Philosophy

                          I. Definition of Philosophy.
                          II. Division of Philosophy.
                          III. The Principal Systematic Solutions.
                          IV. Philosophical Methods.
                          V. The Great Historical Currents of Thought.
                          VI. Contemporary Orientations.
                          VII. Is Progress in Philosophy Indefinite, or Is there a Philosophia
                          Perennis?
                          VIII. Philosophy and the Sciences.
                          IX. Philosophy and Religion.
                          X. The Catholic Church and Philosophy.
                          XI. The Teaching of Philosophy.
                          XII. Bibliography

                                      I. DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY

                     Etymology

                     According to its etymology, the word "philosophy" (philosophia, from philein, to
                     love, and sophia, wisdom) means "the love of wisdom". This sense appears again
                     in sapientia, the word used in the Middle Ages to designate philosophy.

                     In the early stages of Greek, as of every other, civilization, the boundary line
                     between philosophy and other departments of human knowledge was not sharply
                     defined, and philosophy was understood to mean "every striving towards
                     knowledge". This sense of the word survives in Herodotus (I, xxx) and
                     Thucydides (II, xl). In the ninth century of our era, Alcuin, employing it in the
                     same sense, says that philosophy is "naturarum inquisitio, rerum humanarum
                     divinarumque cognitio quantum homini possibile est aestimare" - investigation
                     of nature, and such knowledge of things human and Divine as is possible for man
                     (P.L., CI, 952).

                     In its proper acceptation, philosophy does not mean the aggregate of the human
                     sciences, but "the general science of things in the universe by their ultimate
                     determinations and reasons"; or again, "the intimate knowledge of the causes
                     and reasons of things", the profound knowledge of the universal order.

                     Without here enumerating all the historic definitions of philosophy, some of the
                     most significant may be given. Plato calls it "the acquisition of knowledge",
                     ktêsis epistêmês (Euthydemus, 288 d). Aristotle, mightier than his master at
                     compressing ideas, writes: tên onomazomenên sophian peri ta procirc;ta aitia
                     kai tas archas hupolambanousi pantes - "All men consider philosophy as
                     concerned with first causes and principles" (Metaph., I, i). These notions were
                     perpetuated in the post-Aristotelean schools (Stoicism, Epicureanism,
                     neo-Platonism), with this difference, that the Stoics and Epicureans accentuated
                     the moral bearing of philosophy ("Philosophia studium summae virtutis", says
                     Seneca in "Epist.", lxxxix, 7), and the neo-Platonists its mystical bearing (see
                     section V below). The Fathers of the Church and the first philosophers of the
                     Middle Ages seem not to have had a very clear idea of philosophy for reasons
                     which we will develop later on (section IX), but its conception emerges once more
                     in all its purity among the Arabic philosophers at the end of the twelfth century
                     and the masters of Scholasticism in the thirteenth. St. Thomas, adopting the
                     Aristotelean idea, writes: "Sapientia est scientia quae considerat causas primas
                     et universales causas; sapientia causas primas omnium causarum considerat"
                     - Wisdom [i.e. philosophy] is the science which considers first and universal
                     causes; wisdom considers the first causes of all causes" (In Metaph., I, lect. ii).

                     In general, modern philosophers may be said to have adopted this way of looking
                     at it. Descartes regards philosophy as wisdom: "Philosophiae voce sapientiae
                     studium denotamus" - "By the term philosophy we denote the pursuit of
                     wisdom" (Princ. philos., preface); and he understands by it "cognitio veritatis per
                     primas suas causas" - " knowledge of truth by its first causes" (ibid.). For
                     Locke, philosophy is the true knowledge of things; for Berkeley, "the study of
                     wisdom and truth" (Princ.). The many conceptions of philosophy given by Kant
                     reduce it to that of a science of the general principles of knowledge and of the
                     ultimate objects attainable by knowledge - "Wissenschaft von den letzten
                     Zwecken der menschlichen Vernunft". For the numerous German philosophers
                     who derive their inspiration from his criticism - Fichte, Hegel, Schelling,
                     Schleiermacher, Schopenhauer, and the rest - it is the general teaching of
                     science (Wissenschaftslehre). Many contemporary authors regard it as the
                     synthetic theory of the particular sciences: "Philosophy", says Herbert Spencer,
                     "is completely unified knowledge" (First Principles, #37). Ostwald has the same
                     idea. For Wundt, the object of philosophy is "the acquisition of such a general
                     conception of the world and of life as will satisfy the exigencies of the reason and
                     the needs of the heart" - "Gewinnung einer allgemeinen Welt - und
                     Lebensanschauung, welche die Forderungen unserer Vernunft und die
                     Bedurfnisse unseres Gemüths befriedigen soll" (Einleit. in d. Philos., 1901, p. 5).
                     This idea of philosophy as the ultimate science of values (Wert lehre) is
                     emphasized by Windelband, Déring, and others.

                     The list of conceptions and definitions might be indefinitely prolonged. All of them
                     affirm the eminently synthetic character of philosophy. In the opinion of the
                     present writer, the most exact and comprehensive definition is that of Aristotle.
                     Face to face with nature and with himself, man reflects and endeavours to
                     discover what the world is, and what he is himself. Having made the real the
                     object of studies in detail, each of which constitutes science (see section VIII),
                     he is led to a study of the whole, to inquire into the principles or reasons of the
                     totality of things, a study which supplies the answers to the last Why's. The last
                     Why of all rests upon all that is and all that becomes: it does not apply, as in
                     any one particular science (e.g. chemistry), to this or that process of becoming,
                     or to this or that being (e.g. the combination of two bodies), but to all being and
                     all becoming. All being has within it its constituent principles, which account for
                     its substance (constitutive material and formal causes); all becoming, or change,
                     whether superficial or profound, is brought about by an efficient cause other than
                     its subject; and lastly things and events have their bearings from a finality, or final
                     cause. The harmony of principles, or causes, produces the universal order. And
                     thus philosophy is the profound knowledge of the universal order, in the sense of
                     having for its object the simplest and most general principles, by means of which
                     all other objects of thought are, in the last resort, explained. By these principles,
                     says Aristotle, we know other things, but other things do not suffice to make us
                     know these principles (dia gar tauta kai ek toutôn t'alla gnôrizetai, all' ou tauta
                     dia tôn hupokeimenôn - Metaph., I). The expression universal order should be
                     understood in the widest sense. Man is one part of it: hence the relations of man
                     with the world of sense and with its Author belong to the domain of philosophy.
                     Now man, on the one hand, is the responsible author of these relations, because
                     he is free, but he is obliged by nature itself to reach an aim, which is his moral
                     end. On the other hand, he has the power of reflecting upon the knowledge which
                     he acquires of all things, and this leads him to study the logical structure of
                     science. Thus philosophical knowledge leads to philosophical acquaintance with
                     morality and logic. And hence we have this more comprehensive definition of
                     philosophy: "The profound knowledge of the universal order, of the duties which
                     that order imposes upon man, and of the knowledge which man acquires from
                     reality" - "La connaissance approfondie de l'ordre universel, des devoirs qui en
                     résultent pour l'homme et de la science que l'homme acquiert de la rémite"'
                     (Mercier, "Logique", 1904, p. 23). - The development of these same ideas under
                     another aspect will be found in section VIII of this article.

                                      II. DIVISIONS OF PHILOSOPHY

                     Since the universal order falls within the scope of philosophy (which studies only
                     its first principles, not its reasons in detail), philosophy is led to the consideration
                     of all that is: the world, God (or its cause), and man himself (his nature, origin,
                     operations, moral end, and scientific activities).

                     It would be out of the question to enumerate here all the methods of dividing
                     philosophy that have been given: we confine ourselves to those which have
                     played a part in history and possess the deepest significance.

                     A. In Greek Philosophy

                     Two historical divisions dominate Greek philosophy: the Platonic and the
                     Aristotelean.

                     (1) Plato divides philosophy into dialectic, physics, and ethics. This division is
                     not found in Plato's own writings, and it would be impossible to fit his dialogues
                     into the triple frame, but it corresponds to the spirit of the Platonic philosophy.
                     According to Zeller, Xenocrates (314 B.C.) his disciple, and the leading
                     representative of the Old Academy, was the first to adopt this triadic division,
                     which was destined to go down through the ages (Grundriss d. Geschichte d.
                     griechischen Philosophie, 144), and Aristotle follows it in dividing his master's
                     philosophy. Dialectic is the science of objective reality, i.e., of the Idea (idea
                     eidos), so that by Platonic dialectic we must understand metaphysics. Physics
                     is concerned with the manifestations of the Idea, or with the Real, in the sensible
                     universe, to which Plato attributes no real value independent of that of the Idea.
                     Ethics has for its object human acts. Plato deals with logic, but has no system
                     of logic; this was a product of Aristotle's genius.

                     Plato's classification was taken up by his school (the Academy), but it was not
                     long in yielding to the influence of Aristotle's more complete division and
                     according a place to logic. Following the inspirations of the old Academics, the
                     Stoics divided philosophy into physics (the study of the real), logic (the study of
                     the structure of science) and morals (the study of moral acts). This classification
                     was perpetuated by the neo-Platonists, who transmitted it to the Fathers of the
                     Church, and through them to the Middle Ages.

                     (2) Aristotle, Plato's illustrious disciple, the most didactic, and at the same time
                     the most synthetic, mind of the Greek worid, drew up a remarkable scheme of
                     the divisions of philosophy. The philosophical sciences are divided into theoretic,
                     practical, and poetic, according as their scope is pure speculative knowledge, or
                     conduct (praxis), or external production (poiêsis). Theoretic philosophy
                     comprises: (a) physics, or the study of corporeal things which are subject to
                     change (achôrista men all' ouk akinêta) (b) mathematics, or the study of
                     extension, i.e., of a corporeal property not subject to change and considered, by
                     abstraction, apart from matter (akinêta men ou chôrista d'isôs, all' hôs en hulê);
                     (c) metaphysics, called theology, or first philosophy, i.e. the study of being in its
                     unchangeable and (whether naturally or by abstraction) incorporeal
                     determinations (chôrista kau akinêt). Practical philosophy comprises ethics,
                     economics, and politics, the second of these three often merging into the last.
                     Poetic philosophy is concerned in general with the external works conceived by
                     human intelligence. To these may conveniently be added logic, the vestibule of
                     philosophy, which Aristotle studied at length, and of which he may be called the
                     creator.

                     To metaphysics Aristotle rightly accords the place of honour in the grouping of
                     philosophical studies. He calls it "first philosophy". His classification was taken
                     up by the Peripatetic School and was famous throughout antiquity; it was
                     eclipsed by the Platonic classification during the Alexandrine period, but it
                     reappeared during the Middle Ages.

                     B. In the Middle Ages

                     Though the division of philosophy into its branches is not uniform in the first
                     period of the Middle Ages in the West, i.e. down to the end of the twelfth century,
                     the classifications of this period are mostly akin to the Platonic division into
                     logic, ethics, and physics. Aristotle's classification of the theoretic sciences,
                     though made known by Boethius, exerted no influence for the reason that in the
                     early Middle Ages the West knew nothing of Aristotle except his works on logic
                     and some fragments of his speculative philosophy (see section V below). It
                     should be added here that philosophy, reduced at first to dialectic, or logic, and
                     placed as such in the Trivium, was not long in setting itself above the liberal arts.

                     The Arab philosophers of the twelfth century (Avicenna, Averroes) accepted the
                     Aristotelean classification, and when their works - particularly their translations
                     of Aristotle's great original treatises - penetrated into the West, the Aristotelean
                     division definitively took its place there. Its coming is heralded by Gundissalinus
                     (see section XII), one of the Toletan translators of Aristotle, and author of a
                     treatise, "De divisione philosophiae", which was imitated by Michael Scott and
                     Robert Kilwardby. St. Thomas did no more than adopt it and give it a precise
                     scientific form. Later on we shall see that, conformably with the medieval notion
                     of sapientia, to each part of philosophy corresponds the preliminary study of a
                     group of special sciences. The general scheme of the division of philosophy in
                     the thirteenth century, with St. Thomas's commentary on it, is as follows:

                          There are as many parts of philosophy as there are distinct
                          domains in the order submitted to the philosopher's reflection. Now
                          there is an order which the intelligence does not form but only
                          considers; such is the order realized in nature. Another order, the
                          practical, is formed either by the acts of our intelligence or by the
                          acts of our will, or by the application of those acts to external
                          things in the arts: e.g., the division of practical philosophy into
                          logic, moral philosophy, and aesthetics, or the philosophy of the
                          arts ("Ad philosophiam naturalem pertinet considerare ordinem
                          rerum quem ratio humana considerat sed non facit; ita quod sub
                          naturali philosophia comprehendamus et metaphysicam. Ordo
                          autem quem ratio considerando facit in proprio actu, pertinet ad
                          rationalem philosophiam, cujus est considerare ordinem partium
                          orationis ad invicem et ordinem principiorum ad invicem et ad
                          conclusiones. Ordo autem actionum voluntariarum pertinet ad
                          considerationem moralis philosophiae. Ordo autem quem ratio
                          considerando facit in rebus exterioribus per rationem humanam
                          pertinet ad artes mechanicas." To natural philosophy pertains the
                          consideration of the order of things which human reason considers
                          but does not create - just as we include metaphysics also under
                          natural philosophy. But the order which reason creates of its own
                          act by consideration pertains to rational philosophy, the office of
                          which is to consider the order of the parts of speech with reference
                          to one another and the order of the principles with reference to one
                          another and to the conclusions. The order of voluntary actions
                          pertains to the consideration of moral philosophy, while the order
                          which the reason creates in external things through the human
                          reason pertains to the mechanical arts. - In "X Ethic. ad Nic.", I,
                          lect. i).

