no clue without bringing in the aid of necessary

and universal principles. Closely alied to Empiricism is Historicism, which

considers history as the exclusive source of ethics. What has been said

of Empiricism may also be applied to Historicism. History is concered

with what has happened in the past and only too often has to rehearse the

moral aberrations of mankind.

3.Positivism is a variety of Empiricism; it seeks to emancipate ethics from

metaphysics and base it on facts alone. No science can be constructed

on the mere foundation of facts, and independently of metaphysics. Every

sciencemust set out from evident principles, which form the basis of all

certain cognition. Ethics especially is impossible without metaphysics,

since it is according to the metaphysical view we take of the world that

ethics shapes itself. Whoever considers man as nothing else than a more

highly developed brute will hold different ethical views from one who

discerns in man a creature fashioned to the image and likeness of God,

possessing a spiritual, immortal soul and destined to eternal life; whoever

refuses to recognize the freedom of the will destroys the very foundation of

ethics. Whether man was created by God or possesses a spiritual,

immortal soul which is endowed with free will, or is essentially different

from brute creation, all these are questions pertaining to metaphysics.

Anthropology, moreover, is necessarily presupposed by ethics. No rules

can be prescribed for man's actions, unless his nature is clearly

understood.

4.Another untenable system is Traditionalism, which in France, during the

last half of the nineteenth century, counted many adherents (among

others, de Bonald, Bautain), and which advanced the doctrine that

complete certainty in religious and moral questions was not to be attained

by the aid of reason alone, bt only by the light of revelation as made

known to us through tradition. They failed to see that for all reasonable

belief certain knowledge of the existence of God and of the fact of

revelation is necessarily presupposed, and this knowledge cannot be

gathered from revelation. Fideism, or, as Paulsen designated it, the

Irrationalism of many Protestants, also denies the ability of reason to

furnish certainty in matters relating to God and religion. With Kant, it

teaches that reason does not rise above the phenomena of the visible

world; faith alone can lead us into the realm of the supersensible and

instruct us in matters moral and religious. This faith, however, is not the

acceptance of truth on the strength of external authority, but rather

consists in certain appreciative judgments, i.e. assumptions or

convictions which are the result of each one's own inner experiences, and

which have, therefore, for him a precise worth, and corrspond to his own

peculier temperament. Since these persuasions are not supposed to

come within the range of reason, exception to them cannot be taken on

scientific grounds. According to this opinion, religion and morals are

relegated to pure subjectivism and lose all their objectivity and universality

of value.

III. Historical View of Ethics

As ethics is the philosophical treatment of the moral order, its history does not

consist in narrating the views of morality entertained by different nations at

differnt times; this is properly the scope of the history of civilisation, and of

ethnology. The history of ethics is concerned solely with the various

philosophical systems which in the course of time have been elaborated with

reference to the moral order. Hence the opinions advanced by the wise men of

antiquity, such as Pythagoras (582-500 B.C.), Heraclitus (535-475 B.C.),

Confucius (558-479 B.C.), scarcely belong to the history of ethics; for, though

they proposed various moral truths and principles, they dis so in a dogmatic and

didactic, and not in a philosophically systematic manner. Ethics properly

so-called is first met with among the Greeks, i.e.in the teaching of Socrates

(470- 399 B.C.). According to him the ultimate object of human activity is

happiness, and the necessary means to reach it, virtue. Since everybody

necessarily seeks happiness, no one is deliberately corrupt. All evil arises from

ignorance, and the virtues are one and all but so many kinds of prudence. Virtue

can, therefore, be imparted by instruction. The disciple of Socrates, Plato

(427-347 B.C.) declares that the summum bonum consists in the perfect

imitation of God, the Absolute Good, an imitation which cannot be fully realised

in this life. Virtue enables man to order his conduct, as he properly should,

according to the dictates of reason, and acting thus he becomes like unto God.

But Plato differed from Socrates in that he did not consider virtue to consist in

wisdom alone, but in justice, temperance, and fortitude as well, these

constituting the proper harmony of man's activities. In a sense, the State is man

writ large, and its function its function is to train its citizens in virtue. For his ideal

State he proposed the community of goods and of wives and the public education

of children. Though Socrates and Plato had been to the fore in this mighty work

and had contributed much valuable material to the upbuilding of ethics;

nevertheless, Plato's illustroius disciple, Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), must be

considered the real founder of systematic ethics. With characteristic keenness

he solved, in his ethical and political writings, most of the problems with which

ethics concerns itself. Unlike Plato, who began with ideas as the basis of his

observation, Aristotle chose rathe to take the facts of experience as his

starting-point; these he analysed accurately, and sought to trace to their highest

and ultimate causes. He set out from the point that all men tend to happiness as

the ultimate object of all their endeavours, as the highest good, which is sought

for its own sake, and to which all other goods merely serve as means. This

happiness cannot consist in external goods, but only in the activity proper to

human nature - not indeed in such a lower activity of the vegetative and sensitive

life as man possesses in common with plants and brutes, but in the highest and

most perfect activity of his reason, which springs in turn from virtue. This activity,

however, has to be exercised in a perfect and enduring life. The highest pleasure

is naturally bound up with this activity, yet, to constitute perfect happiness,

external goods must also supply their share. True happiness, though prepared for

him by the gods as the object and reward of virtue, can be attained only through

a man's own individual exertion. With keen penetration Aristotle therupon

proceeds to investigate in turn each of the intellectual and moral virtues, and his

treatment of them must, even at the present time, be regarded as in great part

correct. The nature of the State and of the family were, in the main, rightly

explained by him. The only pity is that his vision did not penetrate beyond this

earthly life, and that he never saw clearly the relationss of man to God.

A more hedonistic (edone, "pleasure") turn in ethics begins with Democritus

(about 460-370 B.C.), who considers a perpetually joyous and cheerful

disposition as the highest good and happiness of man. The means thereto is

virtue, which makes us independent of external goods -- so far as that is possible

-- and which wisely discriminates between the pleasures to be sought after and

those that are to be shunned. Pure Sensualism or Hedonism was first taught by

Aristippus of Cyrene (435-354 B.C.), according to whom the greatest possible

pleasure, is the end and supreme good of human endeavour. Epicurus (341-270

B.C.) differs from Aristippus in holding that the largest sum total possible of

spiritual and sensual enjoyments, with the greatest possible freedom from

displeasure and pain, is man's highest good. Virtue is the proper directive norm

in the attainmemt of this end.

