Intellect

(Latin intelligere -- inter and legere -- to choose between, to discern; Greek nous;

German Vernunft, Verstand; French intellect; Italian intelletto).

The faculty of thought. AS understood in Catholic philosophical literature it

signifies the higher, spiritual, cognitive power of the soul. It is in this view

awakened to action by sense, but transcends the latter in range. Amongst its

functions are attention, conception, judgment, reasoning, reflection, and

self-consciousness. All these modes of activity exhibit a distinctly

suprasensuous element, and reveal a cognitive faculty of a higher order than is

required for mere sense-cognitions. In harmony, therefore, with Catholic usage,

we reserve the terms intellect, intelligence, and intellectual to this higher power

and its operations, although many modern psychologists are wont, with much

resulting confusion, to extend the application of these terms so as to include

sensuous forms of the cognitive process. By thus restricting the use of these

terms, the inaccuracy of such phrases as "animal intelligence" is avoided. Before

such language may be legitimately employed, it should be shown that the lower

animals are endowed with genuinely rational faculties, fundamentally one in kind

with those of man. Catholic philosophers, however they differ on minor points, as

a general body have held that intellect is a spiritual faculty depending

extrinsically, but not intrinsically, on the bodily organism. The importance of a

right theory of intellect is twofold: on account of its bearing on epistemology, or

the doctrine of knowledge; and because of its connexion with the question of the

spirituality of the soul.

HISTORY

The view that the cognitive powers of the mind, or faculties of knowledge, are of a

double order -- the one lower, grosser, more intimately depending on bodily

organs, the other higher and of a more refined and spiritual nature -- appeared

very early, though at first confusedly, in Greek thought. It was in connexion with

cosmological, rather than psychological, theories that the difference between

sensuous and rational knowledge was first emphasized. On the one hand there

seems to be constant change, and, on the other hand, permanence in the world

that is revealed to us. The question: How is the apparent conflict to be

reconciled? or, Which is the true representation? forced itself on the speculative

mind. Heraclitus insists on the reality of the changeable. All things are in a

perpetual flux. Parmenides, Zeno, and the Eleatics argued that only the

unchangeable being truly is. Aisthesis, "sense", is the faculty by which changing

phenomena are apprehended; nous, "thought", "reason", "intellect", presents to

us permanent, abiding being. The Sophists, with a skill unsurpassed by modern

Agnosticism, urged the sceptical consequences of the apparent contradiction

between the one and the many, the permanent and the changing, and

emphasized the part contributed by the mind in knowledge. For Protagoras,

"Man is the measure of all things", whilst with Gorgias the conclusion is:

"Nothing is; nothing can be known; nothing can be expressed in speech".

Socrates held that truth was innate in the mind antecedent to sensuous

experience, but his chief contribution to the theory of knowledge was his

insistence on the importance of the general concept or definition.

It was Plato, however, who first realized the full significance of the problem and

the necessity for coordinating the data of sense with the data of the intellect, he

also first explained the origin of the problem. The universe of being, as reported

by reason, is one, eternal, immutable; as revealed by sense, it is a series of

multiple changing phenomena. Which is the truly real? For Plato there are in a

sense two worlds, that of the intellect (noeton) and that of sense (horaton).

Sense can give only an imperfect knowledge of its object, which he calls belief

(pistis) or conjecture (eikasia). The faculties by which we apprehend the noeton,

"the intelligible world" are two: nous, "intuitive reason", which reaches the ideas

(see IDEA); and logos, "discursive reason", which by its proper process, viz.

episteme "demonstration", attains only to dianoia "conception". Plato thus sets

up two distinct intellectual faculties attaining to different sets of objects. But the

world of ideas is for Plato the real world, that of sense is only a poor shadowy

imitation. Aristotle's doctrine on the intellect in its main outline is clear. The soul

is possessed of two orders of cognitive faculty, to aisthetikon, "sensuous

cognition", and to dianoetikon "rational cognition" . The sensuous faculty

includes aisthesis, sensuous perception", phantasia, "imagination", and mneme,

memory". The faculty of rational cognition includes nous and dianoia. These,

however, are not so much two faculties as two functions of the same power. They

roughly correspond to intellect and ratiocinative reason. For intellect to operate,

previous sense perception is required. The function of the intellect is to divest the

object presented by sense of its material and individualizing conditions, and

apprehend the universal and intelligible form embodied in the concrete physical

reality. The outcome of the process is the generalization in the intellect of an

intellectual form or representation of the intelligible being of the object (eidos,

noeton). This act constitutes the intellect cognizant of the object in its universal

nature. In this process intellect appears in a double character. On the one hand it

exhibits itself as an active agent, in that it operates on the object presented by

the sensuous faculty rendering it intelligible. On the other hand, as subject of the

intellectual representation evolved, it manifests passivity, modifiability, and

susceptibility to the reception of different forms. There is thus revealed in

Aristotle's theory of intellectual cognition an active intellect (nous poietikos) and

a passive intellect (nous pathetikos). But how these are to be conceived, and

what precisely is the nature of the distinction and relation between them, is one

of the most irritatingly obscure points in the whole of Aristotle's works. The locus

classicus is his "De Anima", III, v, where the subject is briefly dealt with. As the

active intellect actuates the passive, it bears to it a relation similar to that of form

to matter in physical bodies. The active intellect "illuminates" the object of

sense, rendering it intelligible somewhat as light renders colours visible. It is pure

energy without any potentiality, and its activity is continuous. It is separate,

immortal, and eternal. The passive intellect, on the other hand, receives the

forms abstracted by the active intellect and ideally becomes the object. The

whole passage is so obscure that commentators from the beginning are

hopelessly divided as to Aristotle's own view on the nature of the nous poietikos.