                     The philosophy of nature, or speculative philosophy, is divided into metaphysics,
                     mathematics, and physics, according to the three stages traversed by the
                     intelligence in its effort to attain a synthetic comprehension of the universal order,
                     by abstracting from movement (physics), intelligible quantity (mathematics),
                     being (metaphysics) (In lib. Boeth. de Trinitate, Q. v., a. 1). In this classification
                     it is to be noted that, man being one element of the world of sense, psychology
                     ranks as a part of physics.

                     C. In Modern Philosophy

                     The Scholastic classification may be said, generally speaking, to have lasted,
                     with some exceptions, until the seventeenth century. Beginning with Descartes,
                     we find a multitude of classifications arising, differing in the principles which
                     inspire them. Kant, for instance, distinguishes metaphysics, moral philosophy,
                     religion, and anthropology. The most widely accepted scheme, that which still
                     governs the division of the branches of philosophy in teaching, is due to Wolff
                     (1679-1755), a disciple of Leibniz, who has been called the educator of Germany
                     in the eighteenth century. This scheme is as follows:

                        1.Logic.
                        2.Speculative Philosophy.
                               Ontology, or General Metaphysics.
                               Special Metaphysics.
                                    Theodicy (the study of God).
                                    Cosmology (the study of the World).
                                    Psychology (the study of Man).
                        3.Practical Philosophy.
                               Ethics
                               Politics
                               Economics

                     Wolff broke the ties binding the particular sciences to philosophy, and placed
                     them by themselves; in his view philosophy must remain purely rational. It is
                     easy to see that the members of Wolff's scheme are found in the Aristotelean
                     classification, wherein theodicy is a chapter of metaphysics and psychology a
                     chapter of physics. It may even be said that the Greek classification is better
                     than Wolff's in regard to speculative philosophy, where the ancients were guided
                     by the formal object of the study - i.e. by the degree of abstraction to which the
                     whole universe is subjected, while the moderns always look at the material
                     object - i.e., the three categories of being, which it is possible to study, God,
                     the world of sense, and man.

                     D. In Contemporary Philosophy

                     The impulse received by philosophy during the last half-century gave rise to new
                     philosophical sciences, in the sense that various branches have been detached
                     from the main stems. In psychology this phenomenon has been remarkable:
                     criteriology, or epistemology (the study of the certitude of knowledge) has
                     developed into a special study. Other branches which have formed themselves
                     into new psychological sciences are: physiological psychology or the study of
                     the physiological concomitant of psychic activities; didactics, or the science of
                     teaching; pedagogy, or the science of education; collective psychology and the
                     psychology of people (Volkerpsychologie), studying the psychic phenomena
                     observable in human groups as such, and in the different races. An important
                     section of logic (called also noetic, or canonic) is tending to sever itself from the
                     main body, viz., methodology, which studies the special logical formation of
                     various sciences. On moral philosophy, in the wide sense, have been grafted the
                     philosophy of law, the philosophy of society, or social philosophy (which is much
                     the same as sociology), and the philosophies of religion and of history.

                                III. THE PRINCIPAL SYSTEMATIC SOLUTIONS

                     From what has been said above it is evident that philosophy is beset by a great
                     number of questions It would not be possible here to enumerate all those
                     questions, much less to detail the divers solutions which have been given to
                     them. The solution of a philosophic question is called a philosophic doctrine or
                     theory. A philosophic system (from sunistêmi, put together) is a complete and
                     organized group of solutions. It is not an incoherent assemblage or an
                     encyclopedic amalgamation of such solutions; it is dominated by an organic
                     unity. Only those philosophic systems which are constructed conformably with
                     the exigencies of organic unity are really powerful: such are the systems of the
                     Upanishads, of Aristotle, of neo-Platonism, of Scholasticism, of Leibniz, Kant
                     and Hume. So that one or several theories do not constitute a system; but some
                     theories, i.e. answers to a philosophic question, are important enough to
                     determine the solution of other important problems of a system. The scope of
                     this section is to indicate some of these theories.

                     A. Monism, or Pantheism, and Pluralism, Individualism, or Theism

                     Are there many beings distinct in their reality, with one Supreme Being, God at
                     the summit of the hierarchy; or is there but one reality (monas, hence monism),
                     one All-God (pan-theos) of whom each individual is but a member or fragment
                     (Substantialistic Pantheism), or else a force, or energy (Dynamic Pantheism)?
                     Here we have an important question of metaphysics the solution of which reacts
                     upon all other domains of philosophy. The system of Aristotle, of the
                     Scholastics, and of Leibniz are Pluralistic and Theistic; the Indian, neo-Platonic,
                     and Hegelian are Monistic. Monism is a fascinating explanation of the real, but it
                     only postpones the difficulties which it imagines itself to be solving (e.g. the
                     difficulty of the interaction of things), to say nothing of the objection, from the
                     human point of view, that it runs counter to our most deep-rooted sentiments.

                     B. Objectivism and Subjectivism

                     Does being, whether one or many, possess its own life, independent of our mind,
                     so that to be known by us is only accident to being, as in the objective system of
                     metaphysics (e.g. Aristotle, the Scholastics, Spinoza)? Or is being no other
                     reality than the mental and subjective presence which it acquires in our
                     representation of it as in the Subjective system (e.g. Hume)? It is in this sense
                     that the "Revue de métaphysique et de morale" (see bibliography) uses the term
                     metaphysics in its title. Subjectivism cannot explain the passivity of our mental
                     representations, which we do not draw out of ourselves, and which therefore
                     oblige us to infer the reality of a non-ego.

                     C. Substantialism and Phenomenism

                     Is all reality a flux of phenomena (Heraclitus, Berkeley, Hume, Taine), or does
                     the manifestation appear upon a basis, or substance, which manifests itself, and
                     does the phenomenon demand a noumenon (the Scholastics)? Without an
                     underlying substance, which we only know through the medium of the
                     phenomenon, certain realities, as walking, talking, are inexplicable, and such
                     facts as memory become absurd.

                     D. Mechanism and Dynamism (Pure and Modified)

                     Natural bodies are considered by some to be aggregations of homogeneous
                     particles of matter (atoms) receiving a movement which is extrinsic to them, so
                     that these bodies differ only in the number and arrangement of their atoms (the
                     Atomism, or Mechanism, of Democritus, Descartes, and Hobbes). Others reduce
                     them to specific, unextended, immaterial forces, of which extension is only the
                     superficial manifestation (Leibniz). Between the two is Modified Dynamism
                     (Aristotle), which distinguishes in bodies an immanent specific principle (form)
                     and an indeterminate element (matter) which is the source of limitation and
                     extension. This theory accounts for the specific characters of the entities in
                     question as well as for the reality of their extension in space.

                     E. Materialism, Agnosticism, and Spiritualism

                     That everything real is material, that whatever might be immaterial would be
                     unreal, such is the cardinal doctrine of Materialism (the Stoics, Hobbes, De
                     Lamettrie). Contemporary Materialism is less outspoken: it is inspired by a
                     Positivist ideology (see section VI), and asserts that, if anything supra-material
                     exists, it is unknowable (Agnosticism, from a and gnôsis, knowledge. Spencer,
                     Huxley). Spiritualism teaches that incorporeal, or immaterial, beings exist or that
                     they are possible (Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, the Scholastics, Descartes,
                     Leibniz). Some have even asserted that only spirits exist: Berkeley, Fichte, and
                     Hegel are exaggerated Spiritualists. The truth is that there are bodies and spirits;
                     among the latter we are acquainted (though less well than with bodies) with the
                     nature of our soul, which is revealed by the nature of our immaterial acts, and
                     with the nature of God, the infinite intelligence, whose existence is demontrated
                     by the very existence of finite things. Side by side with these solutions relating to
                     the problems of the real, there is another group of solutions, not less influential in
                     the orientation of a system, and relating to psychical problems or those of the
                     human ego.

                     F. Sensualism and Rationalism, or Spiritualism

                     These are the opposite poles of the ideogenetic question, the question of the
                     origin of our knowledge. For Sensualism the only source of human knowledge is
                     sensation: everything reduces to transformed sensations. This theory, long ago
                     put forward in Greek philosophy (Stoicism, Epicureanism), was developed to the
                     full by the English Sensualists (Locke, Berkeley, Hume) and the English
                     Associationists (Brown, Hartley, Priestley); its modern form is Positivism (John
                     Stuart Mill, Huxley, Spencer, Comte, Taine, Littré etc.). Were this theory true, it
                     would follow that we can know only what falls under our senses, and therefore
                     cannot pronounce upon the existence or non-existence, the reality or unreality, of
                     the super-sensible. Positivism is more logical than Materialism. In the New
                     World, the term Agnosticism has been very happily employed to indicate this
                     attitude of reserve towards the super-sensible. Rationalism (from ratio, reason),
                     or Spiritualism, establishes the existence in us of concepts higher than
                     sensations, i.e. of abstract and general concepts (Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine,
                     the Scholastics, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Cousin etc.). Ideologic Spiritualism
                     has won the adherence of humanity's greatest thinkers. Upon the spirituality, or
                     immateriality, of our higher mental operations is based the proof of the spirituality
                     of the principle from which they proceed and, hence, of the immortality of the
                     soul.

                     G. Scepticism, Dogmatism, and Criticism

                     So many answers have been given to the question whether man can attain truth,
                     and what is the foundation of certitude, that we will not attempt to enumerate
                     them all. Scepticism declares reason incapable of arriving at the truth. and holds
                     certitude to be a purely subjective affair (Sextus Empiricus, Ænesidemus).
                     Dogmatism asserts that man can attain to truth, and that, in measure to be
                     further determined, our cognitions are certain. The motive of certitude is, for the
                     Traditionalists, a Divine revelation, for the Scotch School (Reid) it is an inclination
                     of nature to affirm the principles of common sense; it is an irrational, but social,
                     necessity of admitting certain principles for practical dogmatism (Balfour in his
                     "Foundations of Belief" speaks of "non-rational impulse", while Mallock holds that
                     "certitude is found to be the child, not of reason but of custom" and Brunetière
                     writes about "the bankruptcy of science and the need of belief"); it is an affective
                     sentiment, a necessity of wishing that certain things may be verities
                     (Voluntarism; Kant's Moral Dogmatism), or the fact of living certain verities
                     (contemporary Pragmatism and Humanism William James, Schiller). But for
                     others - and this is the theory which we accept - the motive of certitude is the
                     very evidence of the connection which appears between the predicate and the
                     subject of a proposition, an evidence which the mind perceives, but which it does
                     not create (Moderate Dogmatism). Lastly for Criticism, which is the Kantian
                     solution of the problem of knowledge, evidence is created by the mind by means
                     of the structural functions with which every human intellect is furnished (the
                     categories of the understanding). In conformity with these functions we connect
                     the impressions of the senses and construct the world. Knowledge, therefore, is
                     valid only for the world as represented to the mind. Kantian Criticism ends in
                     excessive Idealism, which is also called Subjectivism. or Phenomenalism, and
                     according to which the mind draws all its representations out of itself, both the
                     sensory impressions and the categories which connect them: the world becomes
                     a mental poem, the object is created by the subject as representation (Fichte,
                     Schelling, Hegel).

                     H. Nominalism, Realism, and Conceptualism

                     Nominalism, Realism, and Conceptualism are various answers to the question of
                     the real objectivity of our predications, or of the relation of fidelity existing
                     between our general representations and the external world.

                     I. Determinism and Indeterminism

                     Has every phenomenon or fact its adequate cause in an antecedent phenomenon
                     or fact (Cosmic Determinism)? And, in respect to acts of the will, are they
                     likewise determined in all their constituent elements (Moral Determinism,
                     Stoicism, Spinoza)? If so, then liberty disappears, and with it human
                     responsibility, merit and demerit. Or, on the contrary, is there a category of
                     volitions which are not necessitated, and which depend upon the discretionary
                     power of the will to act or not to act and in acting to follow freely chosen
                     direction? Does liberty exist? Most Spiritualists of all schools have adopted a
                     libertarian philosophy, holding that liberty alone gives the moral life an acceptable
                     meaning; by various arguments they have confirmed the testimony of conscience
                     and the data of common consent. In physical nature causation and determinism
                     rule; in the moral life, liberty. Others, by no means numerous, have even
                     pretended to discover cases of indeterminism in physical nature (the so-called
                     Contingentist theories, e.g. Boutroux).

                     J. Utilitarianism and the Morality of Obligation

                     What constitutes the foundation of morality in our actions? Pleasure or utility say
                     some, personal or egoistic pleasure (Egoism - Hobbes, Bentham, and "the
                     arithmetic of pleasure"); or again, in the pleasure and utility of all (Altruism -
                     John Stuart Mill). Others hold that morality consists in the performance of duty
                     for duty's sake, the observance of law because it is law, independently of
                     personal profit (the Formalism of the Stoics and of Kant). According to another
                     doctrine, which in our opinion is more correct, utility, or personal advantage, is
                     not incompatible with duty, but the source of the obligation to act is in the last
                     analysis, as the very exigencies of our nature tell us, the ordinance of God.

