Universals

The name refers on the one hand to the inclination towards uniformity

(uni-versus) existing in different things, in virtue of which different things may be

represented by a single idea applicable to all in the same way; and on the other

hand to this one idea which is applicable to the different things (unum versus

alia).

DEFINITION

Universals are those ideas which, while excluding whatever constitutes the

difference of things of the same genus or species, represent that which is

necessary to their constitution, is essential, and is therefore common to all,

remaining fixed in all vicissitudes (universalia post rem, in re). Universals are thus

mere]y an expression of those Divine ideas which are concerned with the

universal (universalia ante rem) . Universal ideas are opposed to sense

impressions, which represent that which is merely individual and contingent in a

concrete phenomenon, and thus that which changes with circumstances in

corporeal things of the same kind. These sense impressions correspond to those

Divine ideas which are concerned with the corporeal individual.

SUBDIVISION

In so far as the nature of a thing is the object of a direct act of perception, it

contains no relation to individuals, but is recognized in itself only according to its

essential parts. When, however, the intellect has represented to itself the

essential form of a thing (whether this be a substance or an accident), it can by

reflection make this representation of the essence the object of its perception. It

can apply the idea to various individuals of the same kind, can compare it with

other ideas, and thus determine relationship and differences. The universale

directum thus appears as an embryo, which is developed, ever more clearly

arranged, and constantly more nearly perfected by reflection and various logical

operations. It is but another way from the imperfect idea which an entomologist

formed when as a boy he first saw an ant, to that perfected idea of the animal

which he now possesses as the result of all his investigations and studies.

The means to arrive at a perfect idea and an exact definition is the clear

distinction between the parts of a thing, which are grasped directly, if obscurely,

by the perception. It should here be remarked that our intellect proceeds from the

more general and thus less precise ideas to the less general and more precise.

In the direct recognition of a corporeal being, it grasps first its reality, the idea of

existence. This is the most universal of all ideas, but it is no true universal, since

existence pertains to different things in different ways, and consequently cannot

be predicated equivocally of all of them. While the senses are grasping what is

individual in the phenomena, the intellect presses onward to the essence or

nature of the thing, and grasps especially that which is most universal, its

independence, and forms the idea of substance. It simultaneously seizes the

notes of existence pertaining to and borne by the substance (accidents), which

in the individual phenomenon are the object of the senses. Meanwhile it does not

escape the intellect that quality and quantity are possessed by the substance

which they determine in an entirely different way from the actio (action) and

passio (passion), and these again in an entirely different way from the ubi (where)

and quando (when), and that relation stands on the extreme border of accidental

existence. In short, it grasps the various modes of existence of the

above-mentioned accidents in the first substance. It thus comes that the idea of

an accident is only analogous, like that of substance, and that it has no greater

claim than this to be considered a true universal. The case is otherwise with the

idea of substance and the ideas of the individual accidents mentioned above.

They are the most universal of universals in the true sense of the word.

If these ideas be applied with the help of reflection to individuals, they become

the highest predicates (categories) of concrete substance, and prove also the

highest ideas of genera. The intellect is not yet satisfied. If possible, it proceeds

step by step from the highest and least determinate idea of genus to the lowest

and most determinate, which represents that which is common to two

immediately related kinds. Only then is it possible to form a clear and distinct

idea of species. This having been accomplished, one can distinguish the

difference constituting the species, and by noting this lowest species and this

difference, supply an exact definition. But in many cases, the intellect must

remain content with the greatest possible approximation to the definition. For this

purpose are employed description, the characteristics, explanation, and

discussion. The final object in this is to give the lowest clearly recognizable

species and that which, in the notes added to the substance, is proper

(proprium, idion) to all the individuals of the same kind. Consequently, the

connection of the accidents with the substance must be established to discover

which of those accidents necessarily and of themselves arise from the substance

(and from this alone), as speech in the case of man. Other properties are to be

referred to fortuitous external influences, as lameness in the case of individual

men. We thus obtain the logical accident, which indeed must be distinguished

from the metaphysical, which, in accordance with what was said above, may be

a proprium, or logical accident. One may even inquire into the genus, species,

and specific difference of a metaphysical accident (e.g. of continued quantity).

In summary

According to their origin in a direct act of perception or in reflection, universals

are divided into direct and reflex universals.

The direct universal, waiving, as it does, the question of the reality of the

perceived being in nature, is metaphysical. In it lies only the possibility of being

applied to many things, but the relation of universality is not recognized in it.

Consequently, it is also known as the "material universal".

The reflex universal includes the relation to individuals, and is thus known as the

universale logicum, or also as the "formal universal", since it is recognized as

universal.

The universale directum is divided into the categories, since these represent the

various modes of existence in the actual being. Recognized by reflection as the

highest species, the categories are included under the universale logicum, which

is divided into the five predicables: genus, species, specific difference, proprium,

and logical accident.

IMPORTANCE OF THE PROBLEM OF THE UNIVERSALS

Science in general, inasmuch as it is the knowledge of the necessary and

permanent drawn from the nature of things, is impossible without the recognition

of the universals. Without such recognition, it is degraded into the description of

successive individual impressions. The war between the pure Darwinists and the

physicists, who recognize natural species which, in consequence of their mode

of development and the influence of conditions, can be arranged into various

systematic species, has been already designated a new phase of the Scholastic

controversy concerning universals. In physics and chemistry the constancy of

the laws of nature depends on the constancy of the nature of things. In

psychology the existence of universals has led to the recognition of the intellect

as a faculty fundamentally distinct from the senses. It is self-evident that

metaphysics and logic would be an impossibility without universals. Without

universals, ethics and aesthetics would also be surrendered to a relativism

ungoverned by principles, and thus to annihilation. Without universals,

impressionism in art and individual autonomy in life must attain undisputed sway.

To these tendencies correspond in religion the exclusive validity of religious

experiences, the belief in the changing content of dogmas, and the complete

displacement of dogmatic by historical mode of thought. A history of the

controversy concerning the universals and their relation to existence must

necessarily be a presentation of the most fundamental differences of all

philosophical systems. It would reveal that a deviation from Aristotelean

Thomistic moderate Realism leads, on the one side, over Conceptualism and

Nominalism to Scepticism and Agnosticism, or to barren Empiricism and

Materialism, and on the other side over extreme Realism to false Idealism and

Pantheism.

Alois Pichler

Transcribed by Tomas Hancil

The Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume XV

Nihil Obstat, October 1, 1912. Remy Lafort, S.T.D., Censor

Imprimatur. +John Cardinal Farley, Archbishop of New York

The Catholic Encyclopedia: NewAdvent.org