The Cynics, Antisthenes (444-369 B.C.) and Diogenes of Sinope (414-324 B.C.),

taught the direct contrary of Hedonism, namely that virtue alone suffices for

happiness, that pleasure is an evil, and that the truly wise man is above human

laws. This teaching soon degenerated into haughty arrogance and open

contempt for law and for the remainder of men (Cynicism). The Stoics, Zeno

(336-264 B.C.) and his disciples, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and others, strove to

refine and perfect the views of Antisthenes. Virtue, in their opinion, consist in

man's living according to the dictates of his rational, and, as each one's individual

nature is but a part of the entire natural order, virtue is, therefore, the harmonious

agreement with the Divine Reason, which shapes the whole course of nature.

Whether they conceived this relation of God to the world in a pantheistic or a

theistic sense, is not altogether clear. Virtue is to be sought for its own sake,

and it suffices for man's happiness. All other things are indifferent and are, as

circumstances require, to be striven after or shunned. The passions and

affections are bad, and the wise man is independent of them. Among the Roman

Stoics were Seneca (4 B.C. -- A.D. 65), Epictetus (born about A.D. 50), and the

Emperor Marcus Aurelius (A.D. 121-180), upon whom however, at least upon the

latter two, Christian influences had already begun to make themselves felt.

Cicero (106-43 B.C.) elaborated no new philosophical system of his own, but

chose those particular views from the various systems of Grecian philosophy

which appeared best to him. He maintained that moral goodness, which is the

general object of all virtues, consists in what is becoming to man as a rational

being as distinct from the brute. Actions are often good or bad, just or unjust, not

because of human institutions or customs, but of their own intrinsic nature.

Above and beyond human laws, there is a natural law embracing all nations and

all times, the expression of the rational will of the Most High God, from

obedience to which no human authority can exempt us. Cicero gives an

exhaustive exposition of the cardinal virtues and the obligations connected with

them; he insists especially on devotion to the gods, without which human society

could not exist.

Parallel with the above-mentioned Greek and Roman ethical systems runs a

sceptical tendency, which rejects eery natural moral law, bases the whole moral

order on custom or human arbitrariness, and frees the wise man from subjection

to the ordinary precepts of the moral order. This tendency was furthered by the

Sophists, against whom Socrates and Plato arrayed themselves, and later on by

Carnea, Theodore of Cyrene, and others.

A new epoch in ethics begins with the dawn of Christianity. Ancient paganism

never had a clear and definite concept of the relation between God and the world,

of the unity of the human race, of the destiny of man, of the nature and meaning

of the moral law. Christianity first shed full light on these and similar questions.

As St. Paul teaches (Rom., ii, 24 sq.), God has written his moral law in the

hearts of all men, even of those outside the influence of Christian Revelation; this

law manifests itself in the conscience of every man and is the norm according to

which the whole human race will be judged on the day of reckoning. In

consequence of their perverse inclinations, this law had to a great extent become

obscured and distorted among the pagans; Christianity, however, restored it to

its prestine integrity. Thus, too, ethics received its richest and most fruitful

stimulus. Proper ethical methods were now unfolded, and philosophy was in a

position to follow up and develop these methods by means supplied from its own

store-house. This corse was soon adopted in the early ages of the Church by the

Fathers and ecclesiastical writers, as Justin Martyr, Iranaeus, Tertulian, Clement

of Alexandria, Origen, but especially the illustrius Doctors of the Church,

Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine, who, in the exposition and defence of

Christian truth, made use of the principles laid down by the pagan philosophers.

True, the Fathers had no occasion to treat moral questions from a purely

philosophical standpoint, and independently of Christin Revelation; but in the

explanation of Catholic doctrine their discussions naturally led to philosophical

investigations. This is particularly true of St Augustine, who proceeded to

thoroughly develop along philosophical lines and to establish firmly most of the

truths of Christian morality. The eternal law (lex aterna), the original type and

source of all temporal laws, the natural law, conscience, the ultimate end of man,

the cardinal virtues, sin, marriage, etc. were treated by him in the clearest and

most penetrating manner. Hardly a single portion of ethics does he present to us

but is enriched with his keen philosophical commentaries. Late ecclesiastical

writers followed in his footsteps.

A sharper line of separation between philosophy and theology, and in particular

between ethics and moral theology, is first met with in the works of the great

Schoolmen of the Middle Ages, especially of Albert the Great (1193-1280),

Thomas Aquinas (1225- 1274), Bonaventure (1221-1274), and Duns Scotus

(1274-1308). Philosophy and, by means of it, theology reaped abundant fruit from

the works of Aristotle, which had until then been a sealed treasure to Western

civilization, and had first been elucidated by the detailed and profound

commentaries of St. Albert the Great and St. Thomas Aquinas and pressed into

the service of Christian philosophy. The same is particularly true as regards

ethics. St. Thomas, in his commentaries on the political and ethical writings of

the Stagirite, in his "Summa contra Gentiles" and his "Quaestiones disputatae,

treated with his wonted clearness and penetration nearly the whole range of

ethics in a purely philosophical manner, so that even to the present day his wors

are an inexhaustible source whence ethics draws its supply. On the foundations

laid by him the Catholic philosophers and theoologians of succeeding ages have

continued to build. It is true that in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, thanks

especially to the influence of theco-called Nominalists, a period of stagnation and

decline set in, but the sixteenth century is marked by a revival. Ethical

questions, also, though largely treated in connexion with theology, are again

made the subject of careful investigation. We mention as examples the great

theologians Victoria, Dominicus Soto, L. Molina, Suarez, Lessius, and De Lugo.

Since the sixteenth century special chairs of ethics (moral philosophy) have been

erected in many Catholic universities. The larger, purely philosophical works on

ethics, however do not appear until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as

an example of which we may instance the production of Ign. Schwarz,

"Instituitiones juris universalis naturae et gentium" (1743).