                                      IV. PHILOSOPHICAL METHODS

                     Method (meth' hodos) means a path taken to reach some objective point. By
                     philosophical method is understood the path leading to philosophy, which, again,
                     may mean either the process employed in the construction of a philosophy
                     (constructive method, method of invention), or the way of teaching philosophy
                     (method of teaching, didactic method). We will deal here with the former of these
                     two senses; the latter will be treated in section XI. Three methods can be, and
                     have been, applied to the construction of philosophy.

                     A. Experimental (Empiric, or Analytic) Method

                     The method of all Empiric philosophers is to observe facts, accumulate them,
                     and coordinate them. Pushed to its ultimate consequences, the empirical
                     method refuses to rise beyond observed and observable fact; it abstains from
                     investigating anything that is absolute. It is found among the Materialists, ancient
                     and modern, and is most unreservedly applied in contemporary Positivism.
                     Comte opposes the "positive mode of thinking", based solely upon observation,
                     to the theological and metaphysical modes. For Mill, Huxley, Bain, Spencer,
                     there is not one philosophical proposition but is the product, pure and simple, of
                     experience: what we take for a general idea is an aggregate of sensations; a
                     judgment is the union of two sensations; a syllogism, the passage from particular
                     to particular (Mill, "A System of Logic, Rational and Inductive", ed. Lubbock,
                     1892; Bain, "Logic", New York, 1874). Mathematical propositions, fundamental
                     axioms such as a = a, the principle of contradiction, the principle of causality are
                     only "generalizations from facts of experience" (Mill, op. cit., vii, #5). According
                     to this author, what we believe to be superior to experience in the enunciation of
                     scientific laws is derived from our subjective incapacity to conceive its
                     contradictory; according to Spencer, this inconceivability of the negation is
                     developed by heredity.

                     Applied in an exaggerated and exclusive fashion, the experimental method
                     mutilates facts, since it is powerless to ascend to the causes and the laws
                     which govern facts. It suppresses the character of objective necessity which is
                     inherent in scientific judgments, and reduces them to collective formulae of facts
                     observed in the past. It forbids our asserting, e.g., that the men who will be born
                     after us will be subject to death, seeing that all certitude rests on experience,
                     and that by mere observation we cannot reach the unchangeable nature of
                     things. The empirical method, left to its own resources, checks the upward
                     movement of the mind towards the causes or object of the phenomena which
                     confront it.

                     B. Deductive, or Synthetic a Priori, Method

                     At the opposite pole to the preceding, the deductive method starts from very
                     general principles, from higher causes, to descend (Lat. deducere, to lead down)
                     to more and more complex relations and to facts. The dream of the Deductionist
                     is to take as the point of departure an intuition of the Absolute, of the Supreme
                     Reality - for the Theists, God; for the Monists, the Universal Being - and to
                     draw from this intuition the synthetic knowledge of all that depends upon it in the
                     universe, in conformity with the metaphysical scale of the real. Plato is the father
                     of deductive philosophy: he starts from the world of Ideas, and from the Idea of
                     the Sovereign Good, and he would know the reality of the world of sense only in
                     the Ideas of which it is the reflection. St. Augustine, too, finds his satisfaction in
                     studying the universe, and the least of the beings which compose it, only in a
                     synthetic contemplation of God, the exemplary, creative, and final cause of all
                     things. So, too, the Middle Ages attached great importance to the deductive
                     method. "I propose", writes Boethius, "to build science by means of concepts
                     and maxims, as is done in mathematics." Anselm of Canterbury draws from the
                     idea of God, not only the proof of the real existence of an infinite being, but also a
                     group of theorems on His attributes and His relations with the world. Two
                     centuries before Anselm, Scotus Eriugena, the father of anti-Scholasticism, is
                     the completest type of the Deductionist: his metaphysics is one long description
                     of the Divine Odyssey, inspired by the neo-Platonic, monistic conception of the
                     descent of the One in its successive generations. And, on the very threshold of
                     the thirteenth century, Alain de Lille would apply to philosophy a mathematical
                     methodology. In the thirteenth century Raymond Lully believed that he had found
                     the secret of "the Great Art" (ars magna), a sort of syllogism-machine, built of
                     general tabulations of ideas, the combination of which would give the solution of
                     any question whatsoever. Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz are Deductionists:
                     they would construct philosophy after the manner of geometry (more
                     geometrico), linking the most special and complicated theorems to some very
                     simple axioms. The same tendency appears among the Ontologists and the
                     post-Kantian Pantheists in Germany (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel), who base their
                     philosophy upon an intuition of the Absolute Being.

                     The deductive philosophers generally profess to disdain the sciences of
                     observation. Their great fault is the compromising of fact, bending it to a
                     preconceived explanation or theory assumed a priori, whereas the observation of
                     the fact ought to precede the assignment of its cause or of its adequate reason.
                     This defect in the deductive method appears glaringly in a youthful work of
                     Leibniz's, "Specimen demonstrationum politicarum pro rege Polonorum
                     eligendo", published anonymously in 1669, where he demonstrates hy
                     geometrical methods (more geometrico), in sixty propositions, that the Count
                     Palatine of Neuburg ought to be elected to the Polish Throne.

                     C. Analytico-Synthetic Method

                     This combination of analysis and synthesis, of observation and deduction, is the
                     only method appropriate to philosophy. Indeed, since it undertakes to furnish a
                     general explanation of the universal order (see section I), philosophy ought to
                     begin with complex effects, facts known by observation, before attempting to
                     include them in one comprehensive explanation of the universe. This is manifest
                     in psychology, where we begin with a careful examination of activities, notably of
                     the phenomena of sense, of intelligence, and of appetite; in cosmology, where
                     we observe the series of changes, superficial and profound, of bodies; in moral
                     philosophy, which sets out from the observation of moral facts; in theodicy,
                     where we interrogate religious beliefs and feelings; even in metaphysics, the
                     starting-point of which is really existing being. But observation and analysis once
                     completed, the work of synthesis begins. We must pass onward to a synthetic
                     psychology that shall enable us to comprehend the destinies of man's vital
                     principle; to a cosmology that shall explain the constitution of bodies, their
                     changes, and the stability of the laws which govern them; to a synthetic moral
                     philosophy establishing the end of man and the ultimate ground of duty; to a
                     theodicy and deductive metaphysics that shall examine the attributes of God and
                     the fundamental conceptions of all being. As a whole and in each of its divisions,
                     philosophy applies the analytic-synthetic method. Its ideal would be to give an
                     account of the universe and of man by a synthetic knowledge of God, upon whom
                     all reality depends. This panoramic view - the eagle's view of things - has
                     allured all the great geniuses. St. Thomas expresses himself admirably on this
                     synthetic knowledge of the universe and its first cause. The analytico-synthetic
                     process is the method, not only of philosophy, but of every science, for it is the
                     natural law of thought, the proper function of which is unified and orderly
                     knowledge. "Sapientis est ordinare." Aristotle, St. Thomas, Pascal, Newton,
                     Pasteur, thus understood the method of the sciences. Men like Helmholtz and
                     Wundt adopted synthetic views after doing analytical work. Even the Positivists
                     are metaphysicians, though they do not know it or wish it. Does not Herbert
                     Spencer call his philosophy synthetic? and does he not, by reasoning, pass
                     beyond that domain of the "observable" within which he professes to confine
                     himself?

                                   V. THE GREAT HISTORICAL CURRENTS

                     Among the many peoples who have covered the globe philosophic culture
                     appears in two groups: the Semitic and the Indo-European, to which may be
                     added the Egyptians and the Chinese. In the Semitic group (Arabs, Babylonians,
                     Assyrians, Aramaeans, Chaldeans) the Arabs are the most important;
                     nevertheless, their part becomes insignificant when compared with the
                     intellectual life of the Indo-Europeans. Among the latter, philosophic life appears
                     successively in various ethnic divisions, and the succession forms the great
                     periods into which the history of philosophy is divided; first, among the people of
                     India (since 1500 B.C.); then among the Greeks and the Romans (sixth century
                     B.C. to sixth century of our era); again, much later, among the peoples of Central
                     and Northern Europe.

                     A. Indian Philosophy

                     The philosophy of India is recorded principally in the sacred books of the Veda,
                     for it has always been closely united with religion. Its numerous poetic and
                     religious productions carry within themselves a chronology which enables us to
                     assign them to three periods.

                     (1) The Period of the Hymns of the Rig Veda (1500-1000 B.C.)

                     This is the most ancient monument of Indo-Germanic civilization; in it may be
                     seen the progressive appearance of the fundamental theory that a single Being
                     exists under a thousand forms in the multiplied phenomena of the universe
                     (Monism).

                     (2) The Period of the Brahmans (l000-500 B.C.)

                     This is the age of Brahminical civilization. The theory of the one Being remains,
                     but little by little the concrete and anthropomorphic ideas of the one Being are
                     replaced by the doctrine that the basis of all things is in oneself (âtman).
                     Psychological Monism appears in its entirety in the Upanishads: the absolute
                     and adequate identity of the Ego - which is the constitutive basis of our
                     individuality (âtman) - and of all things, with Brahman, the eternal being exalted
                     above time, space, number, and change, the generating principle of all things in
                     which all things are finally reabsorbed - such the fundamental theme to be
                     found in the Upanishad under a thousand variations of form. To arrive at the
                     âtman, we must not stop at empirical reality which is multiple and cognizable;
                     we must pierce this husk, penetrate to the unknowable and ineffable
                     superessence, and identify ourselves with it in an unconscious unity.

                     (3) The Post-Vedic or Sanskrit, Period (since 500 B.C.)

                     From the germs of theories contained in the Upanishad a series of systems
                     spring up, orthodox or heterodox. Of the orthodox systems, Vedanta is the most
                     interesting; in it we find the principles of the Upanishads developed in an integral
                     philosophy which comprise metaphysics, cosmology, psychology, and ethics
                     (transmigration, metempsychosis). Among the systems not in harmony with the
                     Vedic dogmas, the most celebrated is Buddhism, a kind of Pessimism which
                     teaches liberation from pain in a state of unconscious repose, or an extinction of
                     personality (Nirvâna). Buddhism spread in China, where it lives side by side with
                     the doctrines of Lao Tse and that of Confucius. It is evident that even the
                     systems which are not in harmony with the Veda are permeated with religious
                     ideas.

                     B. Greek Philosophy

                     This philosophy, which occupied six centuries before, and six after, Christ, may
                     be divided into four periods, corresponding with the succession of the principal
                     lines of research (1) From Thales of Miletus to Socrates (seventh to fifth
                     centuries B.C. - preoccupied with cosmology) (2) Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle
                     (fifth to fourth centuries B.C. - psychology); (3) From the death of Aristotle to
                     the rise of neo-Platonism (end of the fourth century B.C. to third century after
                     Christ - moral philosophy); (4) neo-Platonic School (from the third century after
                     Christ, or, including the systems of the forerunners of neo-Platonism, from the
                     first century after Christ, to the end of Greek philosophy in the seventh
                     century-mysticism).

                     (1) The Pre-Socratic Period

                     The pre-Socratic philosophers either seek for the stable basis of things - which
                     is water, for Thales of Miletus; air, for Anaximenes of Miletus; air endowed with
                     intelligence, for Diogenes of Apollonia; number, for Pythagoras (sixth century
                     B.C.); abstract and immovable being, for the Eleatics - or they study that which
                     changes: while Parmenides and the Eleatics assert that everything is, and
                     nothing changes or becomes. Heraclitus (about 535-475) holds that everything
                     becomes, and nothing is unchangeable. Democritus (fifth century) reduces all
                     beings to groups of atoms in motion, and this movement, according to
                     Anaxagoras, has for its cause an intelligent being.

                     (2) The Period of Apogee: Socrates, Plato, Aristotle.

                     When the Sophists (Protagoras, Gorgias) had demonstrated the insufficiency of
                     these cosmologies, Socrates (470-399) brought philosophical investigation to
                     bear on man himself, studying man chiefly from the moral point of view. From the
                     presence in us of abstract ideas Plato (427-347) deduced the existence of a
                     world of supersensible realities or ideas, of which the visible world is but a pale
                     reflection. These ideas, which the soul in an earlier life contemplated, are now,
                     because of its union with the body, but faintly perceived. Aristotle (384-322), on
                     the contrary, shows that the real dwells in the objects of sense. The theory of act
                     and potentiality, of form and matter, is a new solution of the relations between
                     the permanent and the changing. His psychology, founded upon the principle of
                     the unity of man and the substantial union of soul and body, is a creation of
                     genius. And as much may be said of his logic.