Theophrastus, who succeeded Aristotle as scholiarch of the Lyceum, accepted

the twofold intellect, but was unable to explain it. The great commentator,

Alexander of Aphrodisias, interprets the nous poietikos as the activity of the

Divine intelligence. This view was adopted by many of the Arabian philosophers

of the Middle Ages, who conceived it in a pantheistic sense. For many of them

the active intellect is one universal reason illuminating all men. With Avicenna the

passive intellect alone is individual. Averrhoës conceives both intellectus agens

and intellectus possibilis as separate from the individual soul and as one in all

men.

The Schoolmen generally controverted the Arabian theories. Albertus Magnus

and St. Thomas interpret intellectus agens and possibilis as merely distinct

faculties or powers of the individual soul. St. Thomas understands "separate"

(choristos) and "pure" or "unmixed" (amiges) to signify that the intellect is

distinct from matter and incorporeal. Interpreting Aristotle thus benevolently, and

developing his doctrine Aquinas teaches that the function of the active intellect is

an abstractive operation on the data supplied by the sensuous faculties to form

the species intelligibiles in the intellectus possibilis. The intellectus possibilis

thus actuated cognizes what is intelligible in the object. The act of cognition is

the concept, or verbum mentale, by which is apprehended the universal nature or

essence of the object prescinded from its individualizing conditions. The main

features of the Aristotelean doctrine of intellect, and of its essential distinction

from the faculty of sensuous cognition, were adhered to by the general body of

the Schoolmen.

By the time we reach modern philosophy, especially in England, the radical

distinction between the two orders of faculties begins to be lost sight of.

Descartes, defending the spirituality of the soul; naturally supposes the intellect

to be a spiritual faculty. Leibniz insists on both the spirituality and innate

efficiency of the intellect. Whilst admitting the axiom, "Nil est in intellectu quod

non prius fuerit in sensu", he adds with much force, "nisi intellectus ipse", and

urges spontaneity and innate activity as characteristics of the monad. From the

break with Scholasticism, however, English philosophy drifted towards

Sensationism and Materialism, subsequently influencing France and other

countries in the same direction, as a consequence, the old conception of

intellect as a spiritual faculty of the soul, and as a cognitive activity by which the

universal, necessary, and immutable elements in knowledge are apprehended,

was almost entirely lost. For Hobbes the mind is material, and all knowledge is

ultimately sensuous. Locke's attack on innate ideas and intuitive knowledge, his

reduction of various forms of intellectual cognition to complex amalgams of so

called simple ideas originating in sense perception, and his representation of the

mind as a passive tabula rasa, in spite of his allotting certain work to reflection

and the discursive reason, paved the way for all modern Sensationism and

Phenomenalism. Condillac, omitting Locke's "reflection", resolved all intellectual

knowledge into Sensationism pure and simple. Hume, analysing all mental

Products into sensuous impressions, vivid or faint, plus association due to

custom, developed the sceptical consequences involved in Locke's defective

treatment of the intellectual faculty, and carried philosophy back to the old

conclusions of the Greek Sensationists and Sophists, but reinforced by a more

subtile and acute psychology. All the main features of Hume's psychology have

been adopted by the whole Associationist school in England, by Positivists

abroad, and by materialistic scientists in so far as they have any philosophy or

psychology at all. The essential distinction between intellect, or rational activity,

and sense has in fact been completely lost sight of, and Scepticism and

Agnosticism have logically followed. Kant recognized a distinction between

sensation and the higher mental element, but, conceiving the latter in a different

way from the old Aristotelean view, and looking on it as purely subjective, his

system was developed into an idealism and scepticism differing in kind from that

of Hume, but not very much more satisfactory. Still, the neo-Kantian and

Hegelian movement, which developed in Great Britain during the last quarter of

the nineteenth century has contributed much towards the reawakening of the

recognition of the intellectual, or rational, element in all knowledge.

THE COMMON DOCTRINE

The teaching of Aristotle on intellect, as developed by Albertus Magnus and St.

Thomas, has become, as we have said, in its main features the common

doctrine of Catholic philosophers. We shall state it in brief outline.