Far different from Catholic ethical methods were those adopted for the most part

by Protestants. With the rejection of the Church's teaching authority, each

individual became on principle his own supreme teacher and arbiter in matters

appertaining to faith and morals. True it is that the Reformers held fast to Holy

Writ as the infallible wourse of revelation, but as to what belongs or does not

belong to it, whether, and how far, it is inspired, and what is its meaning -- all this

was left to the final decision of the individual. The inevitable result was that

philosophy arrogantly threw to the winds all regard for revealed truth, and in many

cases became involved in the most pernicious errors. Melanchthon, in his

"Elementa philosophiae moralis", still clung to the Aristotelean philosophy; so,

too, did Hugo Grotius, in his work, "De jure belli et pacis". But Cumberland and

his follower, Samuel Pufendorf, moreover, assumed, with Descartes, that the

ultimate ground for every distinction between good and evil lay in the free

determination of God's will, a view which renders the philosophical treatment of

ethics fundamentally impossible. Quite an influential factor in the development of

ethics was Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). He suposes that the human race

originally existed in existed in a rude condition (status naturae) in which every

man was free to act as he pleased, and possessed a right to all things, whence

arose a war of all against all. Lest destruction should be the result, it was

decided to abandon this condition of nature and to found a state in which, by

agreement, all were to be subject to one common will (one ruler). This authority

ordains, by the law of the State, what is to be considered by all as good and as

evil, and only then does there arise a distinction between good and evil of

universal binding force on all. The Pantheist Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677)

considers the instinct to self-preservation as the foundation of virtue. Every being

is endowed with the necessary impulse to assert itself, and, as reason demands

nothing contrary to nature, it requires each one to follow this impulse and to stive

after whatever is useful to him. And each individual possesses power and virtue

just in so far as he obeys this impulse. Freedom of the will consists merely in

the ability to follow unrestrainedly this natural impulse. Shaftesbury (1671-1713)

bases ethics on the affections or inclinations of man. There are sympathetic,

idiopathic, and unnatural inclinations. The first of these regard the common good,

the second the private good of the agent, the third are opposed to the other two.

To lead a morally good life, war must be waged upon the unnatural impulses,

while the idiopathetic and sympathetic inclinations must be made to harmonize.

This harmony constitutes virtue. In the attainment of virtue the subjective guiding

principle of knowledge is the "moral sense", a sort of moral instinct. This "moral

sense" theory was further developed by Hutcheson (1694-1747); meanwhile

"common sense" was suggested by Thoms Reid (1710-1796) as the highest

norm of moral conduct. In France the materialistic philosophers of the eighteenth

century -- as Helvetius, de la Mettrie, Holbach, Condillac, and others --

disseminated the teachings of Sensualism and Hedonism as understood by

Epicurus.

A complete revolution in ethics was introduced by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804).

From the wreck of pure theoretical reason he turned for rescue to practical

reason, in which he found an absolute, universal, and categorical moral law. This

law is not to be conceived as an enactmnt of external authority, for this would be

heteromony, which is foreign to true morality; it is rather the law of our own

reason, which is, therefore, autonomous, that is, it must be observed for its own

sake, without regard to any pleasure or utility arising therefrom. Only that will is

morally good which obeys the moral law under the influence of such a subjective

principle or motive as can be willed by the individual to become the universal law

for all men. The followers of Kant have selected now one now another doctrine

from his ethics and combined therewith various pantheistical systems. Fichte

places man's supreme good and destiny in absolute spontaniety and liberty;

Schleiermacher, in co-operating with the progressive civilization of mankind. A

similar view recurs substantially in the writings of Wilhelm Wundt and, to a

certain extent, in those of the pessimist, Edward von Hartmann, though the latter

regards culture and progress merely as means to the ultimate end, which,

according to him, consists in delivering the Absolute from the torment of

existence.

The system of Cumberland, who maintained the common good of mankind to be

the end and criterion of moral conduct, was renewed on a positive basis in the

nineteenth century by Auguste Comte and has counted many adherents, e.g., in

England, John Stuart Mill, Henry Sidgwick, Alexander Bain; in Germany, G.T.

Fechner, F.E. Beneke, F. Paulsen, and others. Herbert Spencer (1820-1903)

sought to effect a compromise between social Utilitarianism (Altruism) and

private Utilitarianism (Egoism) in accordance with the theory of evolution. In his

opinion, that conduct is good which serves to augment life and pleasure withut

any admixture of displeasure. In consequence, however, of man's lack of

adaptation to the conditions of life, such absolute goodness of conduct is not as

yet possible, and hence various compromises must be made between Altruism

and Egoism. With the progress of evolution, however, this adaptability to existing

conditions will become more and more perfect, and consequently the benefits

accruing to the individual from his own conduct will be most useful to society at

large. In particular, sympathy (in joy) will enable us to take pleasure in altrusitic

actions.

The great majority of non-Christian moral philosophers have followed the path

trodden by Spencer. Starting with the assumption that man, by a series of

transformations, was gradually evolved from the brute, and therefore differs from it

in degree only, they seek the first traces and beginnings of moral ideas in the

brute itself. Charles Darwin had done some preparatory work along these lines,

and Spencer did not hesitate to descant on brute-ethics, on the pre-human

justice, conscience, and self-control of brutes. Present-day Evolutionists follow

his view and attempt to show how animal morality has in man continually

become more perfect. With the aid of analogies taken from ethnology, they relate

how mankind originally wandered over the face of the earth in semi-savage

hordes, knew nothing of marriage or the familt, and only by degrees reached a

higher level of morality. These are the merest creations of fancy. If man is nothing

more than a highly developed brute, he cannot possess a spiritual and immortal

soul, and there can no longer be question of the freedom of the will, of the future

retribution of good and evil, nor can man in consequence be hindered from

ordering his life as he pleases and regarding the weel-being of others only in so

far as it redounds to his own profit.

As the Evolutionists, so too the Socialists favour the theory of evolution from their

ethical viewpoint; yet the latter do not base their observations on scientific

principles, but on social and economic considerations. Acoording to K. Marx, F.

Engels, and other exponents of the so-called "materialistic interpretation of

history", all moral, religious, juridical and philosophical concepts are but the

reflex of the economical conditions of society in the minds of men. Now these

social relations are subject to constant change; hence the ideas of morality,

religion, etc. are also continually changing. Every age, every people, and even

each class in a given people forms its moral and religious ideas in accordance

with its own peculiar economical situation. Hence, no universal code of morality

exists binding on all men at all times; the morality of the present day is not of

Divine origin, but the product of history, and will soon have to make room for

anoter system of morality. Allied to this materialistic hidtorical interpretation,

though derived from other sources, is the system of Relativism, which resognizes

no absolute and unchangeable truths in regard to ethics or anything else. Those

who follow this opinion aver that nothing objectively true can be known by us.

Men differ from one another and are subject to change, and with them the

manner and means of viewing the world about them also change. Moreover the

judgments passed on matters religious and moral depend essentially on the

inclinations, interests, and character of the person judgng, while these latter are

constantly varying. Pragmatism differs from Relativism inasmuch as that not only

is to be considered true which is proven by experience to be useful; and, since

the same thing is not always useful, unchangeable truth is impossible.

In view of the chaos of opinions and systems just described, it need not surprise

us that, as regards ethical problems, scepticism is extending its sway to the

utmost limits, in fact many exhibit a fromal contempt for the traditional morality.