                     (3) The Moral Period

                     After Aristotle (end of the fourth Century B.C.) four schools are in evidence:
                     Stoic, Epicurean, Platonic, and Aristotelean. The Stoics (Zeno of Citium,
                     Cleanthes, Chrysippus), like the Epicureans, make speculation subordinate to
                     the quest of happiness, and the two schools, in spite of their divergencies, both
                     consider happiness to be ataraxia or absence of sorrow and preoccupation. The
                     teachings of both on nature (Dynamistic Monism with the Stoics, and Pluralistic
                     Mechanism with the Epicureans) are only a prologue to their moral philosophy.
                     After the latter half of the second century B.C. we perceive reciprocal infiltrations
                     between the various schools. This issues in Eclecticism. Seneca (first century
                     B.C.) and Cicero (106-43 B.C.) are attached to Eclecticism with a Stoic basis;
                     two great commentators of Aristotle, Andronicus of Rhodes (first century B.C.)
                     and Alexander of Aphrodisia about 200), affect a Peripatetic Eclecticism. Parallel
                     with Eclecticism runs a current of Scepticism (AEnesidemus, end of first century
                     B.C., and Sextus Empiricus, second century A.D.).

                     (4) The Mystical Period

                     In the first century B.C. Alexandria had become the capital of Greek intellectual
                     life. Mystical and theurgic tendencies, born of a longing for the ideal and the
                     beyond, began to appear in a current of Greek philosophy which originated in a
                     restoration of Pythagorism and its alliance with Platonism (Plutarch of Chieronea,
                     first century B.C.; Apuleius of Madaura; Numenius, about 160 and others), and
                     still more in the Graeco-Judaic philosophy of Philo the Jew (30 B.C. to A.D. 50).
                     But the dominance of these tendencies is more apparent in neo-Platonism. The
                     most brilliant thinker of the neo-Platonic series is Plotinus (A.D. 20-70). In his
                     "Enneads" he traces the paths which lead the soul to the One, and establishes,
                     in keeping with his mysticism, an emanationist metaphysical system. Porphyry
                     of Tyre (232-304), a disciple of Plotinus, popularizes his teaching, emphasizes
                     its religious bearing, and makes Aristotle's "Organon" the introduction to
                     neo-Platonic philosophy. Later on, neo-Platonism, emphasizing its religious
                     features, placed itself, with Jamblichus, at the service of the pagan pantheon
                     which growing Christianity was ruining on all sides, or again, as with Themistius
                     at Constantinople (fourth century), Proclus and Simplicius at Athens (fifth
                     century), and Ammonius at Alexandria, it took an Encyclopedic turn. With
                     Ammonius and John Philoponus (sixth century) the neo-Platonic School of
                     Alexandria developed in the direction of Christianity.

                     C. Patristic Philosophy

                     In the closing years of the second century and, still more, in the third century,
                     the philosophy of the Fathers of the Church was developed. It was born in a
                     civilization dominated by Greek ideas, chiefly neo-Platonic, and on this side its
                     mode of thought is still the ancient. Still, if some, like St. Augustine, attach the
                     greatest value to the neo-Platonic teachings, it must not be forgotten that the
                     Monist or Pantheistic and Emanationist ideas, which have been accentuated by
                     the successors of Plotinus, are carefully replaced by the theory of creation and
                     the substantial distinction of beings; in this respect a new spirit animates
                     Patristic philosophy. It was developed, too, as an auxiliary of the dogmatic
                     system which the Fathers were to establish. In the third century the great
                     representatives of the Christian School of Alexandria are Clement of Alexandria
                     and Origen. After them Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory of Nazianzus, St. Ambrose,
                     and, above all, St. Augustine (354-430) appear. St. Augustine gathers up the
                     intellectual treasures of the ancient world, and is one of the principal
                     intermediaries for their transmission to the modern world. In its definitive form
                     Augustinism is a fusion of intellectualism and mysticism, with a study of God as
                     the centre of interest. In the fifth century, pseudo-Dionysius perpetuates many a
                     neo-Platonic doctrine adapted to Christianity, and his writings exercise a
                     powerful influence in the Middle Ages.

                     D. Medieval Philosophy

                     The philosophy of the Middle Ages developed simultaneously in the West, at
                     Byzantium, and in divers Eastern centres; but the Western philosophy is the
                     most important. It built itself up with great effort on the ruins of barbarism: until
                     the twelfth century, nothing was known of Aristotle, except some treatises on
                     logic, or of Plato, except a few dialogues. Gradually, problems arose, and,
                     foremost, in importance, the question of universals in the ninth, tenth, and
                     eleventh centuries (see NOMINALISM). St. Anselm (1O33-1109) made a first
                     attempt at systematizing Scholastic philosophy, and developed a theodicy. But
                     as early as the ninth century an anti-Scholastic philosophy had arisen with
                     Eriugena who revived the neo-Platonic Monism. In the twelfth century
                     Scholasticism formulated new anti-Realist doctrines with Adelard of Bath,
                     Gauthier de Mortagne, and, above all, Abelard and Gilbert de la Porrée, whilst
                     extreme Realism took shape in the schools of Chartres. John of Salisbury and
                     Alain de Lille, in the twelfth century, are the co-ordinating minds that indicate the
                     maturity of Scholastic thought. The latter of these waged a campaign against the
                     Pantheism of David of Dinant and the Epicureanism of the Albigenses - the two
                     most important forms of anti-Scholastic philosophy. At Byzantium, Greek
                     philosophy held its ground throughout the Middle Ages, and kept apart from the
                     movement of Western ideas. The same is true of the Syrians and Arabs. But at
                     the end of the twelfth century the Arabic and Byzantine movement entered into
                     relation with Western thought, and effected, to the profit of the latter, the brilliant
                     philosophical revival of the thirteenth century. This was due, in the first place, to
                     the creation of the University of Paris; next, to the foundation of the Dominican
                     and Franciscan orders; lastly, to the introduction of Arabic and Latin translations
                     of Aristotle and the ancient authors. At the same period the works of Avicenna
                     and Averroes became known at Paris. A pleiad of brilliant names fills the
                     thirteenth century - Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, Bl. Albertus Magnus,
                     St. Thomas Aquinas, Godfrey of Fontaines, Henry of Ghent, Giles of Rome, and
                     Duns Scotus - bring Scholastic synthesis to perfection. They all wage war on
                     Latin Averroism and anti-Scholasticism, defended in the schools of Paris by
                     Siger of Brabant. Roger Bacon, Lully, and a group of neo-Platonists occupy a
                     place apart in this century, which is completely filled by remarkable figures. In
                     the fourteenth century Scholastic philosophy betrays the first symptoms of
                     decadence. In place of individualities we have schools, the chief being the
                     Thomist, the Scotist, and the Terminist School of William of Occam, which soon
                     attracted numerous partisans. With John of Jandun, Averroism perpetuates its
                     most audacious propositions; Eckhart and Nicholas of Cusa formulate
                     philosophies which are symptomatic of the approaching revolution. The
                     Renaissance was a troublous period for philosophy. Ancient systems were
                     revived: the Dialectic of the Humanistic philologists (Laurentius Valla, Vivés),
                     Platonism, Aristoteleanism, Stoicism. Telesius, Campanella, and Giordano
                     Bruno follow a naturalistic philosophy. Natural and social law are renewed with
                     Thomas More and Grotius. All these philosophies were leagued together against
                     Scholasticism, and very often against Catholicism. On the other hand, the
                     Scholastic philosophers grew weaker and weaker, and, excepting for the brilliant
                     Spanish Scholasticism of the sixteenth century (Bañez, Suarez, Vasquez, and
                     so on), it may be said that ignorance of the fundamental doctrine became
                     general. In the seventeenth century there was no one to support Scholasticism: it
                     fell, not for lack of ideas, but for lack of defenders.

                     E. Modern Philosophy

                     The philosophies of the Renaissance are mainly negative: modern philosophy is,
                     first and foremost, constructive. The latter is emancipated from all dogma; many
                     of its syntheses are powerful; the definitive formation of the various nationalities
                     and the diversity of languages favour the tendency to individualism. The two great
                     initiators of modern philosophy are Descartes and Francis Bacon. The former
                     inaugurates a spiritualistic philosophy based on the data of consciousness, and
                     his influence may be traced in Malebranche, Spinoza, and Leibniz. Bacon heads
                     a line of Empiricists, who regarded sensation as the only source of knowledge. In
                     the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a Sensualist philosophy grew up in
                     England, based on Baconian Empiricism, and soon to develop in the direction of
                     Subjectivism. Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and David Hume mark the stages of this
                     logical evolution. Simultaneously an Associationist psychology appeared also
                     inspired by Sensualism, and, before long, it formed a special field of research.
                     Brown, David Hartley, and Priestley developed the theory of association of ideas
                     in various directions. At the outset Sensualism encountered vigorous opposition,
                     even in England, from the Mystics and Platonists of the Cambridge School
                     (Samuel Parker and, especially, Ralph Cudworth). The reaction was still more
                     lively in the Scotch School, founded and chiefly represented by Thomas Reid, to
                     which Adam Ferguson, Oswald, and Dugald Stewart belonged in the seventeenth
                     and eighteenth centuries, and which had great influence over Eclectic
                     Spiritualism, chiefly in America and France. Hobbes's "selfish" system was
                     developed into a morality by Bentham, a partisan of Egoistic Utilitarianism, and
                     by Adam Smith, a defender of Altruism, but provoked a reaction among the
                     advocates of the moral sentiment theory (Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Samuel
                     Clarke). In England, also, Theism or Deism was chiefly developed, instituting a
                     criticism of all positive religion, which it sought to supplant with a philosophical
                     religion. English Sensualism spread in France during the eighteenth century: its
                     influence is traceable in de Condillac, de la Mettrie, and the Encyclopedists;
                     Voltaire popularized it in France and with Jean-Jacques Rousseau it made its
                     way among the masses, undermining their Christianity and preparing the
                     Revolution of 1759. In Germany, the philosophy of the eighteenth century is,
                     directly or indirectly, connected with Leibniz - the School of Wolff, the Aesthetic
                     School (Baumgarten), the philosophy of sentiment. But all the German
                     philosophers of the eighteenth century were eclipsed by the great figure of Kant.

                     With Kant (1724-1804) modern philosophy enters its second period and takes a
                     critical orientation. Kant bases his theory of knowledge, his moral and aesthetic
                     system, and his judgments of finality on the structure of the mind. In the first half
                     of the eighteenth century, German philosophy is replete with great names
                     connected with Kantianism - after it had been put through a Monistic evolution,
                     however - Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel have been called the triumvirate of
                     Pantheism; then again, Schopenhauer, while Herbart returned to individualism.
                     French philosophy in the nineteenth century is at first dominated by an eclectic
                     Spiritualistic movement with which the names of Maine de Biran and, especially,
                     Victor Cousin are associated. Cousin had disciples in America (C. Henry), and in
                     France he gained favour with those whom the excesses of the Revolution had
                     alarmed. In the first half of the nineteenth century French Catholics approved the
                     Traditionalism inaugurated by de Bonald and de Lamennais, while another group
                     took refuge in Ontologism. In the same period Auguste Comte founded
                     Positivism, to which Littré and Taine adhered, though it rose to its greatest height
                     in the English-speaking countries. In fact, England may be said to have been the
                     second fatherland of Positivism; John Stuart Mill, Huxley, Alexander Bain and
                     Herbert Spencer expanded its doctrines, combined them with Associationism
                     and emphasized it criteriological aspect, or attempted (Spencer) to construct a
                     vast synthesis of human sciences. The Associationist philosophy at this time
                     was confronted by the Scotch philosophy which, in Hamilton, combined the
                     teachings of Reid and of Kant and found an American champion in Noah Porter.
                     Mansel spread the doctrines of Hamilton. Associationism regained favour with
                     Thomas Brown and James Mill, but was soon enveloped in the large conception
                     of Positivism, the dominant philosophy in England. Lastly, in Italy, Hegel was for
                     a long time the leader of nineteenth-century philosophical thought (Vera and
                     d'Ercole), whilst Gioberti, the ontologist and Rosmini occupy a distinct position.
                     More recently, Positivism has gained numerous adherents in Italy. In the middle
                     of the century, a large Krausist School existed in Spain, represented chiefly by
                     Sanz del Rio (d. 1869) and N. Salmeron. Balmes (181O-48), the author of
                     "Fundamental Philosophy" is an original thinker whose doctrines have many
                     points of contact with Scholasticism.

                                    VI. CONTEMPORARY ORIENTATIONS

                     A. Favourite Problems

                     Leaving aside social questions, the study of which belongs to philosophy in only
                     some of their aspects, it may be said that in the philosophic interest of the
                     present day psychological questions hold the first place, and that chief among
                     them is the problem of certitude. Kant, indeed, is so important a factor in the
                     destinies of contemporary philosophy not only because he is the initiator of
                     critical formalism, but still more because he obliges his successors to deal with
                     the preliminary and fundamental question of the limits of knowledge. On the other
                     hand the experimental investigation of mental processed has become the object
                     of a new study, psycho-physiology, in which men of science co-operate with
                     philosophers, and which meets with increasing success. This study figures in the
                     programme of most modern universities. Originating at Leipzig (the School of
                     Wundt) and Würzburg, it has quickly become naturalized in Europe and
                     America. In America, "The Psychological Review" has devoted many articles to
                     this branch of philosophy. Psychological studies are the chosen field of the
                     American (Ladd, William James, Hall).

