Idealism

                     In discussing this term and its meaning, reference must be had to the cognate
                     expressions, idealist, idealized, ideal (adjective), and the ideal (noun), all of
                     which are derived from the Greek idéa. This signifies "image", "figure, "form": it
                     can be used in the sense of "likeness", or "copy" as well as in that of "type",
                     "model", or "pattern": it is this latter sense that finds expression in "ideal", and
                     "the ideal" and the derivatives are mentioned above. In speaking of "the ideal",
                     what we have in mind is not a copy of any perceptible object, but a type. The
                     artist is said to "idealize" his subject when he represents it as a fairer, nobler,
                     more perfect than it is in reality.

                     Idealism in life is the characteristic of those who regard the ideas of truth and
                     right, goodness and beauty, as standards and directive forces. This signification
                     betrays the influence of Plato, who made idea a technical term in philosophy.
                     According to him the visible world is simply a copy of a supersensible,
                     intelligible, ideal world, and consequently "things" are but the impress stamped
                     on reality by that which is of a higher, spiritual nature.

                     Platonism is the oldest form of idealism, and Plato himself the progenitor of
                     idealists. It is usual to place in contrast Plato's idealism and Aristotle's realism;
                     the latter in fact denies that ideas are originals and that things are mere copies;
                     he holds that the essence is intelligible, but that it is immanent in the things of
                     nature, whereas it is put into the products of art. It is more correct, therefore, to
                     call his teaching an immanent idealism as contrasted with the transcendental
                     idealism of Plato. Both these thinkers reveal the decisive influence of that moral
                     and aesthetic idealism which permeated Greek life, thought, and action; but for
                     both, what lies deepest down in their philosophy is the conviction that the first
                     and highest principle of all things is the one perfect spiritual Being which they
                     call God, and to which they lead back, by means of intermediate
                     principles--essence and form, purpose and law--the multifarious individual beings
                     of the visible world. In this sense idealism is dualism, i.e. the doctrine of a higher
                     spiritual principle over against that which is lower and material; and this doctrine
                     again is clearly opposed to the monism which would derive the higher and the
                     lower alike out of one and the same All-being. This older idealism teaches, not
                     that there is One-All, but that there is an alpha and omega, i.e. a supermundane
                     Cause and End, of the world. By means of its principles, idealism maintains the
                     distinctness of God and the world, of the absolute and finite, yet holds them
                     together in unity; it adjusts the relations between reality and knowledge, by
                     ascribing to things dimension, form, purpose, value, law, at the same time
                     securing forethought the requisite certainty and validity; it establishes objective
                     truth in the things that are known and subjective truth in the mind that knows
                     them. In this sense the Schoolmen teach that forma dat esse et distingui, i.e.
                     the principle which formally constitutes the object, likewise, in the act of
                     cognition, informs the mind. Inasmuch as its principles express the cause and
                     purpose of things, their determinate nature and value, idealism unites the
                     speculative and the ethical, the true and the good, moral philosophy and the
                     philosophy of nature.

                     In this sense St. Augustine developed the Platonic teaching, and in his
                     philosophy is idealism in the genuine meaning of the term. From him comes the
                     definition of ideas which Christian philosophy has since retained: "Ideas are
                     certain original forms of things, their archetypes, permanent and
                     incommunicable, which are contained in the Divine intelligence. And though they
                     neither begin to be nor cease, yet upon them are patterned the manifold things of
                     the world that come into being and pass away. Upon these ideas only the
                     rational sole can fix its gaze, endowed as it is with the faculty which is its
                     peculiar excellence, i.e. mind and reason [mente ac ratione], a power, as it were,
                     of intellectual vision; and for such intuition that sole only is qualified which is pure
                     and holy, i.e., whose eye is normal, clear, and well adjusted to the things which
                     it would fain behold" (De diversis quaest., Q. xlvi, in P.L., XL, 30).

                     This line of thought the Scholastics adopted, developing it in their treatises as
                     ideology. Their theory is described not as idealism, but as realism; but this does
                     not imply that they are in conflict with the doctrine of Augustine; it means rather
                     that the ideal principles possess real validity, that as ideas they subsist in the
                     Divine mind before the things corresponding to them are called into existence,
                     while, as forms and essences, they really exist in nature and are not really
                     products of our thinking. In this last-named sense, i.e., as subjective
                     constructions, ideas had long before been regarded by the philosophers of
                     antiquity and especially by the Stoics, who held that ideas are nothing else than
                     mental representation. This erroneous and misleading view appeared during the
                     Middle Ages in the guise of nominalism, a designation given to the system
                     whose adherents claimed that our concepts are mere names (nomina), which
                     have as their counterparts in the world of reality individual things, but not forms or
                     essences or purposes. This opinion, which robs both science and moral
                     principles of their universal validity, and which paves the way for Materialism and
                     agnosticism, was combated by the leaders of Scholasticism--Anselm of
                     Canterbury, Albertus Mangus, Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure, and Duns
                     Scotus--nevertheless, from the fourteenth century onwards, it had its champions
                     and propagators, notably William of Occam. For the untrained mind it was easier
                     to consider individual things as the only realities and to regard forms and
                     essences as purely mental products.