According to Max Nordau, moral precepts are nothing but "conventional lies";

according to Max Stirner, that alone is good which serves my interests, whereas

the common good, the love for all men, etc. are but empty phantoms. Men of

genius and superiority in particular are coming more and more to be regarded as

exempt from the moral law. Nietzsche is the originator of a school whose

doctrines are founded on these principles. According to him, goodness was

originaly identified with nobility and gentility of rank. Whatever the man of rank

and power did, whatever inclinations he possessed were good. The down-trodden

proletariat, on the other hand were bad, i.e. lowly and ignoble, without any other

derogatory meaning being given to the word bad. It was only by a gradual

process that the oppressed multitude through hatred and envy evolved the

distinction between good and bad, in the moral sense, by denominating the

characteristics and conduct of those in power and rank as bad, and their own

behaviour as good. And thus arose the opposition between the morality of the

master and that of the slave. Those in power still continued to look upon their

own egoistic inclinations as noble and good, while the oppresed populace lauded

the "instincts of the common herd", i.e. all those qulaities necessary and useful

to its existence -- as patience, meekness, obedience and love of one's

neighbour. Weakness became goodness, cringing obsequiousness became

humility, subjection to hated oppressors was obedience, cowardice meant

patience. "All morality is one long and audacious deception." Hence, the value

attached to the prevailing concepts of morality must be entirely re- arranged.

Intellectual superiority is above and beyond good and evil as understood in the

traditional sense. There is no higher moral order to which men of such calibra are

amenable. The end of society is not the common good of its members; the

intellectual aristocracy (the over-man) is its own end; in its behalf the common

herd, the "too many", must be reduced to slavery and decimated. As it rests with

each individual to decide who belongs to this intellectual aristocracy, so each

man is at liberty to emancipate himself from the existing moral order.

In conclusion, one other tendency in ethics may be noted, which has manifested

itself far and wide; namely, the effort to make all morality independent of all

religion. It is clear that many of the above-mentioned ethical systems essentially

exclude all regard for God and religion, and this is true especially of materialistic,

agnostic, and in the last analysis, of all pantheistic systems. Apart, also, from

these systems, "independent morality", called also "lay morality", has gained

many followers and defenders. Kant's ideas formed the basis of this tendency, for

he himself founded a code of morality on the categorical imperative and

expressly declared that morality is sufficient for itself, and therefore has no need

of religion. Many modern philosophers -- Herbart, Eduard von Hartmann, Zeller,

Wundt, Paulsen, Ziegler, and a number of others -- have followed Kant in this

respect. For several decades practical attempts have been made to emanicpate

morality from religion. In France religious instruction was banished from the

schools in 1882 and moral instruction substituted. This tendency manifests a

lively activity in what is known as the "ethical movement", whose home, properly

speaking, is in the United States. In 1876, Felix Adler, professor at Cornell

University, founded the "Society for Ethical Culture", in New York City. Similar

societies were formed in other cities. These were consolidated in 1887 into the

"Union of the Societies for Ethical Culture." Besides Adler, the chief propagators

of the movement by word of mouth and writing were W.M. Salter and Stanton

Coit. The purpose of these societies is declared to be "the improvement of the

moral life of the members of the societies and of the community to which they

belong, without any regard to theological or philosophical opinions". In most of

the European countries ethical societies were founded on the model of the

American organization. All these were combined in 1894 into the "International

Ethical Asociation". Their purpose, i.e. the amelioration of man's moral condition,

is indeed praiseworthy, but it is erroneoud to suppose that any such moral

improvement can be brought about without taking religion into consideration. In

fact many members of the ethical societies are openly antagonistic to all

religions, and would therefore do away with denominational schools and supplant

religious teaching by mere moral instruction. Even upon purely ethical

considerations such attempts must be unhesitatingly rejected. If it be true that

even in the case of adults moral instruction without religion, without any higher

obligation or sanction, is a nonentity, a meaningless sham, how much more so

is it in the case of the young? It is evident that, judged from the standpoint of

Christianity, these efforts must meet with a still more decided condemnation.

Christians are bound to observe not only the prescriptions of the natural law, but

also all the precepts given by Christ concerning faith, hope, love, Divine worship,

and the imitation of Himself. The Christian, moreover, knows that without Divine

grace and, hence, without prayer and the frequent reception of the sacraments, a

morally good life for any considerable length of time is impossible. >From their

earliest years, therefore, the young must not only receive thorough instruction in

all the Commandments, but must be exercised and trained in the practical use of

the means of grace. Religion must be the soil and atmosphere in which

education develops and flourishes.

While, among non-Catholics ever since the Reformation, and especially since

Kant, there has been an increasing tendency to divorce ethics from religion, and

to dissolve it into countless venturesome and frequently contradictory systems,

Catholics for the most part have remained free from these errors, because, in the

Church's infallible teaching authority, the Guardian of Christian Revelation, they

have always found secure orientation. It is true that towards the end of the

eighteenth, and at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Illuminism and

Rationalism penetrated here and there into Catholic circles and attempted to

replace moral theology by purely philosophical ethics, and in turn to transform

the latter according to the Kantian autonomy. This movement, however, was but

a passing phase. With a reawakening of the Church's activity, fresh impetus was

given to Catholic science, which was of benefit to ethics also and produced in its

domain some excellent fruits. Recourse was again had to the illustrius past of

Catholicism, while, at the same time, modern ethical systems gave occasion to

a thorough investigation and verification of principles of the moral order. Taparelli

d'Azeglio led the way with his great work "Saggio teoretico di diritto naturale

appogiato sul fatto" (1840-43). Then followed, in Italy, Audisio, Rosmini,

Liberatore, Sanseverino, Rosselli, Zigliara, Signoriello, Schiffini, Ferretti, Talamo,

and others. In Spain this revival of ethics was due to, among others, J. Balmes,

Donoso Cortés, Zefirio Gonzalez, Mendive, R. de Cepeda; in France and

Belgium, to de Lehen (Institutes de droit naturel), de Margerie, Onclair, Ath,

Vallet, Charles Périn, Piat, de Pascal, Moulart, Castelein; in England and

America, to Joseph Rickaby, Jouin, Russo, Hollaind, J.J. Ming. In

German-speaking countries the reawakening of Scolasticism in general begins

with Kleutgen (Theologie der Vorzeit, 1853); Philosophie der Vorzeit, 1860), and

of ethics in particular with Th. Meyer (Die Grundsätze der Sittlichkeit und des

Rechts, 1868; Institutiones juris naturalis seu philosophiae moralis universae,

1885-1900). After them came A. Stöckl, Ferd, Walter, Moy de Sons, C.