                     The great success of psychology has emphasized the subjective character of
                     aesthetics, in which hardly anyone now recognizes the objective and
                     metaphysical element. The solutions in vogue are the Kantian, which represents
                     the aesthetic judgment as formed in accordance with the subjective, structural
                     function of the mind, or other psychologic solutions which reduce the beautiful to
                     a psychic impression (the "sympathy", or Einfühlung, of Lipps; the "concrete
                     intuition" of Benedetto Croce). These explanations are insufficient, as they
                     neglect the objective aspect of the beautiful - those elements which, on the part
                     of the object, are the cause of the aesthetic impression and enjoyment. It may
                     be said that the neo-Scholastic philosophy alone takes into account the objective
                     aesthetic factor.

                     The absorbing influence of psychology also manifests itself to the detriment of
                     other branches of philosophy; first of all, to the detriment of metaphysics, which
                     our contemporaries have unjustly ostracized - unjustly, since, if the existence
                     or possibility of a thing-in-itself is considered of importance, it behooves us to
                     inquire under what aspects of reality it reveals itself. This ostracism of
                     metaphysics, moreover, is largely due to misconception and to a wrong
                     understanding of the theories of substance, of faculties, of causes etc., which
                     belong to the traditional metaphysics. Then again, the invasion of psychology is
                     manifest in logic: side by side with the ancient logic or dialectic, a mathematical
                     or symbolic logic has developed (Peano, Russell, Peirce, Mitchell, and others)
                     and, more recently, a genetic logic which would study, not the fixed laws of
                     thought, but the changing process of mental life and its genesis (Baldwin).

                     We have seen above (section II, D) how the increasing cultivation of psychology
                     has produced other scientific ramifications which find favour with the learned
                     world. Moral philosophy, long neglected, enjoys a renewed vogue notably in
                     America, where ethnography is devoted to its service (see, e.g., the publications
                     of the Smithsonian Institution). "The International Journal of Ethics" is a review
                     especially devoted to this line of work. In some quarters, where the atmosphere
                     is Positivist, there is a desire to get rid of the old morality, with its notions of
                     value and of duty, and to replace it with a collection of empiric rules subject to
                     evolution (Sidgwick, Huxley, Leslie Stephen, Durkheim, Levy-Bruhl).

                     As to the history of philosophy, not only are very extended special studies
                     devoted to it, but more and more room is given it in the study of every philosophic
                     question. Among the causes of this exaggerated vogue are the impulse given by
                     the Schools of Cousin and of Hegel, the progress of historical studies in general,
                     the confusion arising from the clash of rival doctrines, and the distrust
                     engendered by that confusion. Remarkable works have been produced by
                     Deussen, on Indian and Oriental philosophy; by Zeller, on Greek antiquity; by
                     Denifle, Hauréau, Bäumker, and Mandonnet, on the Middle Ages; by
                     Windelband, Kuno Fischer, Boutroux and Höffding, on the modern period; and
                     the list might easily be considerably prolonged.

                     B. The Opposing Systems

                     The rival systems of philosophy of the present time may be reduced to various
                     groups: Positivism, neo-Kantianism, Monism, neo-Scholasticism. Contemporary
                     philosophy lives in an atmosphere of Phenomenism, since Positivism and
                     neo-Kantianism are at one on this important doctrine: that science and certitude
                     are possible only within the limits of the world of phenomena, which is the
                     immediate object of experience. Positivism, insisting on the exclusive rights of
                     sensory experience, and Kantian criticism, reasoning from the structure of our
                     cognitive faculties, hold that knowledge extends only as far as appearances; that
                     beyond this is the absolute, the dark depths, the existence of which there is less
                     and less disposition to deny, but which no human mind can fathom. On the
                     contrary, this element of the absolute forms an integral constituent in
                     neo-Scholasticism which has revived, with sobriety and moderation, the
                     fundamental notions of Aristotelean and Medieval metaphysics, and has
                     succeeded in vindicating them against attack and objection.

                     (1) Positivism

                     Positivism, under various forms, is defended in England by the followers of
                     Spencer, by Huxley, Lewes, Tyndall, F. Harrison, Congreve, Beesby, J. Bridges,
                     Grant Allen (James Martineau is a reactionary against Positivism); by Balfour,
                     who at the same time propounds a characteristic theory of belief, and falls back
                     on Fideism. From England Positivism passed over to America, where it soon
                     dethroned the Scottish doctrines (Carus). De Roberty, in Russia, and Ribot, in
                     France, are among its most distinguished disciples. In Italy it is found in the
                     writings of Ferrari, Ardigo, and Morselli; in Germany, in those of Laas, Riehl,
                     Guyau, and Durkheim. Less brutal than Materialism, the radical vice of
                     Positivism is its identification of the knowable with the sensible. It seeks in vain
                     to reduce general ideas to collective images, and to deny the abstract and
                     universal character of the mind's concepts. It vainly denies the super-experiential
                     value of the first logical principles in which the scientific life of the mind is rooted;
                     nor will it ever succeed in showing that the certitude of such a judgment as 2 + 2
                     = 4 increases with our repeated addition of numbers of oxen or of coins. In
                     morals, where it would reduce precepts and judgments to sociological data
                     formed in the collective conscience and varying with the period and the
                     environment, Positivism stumbles against the judgments of value, and the
                     supersensible ideas of obligation, moral good, and law, recorded in every human
                     conscience and unvarying in their essential data.

                     (2) Kantianism

                     Kantianism had been forgotten in Germany for some thirty years (1830-60); Vogt,
                     Büchner, and Molesehott had won for Materialism an ephemeral vogue; but
                     Materialism was swept away by a strong Kantian reaction. This reversion
                     towards Kant (Rückkehr zu Kant) begins to be traceable in 1860 (notably as a
                     result of Lange's "History of Materialism"), and the influence of Kantian doctrines
                     may be said to permeate the whole contemporary German philosophy (Otto
                     Liebmann, von Hartmann, Paulsen, Rehmke, Dilthey, Natorp, Fueken, the
                     Immanentists, and the Empirico-criticists). French neo-Criticism, represented by
                     Renouvier, was connected chiefly with Kant's second "Critique" and introduced a
                     specific Voluntarism. Vacherot, Secrétan, Lachelier, Boutroux, Fouillée, and
                     Bergson are all more or less under tribute to Kantianism. Ravaisson proclaims
                     himself a follower of Maine de Biran. Kantianism has taken its place in the state
                     programme of education and Paul Janet, who, with F. Bouillier and Caro, was
                     among the last legatees of Cousin's Spiritualism, appears, in his "Testament
                     philosophique", affecting a Monism with a Kantian inspiration. All those who, with
                     Kant and the Positivists, proclaim the "bankruptcy of science" look for the basis
                     of our certitude in an imperative demand of the will. This Voluntarism, also called
                     Pragmatism (William James), and, quite recently, Humanism (Schiller at Oxford),
                     is inadequate to the establishment of the theoretic moral and social sciences
                     upon an unshakable base: sooner or later, reflection will ask what this need of
                     living and of willing is worth, and then the intelligence will return to its position as
                     the supreme arbiter of certitude.

                     From Germany and France Kantianism has spread everywhere. In England it has
                     called into activity the Critical Idealism associated with T. H. Green and Bradley.
                     Hodgson, on the contrary, returns to Realism. S. Laurie may be placed between
                     Green and Martineau. Emerson, Harris, Everett, and Royce spread Idealistic
                     Criticism in America; Shadworth Hodgson, on the other hand, and Adamson tend
                     to return to Realism, whilst James Ward emphasizes the function of the will.

                     (3) Monism

                     With a great many Kantians, a stratum of Monistic ideas is superimposed on
                     Criticism, the thing in itself being considered numerically one. The same
                     tendencies are observable among Positivist Evolutionists like Clifford and
                     Romanes, or G.T. Ladd.

                     (4) Neo-Scholasticism

                     Neo-Scholasticism, the revival of which dates from the last third of the nineteenth
                     century (Liberatore, Taparelli, Cornoldi, and others), and which received a
                     powerful impulse under Leo XIII, is tending more and more to become the
                     philosophy of Catholics. It replaces Ontologism, Traditionalism, Gunther's
                     Dualism, and Cartesian Spiritualism, which had manifestly become insufficient.
                     Its syntheses, renewed and completed, can be set up in opposition to Positivism
                     and Kantianism, and even its adversaries no longer dream of denying the worth of
                     its doctrines. The bearings of neo-Scholasticism have been treated elsewhere
                     (see NEO-SCHOLASTICISM).

                         VII. IS PROGRESS IN PHILOSOPHY INDEFINITE, OR IS THERE A
                                        PHILOSOPHIA PERENNIS?

                     Considering the historic succession of systems and the evolution of doctrines
                     from the remotest ages of India down to our own times, and standing face to face
                     with the progress achieved by contemporary scientific philosophy, must we not
                     infer the indefinite progress of philosophic thought? Many have allowed
                     themselves to be led away by this ideal dream. Historic Idealism (Karl Marx)
                     regards philosophy as a product fatally engendered by pre-existing causes in our
                     physical and social environment. Auguste Comte's "law of the three states",
                     Herbert Spencer's evolutionism Hegel's "indefinite becoming of the soul", sweep
                     philosophy along in an ascending current toward an ideal perfection, the
                     realization of which no one can foresee. For all these thinkers, philosophy is
                     variable and relative: therein lies their serious error. Indefinite progress,
                     condemned by history in many fields, is untenable in the history of philosophy.
                     Such a notion is evidently refuted by the appearance of thinkers like Aristotle and
                     Plato three centuries before Christ, for these men, who for ages have dominated,
                     and still dominate, human thought, would be anachronisms, since they would be
                     inferior to the thinkers of our own time. And no one would venture to assert this.
                     History shows, indeed, that there are adaptations of a synthesis to its
                     environment, and that every age has its own aspirations and its special way of
                     looking at problems and their solutions; but it also presents unmistakable
                     evidence of incessant new beginnings, of rhythmic oscillations from one pole of
                     thought to the other. If Kant found an original formula of Subjectivism and the
                     reine Innerlichkeit, it would be a mistake to think that Kant had no intellectual
                     ancestors: he had them in the earliest historic ages of philosophy: M. Deussen
                     has found in the Vedic hymn of the Upanishads the distinction between
                     noumenon and phenomenon, and writes, on the theory of Mâyâ, "Kants
                     Grunddogma, so alt wie die Philosophie" ("Die Philos. des Upanishad's", Leipzig,
                     1899, p. 204).

                     It is false to say that all truth is relative to a given time and latitude, and that
                     philosophy is the product of economic conditions in a ceaseless course of
                     evolution, as historical Materialism holds. Side by side with these things, which
                     are subject to change and belong to one particular condition of the life of
                     mankind, there is a soul of truth circulating in every system, a mere fragment of
                     that complete and unchangeable truth which haunts the human mind in its most
                     disinterested investigations. Amid the oscillations of historic systems there is
                     room for a philosophia perennis - as it were a purest atmosphere of truth,
                     enveloping the ages, its clearness somehow felt in spite of cloud and mist. "The
                     truth Pythagoras sought after, and Plato, and Aristotle, is the same that
                     Augustine and Aquinas pursued. So far as it is developed in history, truth is the
                     daughter of time; so far as it bears within itself a content independent of time,
                     and therefore of history, it is the daughter of eternity" [Willmann, "Gesch. d
                     Idealismus", II (Brunswick, 1896), 55O; cf. Commer "Die immerwahrende
                     Philosophie" (Vienna, 1899)]. This does not mean that essential and permanent
                     verities do not adapt themselves to the intellectual life of each epoch. Absolute
                     immobility in philosophy, no less than absolute relativity, is contrary to nature
                     and to history. It leads to decadence and death. It is in this sense that we must
                     interpret the adage: Vita in motu.

                                   VIII. PHILOSOPHY AND THE SCIENCES

                     Aristotle of old laid the foundation of a philosophy supported by observation and
                     experience. We need only glance through the list of his works to see that
                     astronomy, mineralogy, physics and chemistry, biology, zoology, furnished him
                     with examples and bases for his theories on the constitution, of the heavenly and
                     terrestrial bodies, the nature of the vital principle, etc. Besides, the whole
                     Aristotelean classification of the branches of philosophy (see section II) is
                     inspired by the same idea of making philosophy - general science - rest upon
                     the particular sciences. The early Middle Ages, with a rudimentary scientific
                     culture, regarded all its learning, built up on the Trivium (grammar, rhetoric,
                     dialectic) and Quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, music), as
                     preparation for philosophy. In the thirteenth century, when Scholasticism came
                     under Aristotelean influences, it incorporated the sciences in the programme of
                     philosophy itself. This may be seen in regulation issued by the Faculty of Arts of
                     Paris 19 March, 1255, "De libris qui legendi essent" This order prescribes the
                     study of commentaries or various scientific treatises of Aristotle, notably those
                     on the first book of the "Meteorologica", on the treatises on Heaven and Earth,
                     Generation, the Senses and Sensations, Sleeping and Waking, Memory, Plants,
                     and Animals. Here are amply sufficient means for the magistri to familiarize the
                     "artists" with astronomy, botany, physiology, and zoology to say nothing of
                     Aristotle's "Physics", which was also prescribed as a classical text, and which
                     afforded opportunities for numerous observations in chemistry and physics as
                     then understood. Grammar and rhetoric served as preliminary studies to logic,
                     Bible history, social science, and politics were introductory to moral philosophy.
                     Such men as Albertus Magnus and Roger Bacon expressed their views on the
                     necessity of linking the sciences with philosophy and preached it by example.
                     So that both antiquity and the Middle Ages knew and appreciated scientific
                     philosophy.