                     So it came to pass that the word idea in various languages took on more and
                     more the meaning of "representation", "mental image", and the like. Hence too,
                     there was gradually introduced the terminology which we find in the writings of
                     Berkeley, and according to which idealism is the doctrine that ascribes reality to
                     our ideas, i.e. our representations, but denies the reality of the physical world.
                     This sort of idealism is just the reverse of that which was held by the
                     philosophers of antiquity and their Christian successors; it does away with the
                     reality of ideal principles by confining them exclusively to the thinking subject; it
                     is a spurious idealism which deserves rather the name "phenomenalism"
                     (phenomenon, "appearance", as opposed to noumenon, "the object of thought").

                     The doctrine of Descartes has also per nefas been called idealism. It is true that
                     Cartesianism is in line with the genuine idealism of the earlier schools, inasmuch
                     as it postulates God, thought, and spatial reality. But, on the other hand, this
                     system too employs idea only in a subjective signification and quite overlooks
                     the intermediate position of ideal principles. According to the theory of Leibniz,
                     which has also been regarded as idealistic, our mind constructs from its own
                     resources (de son propre fond) its scheme of the world; but , thanks to a
                     pre-established harmony (harmonie préétablie), it accords with reality. This view,
                     however, furnishes no solution for the epistemological problem. Kant claims that
                     his critical philosophy is both a "transcendental idealism" and an "empirical
                     realism"; but he declares ideas are "illusions of reason", and such ideal
                     principles as cause and purpose are simply devices of thought which can be
                     employed only in reference to phenomena. Fichte took Kant as his starting--point
                     but finally rose above the level of subjectivism and posited a principle of reality,
                     the absolute Ego. Hegel's doctrine can be termed idealism so far as it seeks the
                     highest principle in the absolute idea, which finds its self-realization in form,
                     concept, etc.--a view which amounts virtually to monism. The various offshoots of
                     Kantian philosophy are incorrectly regarded as developments of idealism; it is
                     more accurate to describe them as "illusionism" or "Solipsism", since they
                     entirely sweep away objective reality. In this connection a German philosopher
                     declares:

                          I affirm without hesitation that the assertion, 'the existence of the
                          world consists merely in our thinking', is for me the result of a
                          hypertrophy of the passion for knowledge. To this conclusion I have
                          been lead chiefly by the torture I endure in getting over 'idealism'.
                          Whosoever attempts to take this theory in downright earnest, to
                          force his way clean through it and identify himself with it, will
                          certainly feel that something is about to snap in his brain
                          (Jerusalem, "Die Urtheilsfunktion", Vienna, 1886, p.261).

                     Similar conclusions are reached by J. Volkelt (Erfahrung u. Denken, Hamburg,
                     1886, p. 519);

                          Any man who carries his theoretical doubts or denial of the
                          external world so far that even in his everyday experience he is
                          forever reminding himself of the purely subjective character of his
                          perceptions. . .will simply find himself flung out of the natural
                          course and direction of life, stripped of all normal feeling and
                          interest, and sooner or later confronted with the danger of losing his
                          mind completely.

                     It is certainly a matter of regret that the terms idea, idealist, and idealism,
                     originally so rich in content, should be so far degraded as to signify such
                     aberrations of thought. The present writer, in his "Geschichte des Idealismus"
                     (2nd ed., Brunswick, 1907) has taken the ground that the original meaning of
                     these terms should be restored to them. In the index of this "Geschichte" and in
                     his monograph, "Die Wichtigsten Philosophischen Fachausdrücke" (Munich,
                     1909), he traces in detail the changes and meaning which these words have
                     undergone.

                     Otto  Willmann
                     Transcribed by Peter S. Zehr and Patrick C. Swain

                                       The Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume VII
                                    Copyright © 1910 by Robert Appleton Company
                                    Online Edition Copyright © 1999 by Kevin Knight
                                  Nihil Obstat, June 1, 1910. Remy Lafort, S.T.D., Censor
                                 Imprimatur. +John Cardinal Farley, Archbishop of New York

The Catholic Encyclopedia: NewAdvent.org