Gutberlet, Fr. J. Stein, Brandis, Costa-Rossetti, A.M. Weiss, Renninger,

Lehmen, Willems, V. Frins, Heinrich Pesch, and others. We pass over numerous

Catholic writers, who have made a specialty of sociology and political economy.

IV. Outlines of Ethics

It is clear that the following statement cannot pretend to treat thoroughly all

ethical questions; it is intended rather to afford the reader an insight into the

most important problems dealt with by ethics, as well as into the methods

adopted in their treatment. Ethics is usually divided into two parts: general, or

theoretical ethics, and special, or applied ethics. General ethics expounds and

verifies the general principles and concepts of the moral order; special ethics

applies these general principles to the various relations of man, and determines

his duties in particular.

Reason itself can rise from the knowledge of the visible creation to the certain

knowledge of the existence of God, the origin and end of all things. On this

fundamental truth the structure of ethics must be based. God created man, as he

created all things else, for His own honour and glory. The ultimate end is the

proper motive of the will's activity. If God were not the ultimate object and end of

His own activity, he would depend upon His creatures, and would not be infinitely

perfect. He is, then, the ultimate end of all things, they are created for His sake,

not, indeed, that he can derive any benefit from them, which would be repugnant

to an infinitely perfect being, but for His glory. They are to manifest His goodness

and perfection. Irrational creatures cannot of themselves directly glorify God, for

they are incapable of knowing Him. The are intended as means to the end for

which rational man was created. The end of man, however, is to know God, to

love Him and serve Him, and thereby attain to perfect and unending happiness.

Every man has within him an irresistible, indestructible dersire for perfect

happiness; he seeks to be free from every evil and to possess every attainable

good. This impulse to happiness is founded on man's nature; it is implanted there

by his Maker; and hence will be duly realised, if nothing is wanting on the part of

man's own individual endeavour. But perfect happiness is unattainable in the

present life, if for no other reason, at least for this, that inexorable death puts an

early end to all earthly happiness. There is reserved for man a better life, if he

freely chooses to glorify God here on earth. It will be the crown of victory to be

conferred upon him hereafter, if at present he remains subject to God and keeps

His Commandments. Only from the viewpoint of eternity do this earthly life and

the moral order acquire their proper significance and value. But how does mna,

considered in the natural order, or apart from every influence of supernatural

revelations, come to know what God requires of him here below, or how he is to

serve and glorify Him, in order to arrive at eternal happiness? -- By means of the

natural law.

From eternity there existed in the mind of God the idea of the world, which he

determined to create, as well as the plan of government according to which He

wished to rule the world and direct it to its end. This ordination existing in the

mind of God from all eternity, and depending on the nature and essential

relations of rational beings, is the eternal law of God (lex aeternaDei), the source

from which all temporal laws take their rise. God does not move and govern His

creatures by a mere external directive impetus, as the archer does the arrow, but

by means of internal impulses and inclinations, which He has bound up with their

natures. Irrational creatures are urged, by means of physical forces or natural

impulses and instincts to exercise the activity peculiar to them and keep the

order designed for them. Man, on the other hand, is a being endowed with reason

and free will; as such, he cannot be led by blind impulses and instincts in a

manner conformable to his nature, but must needs depend on practical principles

and judgments, which point out to him how he is to order his conduct. These

principles must somehow or other be manifested to him by nature. All created

things have implanted in their natures certain guiding principles, necessary to

their corresponding activities. Man must be no exception to this rule. He must be

led by a natural inborn light, manifesting to him what he is to do, or not to do.

This natural light is the natural law. When we speak of man as possessing a

natural, inborn light, it is not to be understood in the sense that man has innate

ideas. Innate ideas do not exist. It is true, nevertheless, that the Creator has

endowed man with the ability and the inclination to form many concepts anf

develop principles. As soon as he comes to the use of reason, he forms, by a

natural necessity, on the basis of experience, certain general concepts of

theoretical reason -- e.g. those of being and not being, of cause and effect, of

space and time -- and so he arrives at universal principles, e.g. that "nothing can

exist and not exist at the same time", that "every effect has its cause", etc. As it

is in the theoretical, so also in the practical order. As soon as reason has been

sufficiently devloped, and the individual can somehow or other practically judge

that he is something more than a mere animal, by an intrinsic necessity of his

nature he forms the concept of good and evil, i.e. of something that is proper to

the rational nature which distinguishes him from the brute, and which is therefore

worth striving for, and something which is unbecoming and therefore to be

avoided. Adn, as by nature he feels himself attracted by what is good, and

repelled by what is evil, he naturaly forms the judgments, that "good is to be

done and evil avoided", that "man ought to live according to the dictates of

reason", etc. From hid own reflections, especially when assisted by instruction

from others, he easily comes to the conclusion that in these judgments the will

of a superior being, of the Creator and Designer of nature, has its expression.

Around about him he perceives that all things are well ordered, so that it is very

easy for him to discern in them the handiwork of a superior and all-wise power.

He himself has been appointed to occupy in the domain of nature the position of

lord and master; he, too, must lead a well regulated life, as befits a rational

being, not merely because he himself chooses to do so, but also in obedience to

his Creator. Man did not give himself his nature with all its faculties and

inclinations; he received it from a superior being, whose wisdom and power are

everywhere manifest to him in Creation.

The general practical judgments and principles: "Do good and avoid evil", "Lead a

life regulated according to reason", etc., from which all the Commandments of

the Decalogue are derived, are the basis of the natural law, of which St. Paul

(Rom., ii, 14) says, that it is written in the hearts of all men. This law is an

emanation of the Divine law, made known to all men by nature herself; it is the

expression of the will of nature's Author, a participation of the created rational

being in the eternal law of God. Hence the obligation it imposes does not arise

from na's own autonomy, as Kant held, nor from any other human authority, but

from the will of the Creator; and man cannot violate it without rebelling against

God, his master, offending Him, and becoming amenable to his justice. How

deeply rooted among all nations this conviction of the higher origin of the natural

law was, is shown by the fact that for various violations of it (as murder, adultery,

erjury, etc.) they did their utmost to propitiate the angered deity by means of

prayers and sacrifices. Hence they looked upon the deity as the guardian and

protector of the moral order, who would not let the contempt of it to go

unpunished. The same conviction is manifested by the value all nations have

attached to the moral order, a value far surpassing that all other earthly goods.

The noblest among the nations maintained that it was better to undergo any

hardship, even death itself, rather than prove recreant to one's duty. They

understood, therefore, that, over and above earthly tresures, there were higher

and more lasting goods whose attainment was dependent upon the observance

of the moral order, and this not by reason of any ordinance of man, but because

of the law of God. This being premised, it is clearly impossible to divorce morality

from religion without robbing it of its true obligation and sanction, of its sanctity

and inviolability and of its importance as transcending every other earthly

consideration.