(1) Intellect is a cognitive faculty essentially different from sense and of a

supra-organic order; that is, it is not exerted by, or intrinsically dependent on, a

bodily organ, as sensation is. This proposition is proved by psychological

analysis and study of the chief functions of intellect. These are conception,

judgment, reasoning, reflection, and self-consciousness. All these activities

involve elements essentially different from sensuous consciousness. In

conception the mind forms universal ideas. These are different in kind from

sensations and sensuous images. These latter are concrete and individual, truly

representative of only one object, whilst the universal idea will apply with equal

truth to any object of the class. The universal idea possesses a fixity and

invariableness of nature, whilst the sensuous image changes from moment to

moment. Thus the concept or universal idea of "gold", or "triangle", will with equal

justice stand for any specimen, but the image represents truly only one

individual. The sensuous faculty can be awakened to activity only by a stimulus

which whatever it be, exists in a concrete, individualized form. In judgment the

mind perceives the identity or discordance of two concepts. In reasoning it

apprehends the logical nexus between conclusion and premises. In reflection and

self-consciousness it turns back on itself in such a manner that there is perfect

identity between the knowing subject and the object known. But all these forms

of consciousness are incompatible with the notion of a sensuous faculty, or one

exerted by means of a bodily organ. The Sensationist psychologists, from

Berkeley onwards, were unanimous in maintaining that the mind cannot form

universal or abstract ideas. This would be true were the intellect not a spiritual

faculty essentially distinct from sense. The simple fact is that they invariably

confounded the image of the imagination, which is individualized, with the

concept, or idea, of the intellect. When we employ universal terms in any

intelligible proposition the terms have a meaning. The thought by which that

meaning is apprehended in the mind is a universal idea.

(2) In cognition we start from sensuous experience. The intellect presupposes

sensation and operates on the materials supplied by the sensuous faculties. The

beginning of consciousness with the infant is in sensation. This is at first felt,

most probably, in a vague and indefinite form. But repetition of particular

sensations and experience of other sensations contrasted with them render their

apprehension more and more definite as time goes on. Groups of sensations of

different senses are aroused by particular objects and become united by the

force of contiguous association. The awakening of any one of the group calls up

the images of the others. Sense perception is thus being perfected. At a certain

stage in the process of development the higher power of intellect begins to be

evoked into activity, at first feebly and dimly. In the beginning the intellectual

apprehension, like the sensations which preceded, is extremely vague. Its first

acts are probably the cognition of objects revealed through sensation under wide

and indefinite ideas, such as "extended-thing", "moving-thing", "pressing-thing",

and the like. It takes in objects as wholes, before discriminating their parts.

Repetition and variation of sense-impressions stimulates and sharpens attention.

Pleasure or pain evokes interest and the intellect concentrates on part of the

sensuous experience, and the process of abstraction begins. Certain attributes

are laid hold of, to the omission of others. Comparison and discrimination are

also called into action, and the more accurate and perfect elaboration of

concepts now proceeds rapidly. The notions of substance and accidents, of

whole and parts, of permanent and changing, are evolved with increasing

distinctness. Generalization follows quickly upon abstraction. When an attribute

or an object has been singled out and recognized as a thing distinct from its

surroundings, an act of reflection renders the mind aware of the object as

capable of indefinite realization and multiplication in other circumstances, and we

have now the formally reflex universal idea.

The further activity of the intellect is fundamentally the same in kind, comparing,

identifying, or discriminating. The activity of ratiocination is merely reiteration of

the judicial activity. The final stage in the elaboration of a concept is reached

when it is embodied for further use in a general name. Words presuppose

intellectual ideas, but register them and render them permanent. The intellect is

also distinguished according to its functions, as speculative or practical. When

pronouncing simply on the rational relations of ideas, it is called speculative;

when considering harmony with action, it is termed practical. The faculty,

however, is the same in both cases. The faculty of conscience is in fact merely

the practical intellect, or the intellect passing judgment on the moral quality of

actions. The intellect is essentially the faculty of truth and falsity, and in its

judicial acts it at the same time affirms the union of subject and predicate and

the agreement between its own representation and the objective reality. Intellect

also exhibits itself in the higher form of memory when there is conscious

recognition of identity between the present and the past. To the intellect is due

also the conception of self and personal identity. The fundamental difficulty with

the whole Sensationist school, from Hume to Mill, in regard to the recognition of

personality, is due to their ignoring the true nature of the faculty of intellect. Were

there no such higher rational faculty in the mind, then the mind could never be

known as anything more than a series of mental states. It is the intellect which

enables the mind to apprehend itself as a unity, or unitary being. The ideas of the

infinite, of space, time, and causality are all similarly the product of intellectual

activity, starting from the data presented by sense, and exercising a power of

intuition, abstraction, identification, and discrimination. It is, accordingly, the

absence of an adequate conception of intellect which has rendered the treatment

of all these mental functions so defective. in the English psychology of the last

century.

(See also FACULTIES OF THE SOUL; DIALECTIC; EPISTEMOLOGY;

EMPIRICISM; IDEALISM; POSITIVISM.)

Michael Maher

Transcribed by Tomas Hancil

The Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume VIII

Nihil Obstat, October 1, 1910. Remy Lafort, S.T.D., Censor

Imprimatur. +John Cardinal Farley, Archbishop of New York

The Catholic Encyclopedia: NewAdvent.org