                     In the seventeenth century the question of the relation between the two enters
                     upon a new phase: from this period modern science takes shape and begins that
                     triumphal march which it is destined to continue through the twentieth century,
                     and of which the human mind is justly proud. Modern scientific knowledge differs
                     from that of antiquity and the Middle Ages in three important respects: the
                     multiplication of sciences; their independent value; the divergence between
                     common knowledge and scientific knowledge. In the Middle Ages astronomy was
                     closely akin to astrology, chemistry to alchemy, physics to divination; modern
                     science has severely excluded all these fantastic connections. Considered now
                     from one side and again from another, the physical world has revealed continually
                     new aspects, and each specific point of view has become the focus of a new
                     study. On the other hand, by defining their respective limits, the sciences have
                     acquired autonomy; useful in the Middle Ages only as a preparation for rational
                     physics and for metaphysics, they are nowadays of value for themselves, and no
                     longer play the part of handmaids to philosophy. Indeed, the progress achieved
                     within itself by each particular science brings one more revolution in knowledge.
                     So long as instruments of observation were imperfect, and inductive methods
                     restricted, it was practically impossible to rise above an elementary knowledge.
                     People knew, in the Middle Ages, that Wine, when left exposed to the air,
                     became vinegar; but what do facts like this amount to in comparison with the
                     complex formulae of modern chemistry? Hence it was that an Albertus Magnus
                     or a Roger Bacon could flatter himself, in those days, with having acquired all the
                     science of his time, a claim which would now only provoke a smile. In every
                     department progress has drawn the line sharply between popular and scientific
                     knowledge; the former is ordinarily the starting-point of the latter, but the
                     conclusions and teachings involved in the sciences are unintelligible to those
                     who lack the requisite preparation.

                     Do not, then, these profound modifications in the condition of the sciences entail
                     modifications in the relations which, until the seventeenth century, had been
                     accepted as existing between the sciences and philosophy? Must not the
                     separation of philosophy and science widen out to a complete divorce? Many
                     have thought so, both scientists and philosophers, and it was for this that in the
                     eighteenth and nineteenth centuries so many savants and philosophers turned
                     their backs on one another. For the former, philosophy has become useless; the
                     particular sciences, they say, multiplying and becoming perfect, must exhaust
                     the whole field of the knowable, and a time will come when philosophy shall be
                     no more. For the philosophers, philosophy has no need of the immeasurable
                     mass of scientific notions which have been acquired, many of which possess
                     only a precarious and provisional value. Wolff, who pronounced the divorce of
                     science from philosophy, did most to accredit this view, and he has been
                     followed by certain Catholic philosophers who held that scientific study may be
                     excluded from philosophic culture.

                     What shall we say on this question? That the reasons which formerly existed for
                     keeping touch with science are a thousand times more imperative in our day. If
                     the profound synthetic view of things which justifies the existence of philosophy
                     presupposes analytical researches, the multiplication and perfection of those
                     researches is certainly reason for neglecting them. The horizon of detailed
                     knowledge widens incessantly; research of every kind is busy exploring the
                     departments of the universe which it has mapped out. And philosophy, whose
                     mission is to explain the order of the universe by general and ultimate reasons
                     applicable, not only to a group of facts, but to the whole body of known
                     phenomena, cannot be indifferent to the matter which it has to explain.
                     Philosophy is like a tower whence we obtain the panorama of a great city - its
                     plan, its monuments, its great arteries, with the form and location of each -
                     things which a visitor cannot discern while he goes through the streets and
                     lanes, or visits libraries, churches, palaces, and museums, one after another. If
                     the city grows and develops, there is all the more reason, if we would know it as
                     a whole, why we should hesitate to ascend the tower and study from that height
                     the plan upon which its new quarters have been laid out.

                     It is, happily, evident that contemporary philosophy is inclined to be first and
                     foremost a scientific philosophy; it has found its way back from its wanderings of
                     yore. This is noticeable in philosophers of the most opposite tendencies. There
                     would be no end to the list if we had to enumerate every case where this
                     orientation of ideas has been adopted. "This union", says Boutroux, speaking of
                     the sciences and philosophy, "is in truth the classic tradition of philosophy. But
                     there had been established a psychology and a metaphysics which aspired to
                     set themselves up beyond the sciences, by mere reflection of the mind upon
                     itself. Nowadays all philosophers are agreed to make scientific data their
                     starting-point" (Address at the International Congress of Philosophy in 1900;
                     Revue de Métaph. et de Morale, 1900, p. 697). Boutroux and many others spoke
                     similarly at the International Congress of Bologna (April, 1911). Wundt introduces
                     this union into the very definition of philosophy, which, he says, is "the general
                     science whose function it is to unite ia a system free of all contradictions the
                     knowledge acquired through the particular sciences, and to reduce to their
                     principles the general methods of science and the conditions of knowledge
                     supposed by them" ("Einleitung in die Philosophie", Leipzig, 1901, p. 19). And R.
                     Eucken says: "The farther back the limits of the observable world recede, the
                     more conscious are we of the lack of an adequately comprehensive explanation"
                     - " Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Philos. u. Lebensanschanung" (Leipzig, 1903), p.
                     157]. This same thought inspired Leo XIII when he placed the parallel and
                     harmonious teaching of philosophy and of the sciences on the programme of the
                     Institute of Philosophy created by him in the University of Louvain (see
                     NEO-SCHOLASTICISM).

                     On their side, the scientists have been coming to the same conclusions ever
                     since they rose to a synthetic view of that matter which is the object of their
                     study. So it was with Pasteur, so with Newton. Ostwald, professor of chemistry
                     at Leipzig, has undertaken to publish the "Annalen der Naturphilosophie", a
                     review devoted to the cultivation of the territory which is common to philosophy
                     and the sciences A great many men of science, too, are engaged in philosophy
                     without knowing it: in their constant discussions of "Mechanism", "Evolutionism",
                     "Transformism", they are using terms which imply a philosophical theory of
                     matter.

                     If philosophy is the explanation as a whole of that world which the particular
                     sciences investigate in detail, it follows that the latter find their culmination in the
                     former, and that as the sciences are so will philosophy be. It is true that
                     objections are put forward against this way of uniting philosophy and the
                     sciences. Common observation, it is said, is enough support for philosophy. This
                     is a mistake: philosophy cannot ignore whole departments of knowledge which
                     are inaccessible to ordinary experience biology, for example, has shed a new
                     light on the philosophic study of man. Others again adduce the extent and the
                     growth of the sciences to show that scientific philosophy must ever remain an
                     unattainable ideal; the practical solution of this difficulty concerns the teaching of
                     philosophy (see section XI).

                                     IX. PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

                     Religion presents to man, with authority, the solution of man's problems which
                     also concern philosophy. Such are the questions of the nature of God, of His
                     relation with the visible world, of man's origin and destiny Now religion, which
                     precedes philosophy in the social life, naturally obliges it to take into
                     consideration the points of religious doctrine. Hence the close connection of
                     philosophy with religion in the early stages of civilization, a fact strikingly
                     apparent in Indian philosophy, which, not only at its beginning but throughout its
                     development, was intimately bound up with the doctrine of the sacred books (see
                     above). The Greeks, at least during the most important periods of their history,
                     were much less subject to the influences of pagan religions; in fact, they
                     combined with extreme scrupulosity in what concerned ceremonial usage a wide
                     liberty in regard to dogma. Greek thought soon took its independent flight
                     Socrates ridicules the gods in whom the common people believed; Plato does
                     not banish religious ideas from his philosophy; but Aristotle keeps them entirely
                     apart, his God is the Actus purus, with a meaning exclusively philosophic, the
                     prime mover of the universal mechanism. The Stoics point out that all things
                     obey an irresistible fatality and that the wise man fears no gods. And if Epicurus
                     teaches cosmic determinism and denies all finality, it is only to conclude that
                     man can lay aside all fear of divine intervention in mundane affairs. The question
                     takes a new aspect when the influences of the Oriental and Jewish religions are
                     brought to bear on Greek philosophy by neo-Pythagorism, the Jewish theology
                     (end of the first century), and, above all, neo-Platonism (third century B.C.). A
                     yearning for religion was stirring in the world, and philosophy became enamoured
                     of every religious doctrine Plotinus (third century after Christ), who must always
                     remain the most perfect type of the neo-Platonic mentality, makes philosophy
                     identical with religion, assigning as its highest aim the union of the soul with God
                     by mystical ways. This mystical need of the supernatural issues in the most
                     bizarre lucubrations from Plotinus's successors, e.g. Jamblicus (d. about A.D.
                     330), who, on a foundation of neo-Platonism, erected an international pantheon
                     for all the divinities whose names are known.

                     It has often been remarked that Christianity, with its monotheistic dogma and its
                     serene, purifying morality, came in the fulness of time and appeased the inward
                     unrest with which souls were afflicted at the end of the Roman world. Though
                     Christ did not make Himself the head of a philosophical school, the religion which
                     He founded supplies solutions for a group of problems which philosophy solves
                     by other methods (e.g. the immortality of the soul). The first Christian
                     philosophers the Fathers of the Church, were imbued with Greek ideas and took
                     over from the circumambient neo-Platonism the commingling of philosophy and
                     religion. With them philosophy is incidental and secondary, employed only to
                     meet polemic needs, and to support dogma; their philosophy is religious. In this
                     Clement of Alexandria and Origen are one with St. Augustine and
                     Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. The early Middle Ages continued the same
                     traditions, and the first philosophers may be said to have received neo-Platonic
                     influences through the channel of the Fathers. John Scotus Eriugena (ninth
                     century), the most remarkable mind of this first period, writes that "true religion is
                     true philosophy and, conversely, true philosophy is true religion" (De div. praed.,
                     I, I). But as the era advances a process of dissociation sets in, to end in the
                     complete separation between the two sciences of Scholastic theology or the
                     study of dogma, based fundamentally on Holy Scripture, and Scholastic
                     philosophy, based on purely rational investigation. To understand the successive
                     stages of this differentiation, which was not completed until the middle of the
                     thirteenth century, we must draw attention to certain historical facts of capital
                     importance.

                     (1) The origin of several philosophical problems, in the early Middle Ages, must
                     be sought within the domain of theology, in the sense that the philosophical
                     discussions arose in reference to theological questions. The discussion, e.g. of
                     transubstantiation (Berengarius of Tours), raised the problem of substance and of
                     change, or becoming. (2) Theology being regarded as a superior and sacred
                     science, the whole pedagogic and didactic organization of the period tended to
                     confirm this superiority (see section XI). (3) The enthusiasm for dialectics, which
                     reached its maximum in the eleventh century, brought into fashion certain purely
                     verbal methods of reasoning bordering on the sophistical. Anselm of Besata
                     (Anselmus Peripateticus) is the type of this kind of reasoner. Now the
                     dialecticians, in discussing theological subjects, claimed absolute validity for
                     their methods, and they ended in such heresies as Gottschalk's on
                     predestination, Berengarius's on transubstantiation, and Roscelin's Tritheism.
                     Berengarius's motto was: "Per omnia ad dialecticam confugere". There followed
                     an excessive reaction on the part of timorous theologians, practical men before
                     all things, who charged dialectics with the sins of the dialecticians. This
                     antagonistic movement coincided with an attempt to reform religious life. At the
                     head of the group was Peter Damian (1007-72), the adversary of the liberal arts;
                     he was the author of the saying that philosophy is the handmaid of theology.
                     From this saying it has been concluded that the Middle Ages in general put
                     philosophy under tutelage, whereas the maxim was current only among a narrow
                     circle of reactionary theologians. Side by side with Peter Damian in Italy, were
                     Manegold of Lautenbach and Othloh of St. Emmeram, in Germany.

                     (4) At the same time a new tendency becomes discernible in the eleventh
                     century, in Lanfranc, William of Hirschau, Rodulfus Ardens, and particularly St.
                     Anselm of Canterbury; the theologian calls in the aid of philosophy to
                     demonstrate certain dogmas or to show their rational side. St. Anselm, in an
                     Augustinian spirit, attempted this justification of dogma, without perhaps
                     invariably applying to the demonstrative value of his arguments the requisite
                     limitations. In the thirteenth century these efforts resulted in a new theological
                     method, the dialectic.

                     (5) While these disputes as to the relations of philosophy and theology went on,
                     many philosophical questions were nevertheless treated on their own account, as
                     we have seen above (universals, St. Anselm's theodicy, Abelard's philosophy,
                     etc.).