The natural law consists of general practical principles (commands and

prohibitions) and the conclusion necessarily flowing therefrom. It is the peculiar

function of man to formulate these conclusions himself, though instruction and

training are to assist him in doing so. Besides this, each individual has to take

these principles as a guide of his conduct and apply them to his particular

actions. This, to a certain extent, everybody does spontaneously, by virtue of an

innate tendency. As in the case of all practical things, so in regard to what

concerns the moral order, reason uses syllogistic processes. When a person,

e.g., is on the point of telling a lie, or saying what is contrary to his convictions,

there rises before his mental vision the general precept of the natural law: "Lying

is wrong and forbidden." Hence he avails himself, at least virtually, of the

following syllogisim: "Lying is forbidden; what you are about to say is a lie;

therefore, what you are about to say is forbidden." The conclusion thus arrived at

is our conscience, the proximate norm of our conduct. Conscience, therefore, is

not an obscure feeling or a sort of moral instinct, but a practical judgment of our

reason on the moral character of individual acts. If we follow the voice of

conscience, our reward is peace and calm of soul, if we resist this voice, we

experience disquiet and remorse.

The natural law is the foundation of all human laws and precepts. It is only

because we recognize the necessity of authority for human society, and because

the natural law enjoins obedience to regularly constituted authority, that it is

possible for a human superior to impose laws and commands binding in

conscience. Indeed all human laws and precepts are fundamentally the

conclusions, or more minute determinations, of the general principles of the

natural law, and for this very reason every deliberate infraction of a law or precept

binding in conscience is a sin, i.e. the violation of a Divine commandment, a

rebellion against God, an offence against Him, which will not escape punishment

in this life or in the next, unless dult repented of before death.

The problems hitherto mentioned belong to general, or theoretical, ethics, and

their investigation in nearly all cases bear upon the natural law, whose origin,

nature, subject- matter, obligation, and properties it is the scope of ethics to

explain thoroughly and verify. The general philosophical doctrine of right is

usually treated in general ethics. Under no circumstances may the example of

Kant and others be imitated in severing the doctrine of right from ethics, or moral

philosophy, and developing it as a seperate and independent science. The

juridical order is but a part of the moral order, even as justice is but one of the

moral virtues. The first principle of right: "Give every man his due"; "Commit no

injustice"; and the necessary conclusions from these: "Thou shalt not kill"; "Thou

shalt not commit adultery", and the like, belong to the natural law, and cannot be

deviated from without violating one's duty and one's neighbour's rights, and

staining one's conscience with guilt in the sight of God.

Special ethcis applies the principles of general, or theoretical, ethics to the

various relations of man, and thus deduces his duties in particular. General

ethics teaches that man must do good and avoid evil, and must inflict injury upon

no one. Special ethics descends to particulars and demonstrates what is good or

bad, right or wrong, and therefore to be done or avoided in the various relations of

human life. First of al, it trest of man as an individual in his relations to God, to

himself, and to his fellow-men. God is the Creator, Master, and ultimate end of

man; from these relations arise man's dutie toward God. Presupposing his own

individual efforts, he is, with God's assistance, to hope for eternal happiness from

Him; he must love God above all things as the highest, infinite good, in such a

manner that no creature shall be preferred to Him; he must acknowledge Him as

his absolute lord and master, adore and reverence Him, and resign himself

entirely to His holy Will. The first, highest, and most essential business of man

is to serve God. In case it is God's good pleasure to reveal a supernatural religion

and to determine in detail the manner and means of our worship of Him, man is

bound by the natural law to accept this revelation in a spirit of faith. and to order

his life accordingly. Here, too, it is plain that to divorce morality from religion is

impossible. Religious duties, those, namely, which have direct reference to God,

are man's prinicpal and most essential moral duties. Linked to these duties to

God are man's duties regarding himself. Man loves himself by an intrinsic

necessity of his nature. From this fact Schopenhauer drew the conclusion that

the commandment concerning sel-love was superflous. This would be true, if it

were a matter of indifference how man loved himself. But such is not the case; he

must love himself with a well-ordered love. He is to be solicitous for the welfare of

his soul and to do what is necessary to attain to eternal happiness. He is not his

own master, but was created for the service of God; hence the deliberate

arbitrary destruction of one's own life (suicide), as well as the freely intended

mutilation of self, is a criminal attack on the proprietary right God has to man's

person. Furthermore, every man is supposed to take a reasonable care to

preserve his health. He has certain duties also as regards temperance; for the

body must not be his master, but an instrument in the service of the soul, and

hence must be cared for in so far only as is conducive to this purpose. A further

duty concerns the acquisition of external material goods, as far as they are

necessary for man's support and the fulfillment of his other obligations. This

again involves the obligation to work; furthermore, God has endowed man with

the capacity for work in order that he might prove himself a beneficial member of

society; for idleness is the root of all evil. Besides these self-regarding duties,

there are simial ones regarding our fellow-men: duties of love, justice, fidelity,

truthfullness, gratitude, etc. The commandment of the love of our neighbour first

received its true appreciation in the Christian Dispensation. Though doublessly

contained to a certain extent in the natural law, the pagans had so lost sight of

the unity of the human race, and of the fact that all men are members of one vast

family dependent upon God, that they looked on every stranger as an enemy.

Christianity restored to mankind the consciousness of its unity and solidarity,

and supernaturally transfigured the natural precept to love our neighbour, by

demonstrating that all men are children of the same Father in heaven, were

redeemed by the same blood of the same Saviour, and are destined to the same

supernatual salvation. And, better still, Christianity provided man with the grace

necessary to the fulfillment of this precept and thus renewed the face of the

earth. In man's intercourse with his fellow-men the precepts of justice and of the

other allied virtues go hand in hand with the precept of love. There exists in man

the natural tendency to assert himself when there is question of his goods or

property. He expects his fellow-men to respect what belongs to him, and

instinctively resists any unjust attempt to violate this proprietorship. He will brook

an injury from no one in all that regards his life or health, his wife or child, his

honour or good name; he resents faithlessness and ingratitude on the part of

others, and the lie by which they would lead him into error. Yet he clearly

understands that only then can he reasonably expect others to respect his rights

when he in turn respects theirs. Hence the general maxim: "Do not do to others,

what you would not wish them to do to you"; from which are naturally deduced

the general commandments known to all men: "Thou shalt not kill, nor commit

adultery, nor steal, nor bear false witness against thy neighbour", etc. In this part

of ethics it is customary to investigate the principles of right as regards private

ownership. Has every man the right to acquire property? Or, at least, may not

society (the State) abolish private ownership and assume possession and control

of all material goods either wholly or in part, in order to thus distribute among the

members of the community the products of their joint industry? This latter

question is answered in the affirmative by the Socialists; and yet, it is the

experience of all ages that the community of goods and of ownership is

altogether impracticable in larger commonwealths, and would, if realiszd in any

case, invlolve widespread slavery.

The second part of special, or applied, ethics, called by many sociology,

considers man as a member of society, as far as this can be made the subject

of philosophical investigation. Man is by nature a social being; out of his innate

needs, inclinations, and tendencies the family and State necessarily arise. And

first of all the Creator had to provide for the preservation and propagation of the

human race. Man's life is brief, were no provision made for the perpetuation of the

human species, the world would soon become an uninhabited solitude, a

well-appointed abode without occupants. Hence God has given man the power

and propensity to propagate his kind. The generative function was not primarily

intended for man's indicidual well-being, but for the general good of his species,

and in its exercise, therefore, he must be guided accordingly. This general good

cannot be perfectly realized except in a lasting indissoluble monogamy. The

unity and indissolubility of the marriage bond are requirements of the natural law,

at least in the sense that man may not on his own authority set them aside.

Marriage is a Divine institution, for which God Himself has provided by means of

definite laws, and in regard to which, therefore, man has not the power to make

any change. The Creator might, of course, dispense for a time from the unity and

indissolubility of the marriage tie; for, though the perfection of the married state

demands these qualities, they are not of absolute necessity; the principal end of

marriage may be attained to a certain degree without them. God could, therefore,

for wise reasons grant a dispensation in regard to them for a certain length of

time. Christ, however, restored marriage to the original perfection consonant with

its nature. Moreover He raised marriage to the dignity of a sacrament and made it

symbolic of His own union with the Church; and had he done nothing more in this

respect than restore the natural law to its prestine integrity, mankind would be

bound to Him by an eternal debt of gratitude. For it was chiefly be means of the

unity and indissolubility of the married life that the sanctuary of the Christian

family was established, from which mankind has reaped the choicest blessings,

and compared with which paganism has no equivalent to offer. This exposition of

the nature of marriage from a theistic standpoint is diametrically opposed to the

views of modern Darwinists. According to them, men did not primitively recognize

any such institution as the married state, but lived together in complete

promiscuity. Marriage was the result of gradual development, woman was

originally the centre about which the family crystallized, and from this latter

circumstance there arises an explanation of the fact that many savage tribes

reckon heredity and kinship between families accoding to the lineal descent of

the female. We cannot dwell long upon these fantastic speculations, because

they do not consider man as essentially different from the brute, but as gradually

developed from a purely animal origin. Although marriage is of Divine institution,

not every individual is obliged, as a human being, to embrace the married state.

God intends marriage for the propagation of the human race. To achieve this

purpose it is by no means necessary for each and every member of the human

family to enter upon marriage, and this particularly at the present time, when the

question of over-population presents so many grave difficulties to social

economists. In this connexion certain other considerations from a Christian point

of view arise, which do not, however, belong to philosophical ethics. Since the

principal end of marriage is the procreation and education of children, it is

encumbent upon both parents to co-operate according to the requirements of sex

in the attainment of this end. From this it may readily be gathered what duties

exist between husband and wife, and between parents and their children.

The second natural society, the State, is a logical and necessary outcome of the

family. A completely isolated family could scarcely support itself, at all events it

could never rise above the lowest grade of civilization. Hence we see that at all

times and in all places, owing to natural needs and tendencies, larger groups of

families are formed. A division of labour takes place. Each family devotes itself to

some industry in which it may improve and develop its resources, and then

exchanges its products for those of other families. And now the way is opened to

civilization and progress. This grouping of families, in order to be permanent, has

need of authority, which makes for security, order, and peace, and in general

provides for what is necessary to the common good. Since God intends men to

live together in harmony and order, He likewise desires such authority in the

community as will have the right to procure what is needful for the common good.

This authority, considered in itself and apart from the human vehicle in which it is

placed, comes immediately from God, and hence, within its proper sphere, it

imposes upon the consciences of the subjects the duty of obedience. In the light

of this interpretation, the exercise of public power is vested with its proper dignity

and inviolability, and at the same time is circumscribed by necessary limitations.

A group of families under a common authoritive head, and not subject to any

similar aggregation, forms the primitive State, however small this may be. By

further development, or by coalition with other States, larger States gradually

come into existence. It is not the purpose of the State to supplant the families,

but to safeguard their rights, to protect them, and to supplement their efforts. It is

not to forfeit their rights or to abandon their proper functions that individuals and

families combine to form the State, but to be secured in these rights, and to find

support and encouragement in the discharge of the various duties assigned

them. Hence the State may not deprive the family of its right to educate and

instruct the children, but must simply lend its assistance by supplying, wheneer

needful, opportunities for the better accomplishment of this duty. Only so far as

the order and prosperity of the body politic requires it, may the State

circumscribe individual effort and activity. In other words, the State is to posit the

conditions under which, provided private endeavour be not lacking, each individual

and each family may attain to true earthly happiness. By true earthly happiness

is meant such as not only does not interfere with the free performance of the

individual's moral duties, but even upholds and encourages him therin.

Having defined the end and aim of the State, we are now in a position to examine

in detail its various functions and extent. Private morality is not subject to State

interference; but it is the proper function of the State to concern itself with the

interests of public morality. It must not only prevent vice from parading in public

and becoming a snare to many (e.g. through immoral literature, theatres, plays,

or other means of seduction), but also see to it that the public ordinances and

laws facilitate and advance morally good behaviour. The State may not affect

indifference as regards religion; the obligation to honour God publicly is binding

upon the Sate as such. It is true that the direct supervision of religious matters in

the present supernatural order was entrusted by Christ to His Church;

nevertheless, it is the duty of the Christian State to protect and uphold the

Church, the one true Church founded by Christ. Of course, owing to the

unfortunate division of Christians into numerous religious systems, such an

intimate relation betwen Church and State is at the present day but rarely

maintained. The separation of Church and State, with complete liberty of

conscience and worship, is often the only practical modus vivendi. In

circumstances such as these the State must be satisfied to leave the affairs of

religion to various bodies, and to protect the latter in those rights which have

reference to the general public order. The education and instruction of children

belongs per se to the family, and should not be monopolized by the State. The

later has, however, the right and the duty to suppress schools which disseminate

immoral doctrine or foster the practice of vice; beyond such control it may not set

limits to free individual endeavour. It may, however, assist the individual in his

efforts to secure an education, and, in case these do not suffice, it may establish

schools and institutions for his benefit. Finally, the State has to exercise

important economical functions. It must protect private property and see to it that

in man's industrial life the laws affecting justice be carried out in all their force

and vigour. But its duties do not stop here. It should pass such laws as will

enable its subjects to procure what is needed for their respectable sustenance

and even to attain a moderate competency. Both excessive wealth and extreme

poverty involve many dangers to the individual and to society. Hence the State

should pass such laws as will favour the sturdy middle class of citizens and add

to their numbers. Much can be done to bring about this desirable condition by

the enactment of proper tax and inheritance laws, of laws which protect the

labouring, manufacturing, and agricultural interests, and which supervise and

control trusts, syndicates, etc.