                     (6) The dialectic method, developed fully in the twelfth century, just when
                     Scholastic theology received a powerful impetus, is a theological, not a
                     philosophical, method. The principal method in theology is the interpretation of
                     Scripture and of authority; the dialectic method is secondary and consists in first
                     establishing a dogma and then showing its reasonableness, confirming the
                     argument from authority by the argument from reason. It is a process of
                     apologetics. From the twelfth century onward, these two theological methods are
                     fairly distinguished by the words auctoritates, rationes. Scholastic theology,
                     condensed in the "summae" and "books of sentences", is henceforward regarded
                     as distinct from philosophy. The attitude of theologians towards philosophy is
                     threefold: one group, the least influential, still opposes its introduction into
                     theology, and carries on the reactionary traditions of the preceding period (e.g.
                     Gauthier de Saint-Victor); another accepts philosophy, but takes a utilitarian view
                     of it, regarding it merely as a prop of dogma (Peter Lombard); a third group, the
                     most influential, since it includes the three theological schools of St. Victor,
                     Abelard, and Gilbert de la Porrée, grants to philosophy, in addition to this
                     apologetic role, an independent value which entitles it to be cultivated and
                     studied for its own sake. The members of this group are at once both theologians
                     and philosophers.

                     (7) At the opening of the thirteenth century one section of Augustinian
                     theologians continued to emphasize the utilitarian and apologetic office of
                     philosophy. But St. Thomas Aquinas created new Scholastic traditions, and
                     wrote a chapter on scientific methodology in which the distinctness and in
                     dependence of the two sciences is thoroughly established. Duns Scotus, again,
                     and the Terminists exaggerated this independence. Latin Averroism, which had a
                     brilliant but ephemeral vogue in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, accepted
                     whole and entire in philosophy Averroistic Peripateticism, and, to safeguard
                     Catholic orthodoxy, took refuge behind the sophism that what is true in
                     philosophy may be false in theology, and conversely - wherein they were more
                     reserved than Averroes and the Arab philosophers, who regarded religion as
                     something inferior, good enough for the masses, and who did not trouble
                     themselves about Moslem orthodoxy. Lully, going to extremes, maintained that
                     all dogma is susceptible of demonstration, and that philosophy and theology
                     coalesce. Taken as a whole, the Middle Ages, profoundly religious, constantly
                     sought to reconcile its philosophy with the Catholic Faith. This bond the
                     Renaissance philosophy severed. In the Reformation period a group of publicists,
                     in view of the prevailing strife, formed projects of reconciliation among the
                     numerous religious bodies. They convinced themselves that all religions possess
                     a common fund of essential truths relating to God, and that their content is
                     identical, in spite of divergent dogmas. Besides, Theism, being only a form of
                     Naturism applied to religion, suited the independent ways of the Renaissance.
                     As in building up natural law, human nature was taken into consideration, so
                     reason was interrogated to discover religious ideas. And hence the wide
                     acceptance of Theism, not among Protestants only, but generally among minds
                     that had been carried away with the Renaissance movement (Erasmus,
                     Coornheert).

                     For this tolerance or religious indifferentism modern philosophy in more than one
                     instance substituted a disdain of positive religions. The English Theism or Deism
                     of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries criticizes all positive religion and, in
                     the name of an innate religious sense, builds up a natural religion which is
                     reducible to a collection of theses on the existence of God and the immortality of
                     the soul. The initiator of this movement was Herbert of Cherbury (1581-1648); J.
                     Toland (1670-1722), Tindal (1656-1733), and Lord Bolingbroke took part in it. This
                     criticizing movement inaugurated in England was taken up in France, where it
                     combined with an outright hatred of Catholicism. Pierre Bayle (1646-17O6)
                     propounded the thesis that all religion is anti-rational and absurd, and that a state
                     composed of Atheists is possible. Voltaire wished to substitute for Catholicism
                     an incoherent mass of doctrines about God. The religious philosophy of the
                     eighteenth century in France led to Atheism and paved the way for the
                     Revolution. In justice to contemporary philosophy it must be credited with
                     teaching the amplest tolerance towards the various religions; and in its
                     programme of research it has included religious psychology, or the study of the
                     religious sentiment.

                     For Catholic philosophy the relations between philosophy and theology, between
                     reason and faith, were fixed, in a chapter of scientific methodology, by the great
                     Scholastic thinkers of the thirteenth century. Its principles, which still retain their
                     vitality, are as follows:

                     (a) Distinctness of the two sciences.

                     The independence of philosophy in regard to theology, as in regard to any other
                     science whatsoever, is only an interpretation of this undeniable principle of
                     scientific progress, as applicable in the twentieth century as it was in the
                     thirteenth, that a rightly constituted science derives its formal object, its
                     principles, and its constructive method from its own resources, and that, this
                     being so, it cannot borrow from any other science without compromising its own
                     right to exist.

                     (b) Negative, not positive, material, not formal, subordination of philosophy in
                     regard to theology.

                     This means that, while the two sciences keep their formal independence (the
                     independence of the principles by which their investigations are guided), there are
                     certain matters where philosophy cannot contradict the solutions afforded by
                     theology. The Scholastics of the Middle Ages justified this subordination, being
                     profoundly convinced that Catholic dogma contains the infallible word of God, the
                     expression of truth. Once a proposition, e.g. that two and two make four, has
                     been accepted as certain, logic forbids any other science to form any conclusion
                     subversive of that proposition. The material mutual subordination of the sciences
                     is one of those laws out of which logic makes the indispensable guarantee of the
                     unity of knowledge. "The truth duly demonstrated by one science serves as a
                     beacon in another science." The certainty of a theory in chemistry imposes its
                     acceptance on physics, and the physicist who should go contrary to it would be
                     out of his course. Similarly, the philosopher cannot contradict the certain data of
                     theology, any more than he can contradict the certain conclusions of the
                     individual sciences. To deny this would be to deny the conformity of truth with
                     truth, to contest the principle of contradiction, to surrender to a relativism which
                     is destructive of all certitude. "It being supposed that nothing but what is true is
                     included in this science (sc. theology) . . . it being supposed that whatever is
                     true by the decision and authority of this science can nowise be false by the
                     decision of right reason: these things, I say, being supposed, as it is manifest
                     from them that the authority of this science and reason alike rest upon truth, and
                     one verity cannot be contrary to another, it must be said absolutely that reason
                     can in no way be contrary to the authority of this Scripture, nay, all right reason
                     is in accord with it" (Henry of Ghent, "Summa Theologica", X, iii, n.4).

                     But when is a theory certain? This is a question of fact, and error is easy. In
                     proportion as the principle is simple and absolute, so are its applications
                     complex and variable. It is not for philosophy to establish the certitude of
                     theological data, any more than to fix the conclusions of chemistry or of
                     physiology. The certainty of those data and those conclusions must proceed
                     from another source. "The preconceived idea is entertained that a Catholic savant
                     is a soldier in the service of his religious faith, and that, in his hands, science is
                     but a weapon to defend his Credo. In the eyes of a great many people, the
                     Catholic savant seems to be always under the menace of excommunication, or
                     entangled in dogmas which hamper him, and compelled, for the sake of loyalty to
                     his Faith, to renounce the disinterested love of science and its free cultivation"
                     (Mercier, "Rapport sur les études supér. de philos.", 1891, p. 9). Nothing could
                     be more untrue.

                                X. THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND PHILOSOPHY

                     The principles which govern the doctrinal relations of philosophy and theology
                     have moved the Catholic Church to intervene on various occasions in the history
                     of philosophy. As to the Church's right and duty to intervene for the purpose of
                     maintaining the integrity of theological dogma and the deposit of faith, there is no
                     need of discussion in this place. It is interesting, however, to note the attitude
                     taken by the Church towards philosophy throughout the ages, and particularly in
                     the Middle Ages, when a civilization saturated with Christianity had established
                     extremely intimate relations between theology and philosophy.

                     A. The censures of the Church have never fallen upon philosophy as such, but
                     upon theological applications, judged false, which were based upon philosophical
                     reasonings. John Scotus Eriugena, Roscelin, Berengarius, Abelard, Gilbert de la
                     Porrée were condemned because their teachings tended to subvert theological
                     dogmas. Eriugena denied the substantial distinction between God and created
                     things; Roscelin held that there are three Gods; Berengarius, that there is no real
                     transubstantiation in the Eucharist; Abelard and Gilbert de la Porrée essentially
                     modified the dogma of the Trinity. The Church, through her councils, condemned
                     their theological errors; with their philosophy as such she does not concern
                     herself. "Nominalism", says Hauréau, "is the old enemy. It is, in fact, the
                     doctrine which, because it best accords with reason, is most remote from
                     axioms of faith. Denounced before council after council, Nominalism was
                     condemned in the person of Abelard as it had been in the person of Roscelin"
                     (Hist. philos. scol., I, 292).

                     No assertion could be more inaccurate. What the Church has condemned is
                     neither the so-called Nominalism, nor Realism, nor philosophy in general, nor the
                     method of arguing in theology, but certain applications of that method which are
                     judged dangerous, i.e. matters which are not philosophical. In the thirteenth
                     century a host of teachers adopted the philosophical theories of Roscelin and
                     Abelard, and no councils were convoked to condemn them. The same may be
                     said of the condemnation of David of Dinant (thirteenth century), who denied the
                     distinction between God and matter, and of various doctrines condemned in the
                     fourteenth century as tending to the negation of morality. It has been the same in
                     modern times. To mention only the condemnation of Gunther, of Rosmini, and of
                     Ontologism in the nineteenth century, what alarmed the Church was the fact that
                     the theses in question had a theologic: bearing.

                     B. The Church has never imposed any philosophical system, though she has
                     anathematized many doctrines, or branded them as suspect. This corresponds
                     with the prohibitive, but not imperative attitude of theology in regard to
                     philosophy. To take one example, faith teaches that the world was created in
                     time; and yet St. Thomas maintains that the concept of eternal creation (ab
                     aeterno) involves no contradiction. He did not think himself obliged to
                     demonstrate creation in time: his teaching would have been heterodox only if,
                     with the Averroists his day, he had maintained the necessary eternity of the
                     world. It may, perhaps, be objected that many Thomistic doctrines were
                     condemned in 1277 by Etienne Tempier, Bishop of Paris. But it is well to note,
                     and recent works on the subject have abundantly proved this, that Tempier's
                     condemnation, in so far as it applied to Thomas Aquinas, was the issue of
                     intrigues and personal animosity, and that, in canon law, it had no force outside
                     of the Diocese of Paris. Moreover, it was annulled by one of Tempier's
                     successors, Etienne de Borrète, in 1325.

                     C. The Church has encouraged philosophy. To say nothing of the fact that all
                     those who applied themselves to science and philosophy in the Middle Ages
                     were churchmen, and that the liberal arts found an asylum in capitular and
                     monastic schools until the twelfth century, it is important to remark that the
                     principal universities of the Middle Ages were pontifical foundations. This was the
                     case with Paris. To be sure, in the first years of the university's aquaintance with
                     the Aristotelean encyclopaedia (late twelfth century) there were prohibitions
                     against reading the "Physics", the "Metaphysics", and the treatise "On the
                     Soul". But these restrictions were of a temporary character and arose out of
                     particular circumstanccs. In 1231, Gregory IX laid upon a commission of three
                     consultors the charge to prepare an amended edition of Aristotle "ne utile per
                     inutile vitietur" (lest what is useful suffer damage through what is useless). The
                     work of expurgatio. was done, in point of fact, by the Albertine-Thomist School,
                     and, beginning from the year 1255, the Faculty of Arts, with the knowledge of the
                     ecclesiastical authority, ordered the teaching of all the books previously
                     prohibited (see Mandonnet, "Siger de Brabant et l'averroïsme latin au XIIIe s.",
                     Louvain 1910). It might also be shown how in modern times and in our own day
                     the popes have encouraged philosophic studies. Leo XIII, as is well known,
                     considered the restoration of philosophic Thomism on of the chief tasks of his
                     pontificate.

                                    XI. THE TEACHING OF PHILOSOPHY

                     The methods of teaching philosophy have varied in various ages. Socrates used
                     to interview his auditors, and hold symposia in the market-place, on the porticoes
                     and in the public gardens. His method was interrogation, he whetted the curiosity
                     of the audience and practised what had become known as Socratic irony and the
                     maieutic art (maieutikê techne), the art of delivering minds of their conceptions.
                     His successor opened schools properly so called, and from the place occupied
                     by these schools several systems took their names (the Stoic School, the
                     Academy, the Lyceum). In the Middle Ages and down to the seventeenth century
                     the learned language was Latin. The German discourses of Eckhart are
                     mentioned as merely sporadic examples. From the ninth to the twelfth century
                     teaching was confined to the monastic and cathedral schools. It was the golden
                     age of schools. Masters and students went from one school to another: Lanfranc
                     travelled over Europe; John of Salisbury (twelfth century) heard at Paris all the
                     then famous professors of philosophy; Abelard gathered crowds about his
                     rostrum. Moreover: as the same subjects were taught everywhere, and from the
                     same text-books, scholastic wanderings were attended with few disadvantages.
                     The books took the form of commentaries or monographs. From the time of
                     Abelard a method came into use which met with great success, that of setting
                     forth the pros and cons of a question, which was later perfected by the addition of
                     a solutio. The application of this method was extended in the thirteenth century
                     (e.g. in the "Summa theologica" of St. Thomas). Lastly, philosophy being an
                     educational preparation for theology, the "Queen of the Sciences", philosophical
                     and theological topics were combined in one and the same book, or even in the
                     same lecture.