Although the authority of the State comes immediately from God, the person who

exercises it is not immediately designated by Him. This determination is left to

the circumstances of men's progress and development or of their modes of social

aggregation. According as the supreme power resides in one individual, or in a

privileged class, or in the people collectively, governments are divided into three

forms: the monarchy; the aristocracy; the democracy. The monarchy is

hereditary or elective, according as succession to supreme power follows the

right of primogeniture of a family (dynasty) or is subject to suffrage. At the

present day the only existing kind of monarchy is the hereditary, the elective

monarchies, such as Poland and the old German Sovereignty, having long since

disappeared. Those States in which the sovereign power resides in the body of

the people are called polycracies, or more commonly, republics, and are divided

into aristocracies and democracies. In republics sovereignty is vested in the

people. The latter elect from their number representatives who frame their laws

and administer the affairs of government in their name. The almost universally

prevailing form of government in Europe, fashioned upon the model created in

England, is the constitutional monarchy, a mixture of the monarchical,

aristocratic, and democratic forms. The law- making power is vested in the king

and two chambers. The members of one chamber represent the aristocratic and

conservative element, while the other chamber, elected from the body of citizens,

represents the democratic element. The monarch himself is responsible to no

one, yet his governmental acts require the counter-signature of the ministers,

who in turn are responsible to the chamber.

With regard to its appointed functions the government of the State is divided into

the legislative, judiciary, and executive powers. It is of primary importace that the

State enact general and stable laws governing the activities of its subjects, as far

as this is required for the good order and well-being of the whole body. For this

purpose it must possess the right to legislate; it must, moreover, carry out these

laws and provide, by means of the administrative, or rather executive, power for

what is needful to the general good of the community; finally, it has to punish

infractions of the laws and authoritively settle legal disputes, and for this purpose

it has need of the judiciary power (in civil and criminal courts). This right of the

State to impose penalties is founded on the necessity to preserve good order and

of providing for the security of the whole body politic. In a community there are

always found those who can in no other way be effectually forced to observe the

laws and respect the rights of others than by the infliction of punishment. Hence

the State must have the right to enact penal statutes, calculated to deter its

subjects from violating the laws, and the right, moreover, to actually inflict

punishment after the violation has occurred. Among the legitimate modes of

punishment is capital punishment. It is considered, and rightly so, a step forward

in civilization, that nowadays a milder practice has been adopted in this regard,

and that capital punishment is more rarely inflicted, and then only for such

heinous crimes as murder and high treason. Nevertheless humanitarian

sentimentalism has no doubt been carried to an exaggerated degree, so much

so that many would on principle do away with capital punishment altogether. And

yet, this is the only sanction sufficiently effective to deter some men from

committing the gravest crimes.

When it is asserted, with Aristotle, that the State is a society sufficient for itself,

this is to be considered true in the sense that the State needs no further

development to complete its organization, but not in the sense that it is

independent in every respect. The greater the advance of mankind in progress

and civilization, the more necessary and frequent the communication between

nations becomes. Hence the question arises as to what rights and duties

mutually exist between nation and nation. That portion of ethics which treats

thisquestion from a philosophical standpoint is called the theory of international

law, or of the law of nations. Of course, many writers of the present day deny the

propriety of a philosophical treatment of international law. According to them the

only international rights and duties are those which have been established by

some positive measure either implicitly or explicitly agreed upon. This, indeed, is

the position that must be taken by all who reject the natural law. On the other

hand, this position precludes the possibility of any positive international law

whatever, for lasting and binding compacts between various States are possible

only when the primary principle of right is recognized -- that it is just and

obligatory to stand by lawful agreements. Now this is a principle of natural law;

hence, those who deny the existence of natural law (e.g. E. von Hartmann) must

consequently reject any international law properly so called. In their opinion any

international agreements are mere conventions, which each one observes as long

as he finds it necessary or advantageous. And so we are eventually led back to

the principle of ancient paganism, which, in the intercourse between nations, too

often identified right with might. But Christianity brought the nations into a closer

union and broke down the barriers of narrow-minded policy. It proclaimed,

moreover, the duties of love and justice as binding on all nations, thus restoring

and perfecting the natural law. The fundamental principles: "Give each one his

due", "Do injury to no man", "Do not to others what you would not have them do

to you", etc., have an absolute and universal value, and hence must obtain also

in the intercourse between nations. Purely natural duties and rights are comon to

all nations; the acquired or positive ones may vary considerably. Various, too,

are the rights and duties of nations in peace and in war. Since, however, there

are, under this head, many details of a doubtful and changeable character, the

codification of international law is a most urgent desideratum. Besides this an

international court should be established to attend to the execution of the various

measures promulgated by the law and to arbitrate in case of dispute. The

foundations of such an intenational court of arbitration have been laid at The

Hague; unfortunately, its competence has been hitherto very much restricted,

and besides, it exercises its functions only when the Powers at variance appeal

to it of their own accord. In the codification of international law no one would be

more competent to lend effective cooperation and to maintain the principles of

justice and love which should exist between nations in their intercourse with one

another, than the pope. No one can offer sounder guarantees for the

righteousness of the principles to be laid down, and no one can exert greated

moral influence towards carrying them into effect. This is even recognized by

unprejudiced Protestants. At the Vatican Council not only the many Catholic

bishops present, but the Protestant David Urquhart appealed to the pope to draw

up a schedule of the more important principles of international law, which were to

be binding on all Christian nations. Religious prejudice, however, places many

difficulties in the way of realizing this plan.

V. Cathrein

Transcribed by Brendan Byrne

The Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume V

Nihil Obstat, May 1, 1909. Remy Lafort, Censor

Imprimatur. +John M. Farley, Archbishop of New York

The Catholic Encyclopedia: NewAdvent.org