                     At the end of the twelfth century and the beginning of the thirteenth, the
                     University of Paris was organized, and philosophical teaching was concentrated
                     in the Faculty of Arts. Teaching was dominated by two principles:
                     internationalism and freedom. The student was an apprentice-professor: after
                     receiving the various degrees, he obtained from the chancellor of the university a
                     licence to teach (licentia docendi). Many of the courses of this period have been
                     preserved, the abbreviated script of the Middle Ages being virtually a
                     stenographic system. The programme of courses drawn up in 1255 is well
                     known: it comprises the exegesis of all the books of Aristotle. The commentary,
                     or lectio (from legere, to read), is the ordinary form of instruction (whence the
                     German Vorlesungen and the English lecture). There were also disputations, in
                     which questions were treated by means of objections and answers; the exercise
                     took a lively character, each one being invited to contribute his thoughts on the
                     subject. The University of Paris was the model for all the others, notably those of
                     Oxford and Cambridge. These forms of instruction in the universities lasted as
                     long as Aristoteleanism, i.e. until the seventeenth century. In the eighteenth
                     century - the siècle des lumières (Erklärung) - philosophy took a popular and
                     encyclopedic form, and was circulated in the literary productions of the period. In
                     the nineteenth century it resumed its didactic attitude in the universities and in
                     the seminaries, where, indeed its teaching had long continued. The advance of
                     philological and historical studies had a great influence on the character of
                     philosophical teaching: critical methods were welcomed, and little by little the
                     professors adopted the practice of specializing in this or that branch of
                     philosophy - a practice which is still in vogue. Without attempting to touch on
                     all the questions involved in modern methods of teaching philosophy, we shall
                     here indicate some of the principal features.

                     A. The Language of Philosophy

                     The earliest of the moderns - as Descartes or Leibniz - used both Latin and
                     the vernacular, but in the nineteenth century (except in ecclesiastical seminaries
                     and in certain academical exercises mainly ceremonial in character) the living
                     languages supplanted Latin; the result has been a gain in clearness of thought
                     and interest and vitality of teaching. Teaching in Latin too often contents itself
                     with formulae: the living language effects a better comprehension of things which
                     must in any case be difficult. Personal experience, writes Fr. Hogan, formerly
                     superior of the Boston Seminary, in his "Clerical Studies" (Philadelphia,
                     1895-1901), has shown that among students who have learned philosophy,
                     particularly Scholastic, only in Latin, very few have acquired anything more than
                     a mass of formulae, which they hardly understand; though this does not always
                     prevent their adhering to their formulae through thick and thin. Those who
                     continue to write in Latin - as many Catholic philosophers, often of the highest
                     worth, still do - have the sad experience of seeing their books confined to a very
                     narrow circle of readers.

                     B. Didactic Processes

                     Aristotle's advice, followed by the Scholastics, still retains its value and its force:
                     before giving the solution of a problem, expound the reasons for and against. This
                     explains, in particular, the great part played by the history of philosophy or the
                     critical examination of the solutions proposed by the great thinkers. Commentary
                     on a treatise still figures in some special higher courses; but contemporary
                     philosophical teaching is principally divided according to the numerous branches
                     of philosophy (see section II). The introduction of laboratories and practical
                     seminaries (séminaires practiques) in philosophical teaching has been of the
                     greatest advantage. Side by side with libraries and shelves full of periodicals
                     there is room for laboratories and museums, once the necessity of vivifying
                     philosophy by contact with the sciences is admitted (see section VIII). As for the
                     practical seminary, in which a group of students, with the aid of a teacher,
                     investigate to some special problem, it may be applied to any branch of
                     philosophy with remarkable results. The work in common, where each directs his
                     individual efforts towards one general aim, makes each the beneficiary of the
                     researches of all; it accustoms them to handling the instruments of research,
                     facilitates the detection of facts, teaches the pupil how to discover for himself the
                     reasons for what he observes, affords a real experience in the constructive
                     methods of discovery proper to each subject, and very often decides the
                     scientific vocation of those whose efforts have been crowned with a first success.

                     C. The Order of Philosophical Teaching

                     One of the most complex questions is: With what branch ought philosophical
                     teaching to begin, and what order should it follow? In conformity with an
                     immemorial tradition, the beginning is often made with logic. Now logic, the
                     science of science, is difficult to understand and unattractive in the earliest
                     stages of teaching. It is better to begin with the sciences which take the real for
                     their object: psychology, cosmology, metaphysics, and theodicy. Scientific logic
                     will be better understood later on; moral philosophy presupposes psychology;
                     systematic history of philosophy requires a preliminary acquaintance with all the
                     branches of philosophy (see Mercier, "Manuel de philosophie", Introduction, third
                     edition, Louvain, 1911).

                     Connected with this question of the order of teaching is another: viz. What should
                     be the scientific teaching preliminary to philosophy? Only a course in the
                     sciences specially appropriate to philosophy can meet the manifold exigencies of
                     the problem. The general scientific courses of our modern universities include too
                     much or too little: "too much in the sense that professional teaching must go into
                     numerous technical facts and details with which philosophy has nothing to do;
                     too little, because professional teaching often makes the observation of facts its
                     ultimate aim, whilst, from our standpoint, facts are, and can be, only a means, a
                     starting-point, towards acquiring a knowledge of the most general causes and
                     laws" (Mercier, "Rapport sur les études supérieures de philosophie", Louvain,
                     1891, p. 25). M. Boutroux, a professor at the Sorbonne, solves the problem of
                     philosophical teaching at the university in the same sense, and, according to
                     him, the flexible and very liberal organization of the faculty of philosophy should
                     include "the whole assemblage of the sciences, whether theoretic,
                     mathematico-physical, or philologico-historical" ("Revue internationale de
                     l'enseignement", Paris, 1901, p. 51O). The programme of courses of the Institute
                     of Philosophy of Louvain is drawn up in conformity with this spirit.

                                          XII. BIBLIOGRAPHY

                     GENERAL WORKS. - MERCIER, Cours de philosophie. Logique. Criteriologie
                     générale. Ontologie. Psychologie (Louvain, 1905-10); NYS, Cosmologie (Louvain,
                     1904); Stonyhurst Philosophical Series: - CLARKE, Logic (London, 1909);
                     JOHN RICKABY, First Principles of Knowledge (London, 1901); JOSEPH
                     RICKABY, Moral Philosophy (London, 1910); BOEDDER, Natural Theology
                     (London, 1906); MAHER, Psychology (London, 1909); JOHN RICKABY, General
                     Metaphysics (London, 1909); WALKER, Theories of Knowledge (London,
                     1910-); ZIGLIARA, Summa philos. (Paris); SCHIFFINI, Principia philos. (Turin);
                     URRABURU, Institut. philosophiae (Valladolid); IDEM, Compend. phil. schol.
                     (Madrid); Philosophia Locensis: - PASCH, Inst. Logicales (Freiburg, 1888);
                     IDEM, Inst. phil. natur. (Freiburg, 1880); IDEM, Inst. psychol. (Freiburg, 1898);
                     HONTHEIM, Inst. theodicaeae; MEYER, Inst. iuris notur.; DOMET DE VORGEs,
                     Abrégé de métaophysique (Paris); FAROES, Etudes phil. (Paris); GUTBERLET,
                     Lehrbuch der Philos. Logik und Erkenntnistheorie, Algemeine Metaphys.,
                     Naturphilos., Die psychol., Die Theodicee, Ethik u. Naturrecht, Ethik u. Religion
                     (Münster, 1878-85); RABIER, Leçons de phil. (Paris); WINDELBAND with the
                     collaboration of LIEBMANN, WUNDT, LIPPS, BAUSH, LASK, RICKERT,
                     TROELTSCH, and GROOS, Die Philos. im Beginn des zwanzigsten Jahrhund.
                     (Heidelberg); Systematische Philosophie by DILTHEY, RIEHL, WUNDT,
                     OSTWALD, EBBINGHAUS, EUCKEM, PAULSEN, and MUNCH; LIPPS, Des
                     Gesamtwerkers, Die Kultur der Gegenwärt (Leipzig), pt. I, vi; DE WULF, tr.
                     COFFEY, Scholasticism Old and New. An Introduction to Neo-Scholastic
                     Philosophy (Dublin, 1907); KULPE, Einleitung in die Philos. (Leipzig); WUNDT,
                     Einleitung in die Philos. (Leipzig); HARPER, The Metaphysics of the School
                     (London, 1879-84).

                     DICTIONARIES. - BALDWIN, Dict. of Philosophy and Psychology (London,
                     1901-05); FRANCE, Dict. des sciences Phil. (Paris, 1876); EISLER, Wörterbuch
                     der Philosoph. Begriffe (Berlin, 1899); Vocabulaire technique et critique de Phil.,
                     in course of publication by the Soc. française do philosophie.

                     COLLECTIONS. - Bibliothèque de l'Institut supérieur de Philosophie;
                     PEILLAUBE, Bibl. de Phil. expérimentale (Paris); RIVIERE, Bibl. de Phil.
                     contemporaine (Paris); Coll. historique des grands Philosophes (Paris); LE BON,
                     Bibl. de Philosophie scientif. (Paris); PIAT, Les grands Philosophes (Paris);
                     Philosophische Bibliothek (Leipzig).

                     PERIODICAL PUBLICATIONS. - Mind, a quarterly review of psychology and
                     Philosophy (London, 1876-); The Philosoph. Rev. (New York, 1892-); Internat.
                     Jour. of Ethics (Philadelphia); Proc. of Aristotelian Society (London, 1888-);
                     Rev. Neo-scholastique de Phil. (Louvain, 1894-); Rev. des sciences phil. et
                     théol. (Paris) Revue Thomiste (Toulouse, 1893-); Annales de Philosophie Chret.
                     (Paris, 1831-); Rev. de Philos. (Paris); Philosophisches Jahrbuch (Fulda);
                     Zeitschr. für Philos. und Philosophische Kritik, formerly Fichte-Utrisische
                     Zeitschr. (Leipzig, 1847-); Kantstudien (Berlin, 1896-); Arch. f. wissehoftliche
                     Philos. und Soziologie (Leipzig, 1877-); Arch. f. systematische Philos. (Berlin,
                     1896); Arch. f. Gesch. d. Philos. (Berlin, 1888-); Rev. Phil. de la France et de
                     l'Etranger (Paris, 1876-); Rev. de métaph. et de morale (Paris, 1894-);
                     Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte (Amsterdam, 1907-); Riv. di filosofio
                     neo-scholastico (Florence, 1909-); Rivisto di filosofia (Modena).

                     DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY. - Methods. - MARIETAN, Le probème de la
                     classification des sciences d'Aristote d S. Thomas (Paris, 1901); WILLMANN,
                     Didaktik (Brunswick, 1903).

                     GENERAL HISTORY. - UEBERWEG, Hist. of Philosophy, tr. HARRIS (New
                     York, 1875-76); ERDMANN, Hist. of Phil. (London, 1898); WINDELBAND, Hist.
                     of Phil. (New York, 1901); TURNER, Hist. of Phil. (Boston, 1903); WILLMANN,
                     Gesch. des Idealismus (Brunswick, 1908); ZELLER, Die Philos. der Griechen
                     (Berlin), tr. ALLEYNE, RETEHEL, GOODWIN, COSTELLOE, and MUIRHEAD
                     (London); DE WULF, Hist. of Mediaeval Phil. (London, 1909; Paris, Tubingen,
                     and Florence, 1912); WINDELRAND, Gesch. der neueren Philos. (Leipzig,
                     1872-80), tr. TUFTS (New York, 1901); HOFFDING, Den nyere Filosofis Historie
                     (Copenhagen, 1894), tr. MAYER, A Hist. of Mod. Phil. (London, 1900); FISHER,
                     Geschichte der neueren Philosophie (Heidelberg, 1889-1901); STÖCKL,
                     Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie (Mainz, 1888; tr. in part by FINLAY,
                     Dublin, 1903); WEBER, History of Philosophy, tr. THILLY (New York, 1901).

                     CONTEMPORARY HISTORY. - EUCKEN, Geistige Strömungen der Gegenwart
                     (Leipzig, 1901); WINDELBAND, Die Philos. im Beginn d. XX. Jahr., I
                     (Heidelberg); CALDERON, Les courants phil. dans l'Amérique Latine (Heidelberg,
                     1909); CEULEMANS, Le mouvement phil. en Amérique in Rev. néo-scholast.
                     (Nov., 1909); BAUMANN, Deutsche u. ausserdeutsche Philos. der letzen
                     Jahrzehnte (Gotha, 1903).

                     PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY. - HEITZ, Essai hist. sur les rapp. entre la
                     philosophie et la foi de Bérenger de Tours à S. Thomas (Paris, 1909);
                     BRUNHES, La foi chrét. et la pil. au temps de la renaiss. caroling. (Paris, 1903);
                     GRABMANN, Die Gesch. der scholast. methode (Freiburg, 1909).

                     Maurice De Wulf
                     Transcribed by Kevin Cawley

                                       The Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume XII
                                    Copyright © 1911 by Robert Appleton Company
                                    Online Edition Copyright © 1999 by Kevin Knight
                                  Nihil Obstat, June 1, 1911. Remy Lafort, S.T.D., Censor
                                 Imprimatur. +John Cardinal Farley, Archbishop of New York

The Catholic Encyclopedia: NewAdvent.org